THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 3 SEPTEMBER Vol. XLII

THE BRISTOL CONFERENCE, 1952

By The Editor

THE 35th Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Bristol, September 8—12, 1952, in the congenial and hospitable environment of Wills Hall. *Christianity To-day: Challenge and Response* was the theme selected for the Conference. After the Conference sermon, preached by Professor H. H. Walsh of McGill University, Montreal, our President, Sir Henry Self, delivered his presidential address on the duty and opportunity of the Church of England in the existing religious situation. After the daily service of Holy Communion the following twelve papers were read and discussed :

The Contemporary Social Environment of Christianity by E. F. Carpenter, M.A., B.D., Ph.D., Canon of Westminster.

Dogmatic Religion and the Climate of Our Time by Canon L. W. Grensted, D.D.

Christian Moral Standards and Contemporary Life by F. A. Piachaud, M.A., B.D.

The Aims, Methods and Results of Religious Broadcasting by Francis House, M.A., Head of Religious Broadcasting, B.B.C.

Religion in the Universities by M. B. Foster, M.A., Wilde Lecturer in Religion, Oxford.

Christian Strategy by C. S. Milford, M.C., M.A., Secretary C.M.S.

Revelation, Inspiration and Faith by H. D. Lewis, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, University College, Bangor.

The Present State of Biblical Studies by Professor S. G. F Brandon, M.A., D.D., University of Manchester.

The Christian Vocabulary : the Problem of Communication by Howard E. Root, B.A., Senior Demy of Magdalen College, Oxford.

The Christian Challenge to Science by C. D. Curling, M.A. Lecturer in Physics, King's College, London.

The Challenge of Contemporary Philosophy by Canon I. T Ramsey, Nolloth Professor, Oxford.

The Christian Response to Change by D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A. Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford.

This many-sided handling of the Conference theme by a distinguished body of Christian thinkers provided arresting interest from first to last, for which the Conference owes a debt of gratitude to its Chairman, the Rev. A. W. Adams, Dean of Divinity Magdalen College, Oxford. The discussions reached and maintained a remarkably high level in which, notwithstanding their seriousness, the gift of humour was conspicuous. The Conference attendance was gratifying, and our President commented on the increase in the proportion of clergy present.

Although on occasions emphatic assertions and denials marked our papers and discussions, our debates and criticisms were controlled by the underlying consciousness of our membership of the only Church in Christendom which, as Edmund Burke, emphasized, 'professes fallibility.'

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

esidential Address to the 35th Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen at istol on September 8th, 1952, by Sir HENRY SELF, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., B.D. (President of the Modern Churchmen's Union).

CHRISTIANITY TO-DAY: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

THE purpose of this Conference is to offer a constructive contribution to the critical need of to-day — a living religion. llowing the two world wars, there has developed inevitably a rld-wide uneasiness that the traditional religious institutions ve failed. This sense of uncertainty has led to two opposed ndencies — yet both towards authoritarianism as the means of cape from the problems of the age, and both offering refuge in gma and the subordination of the individual. Romanism and mmunism express the extremes of emphasis — the one as the isting of religion into blind faith in the Church, and the other as e fanatical subordination of the individual to the State in search a material paradise.

This amazing development of two opposed arks of refuge from situation deemed by many to be beyond man's ability to control, s been complicated by the development of the concept of the elfare State. This, while overwhelmingly right in principle, yet reatens in its application under present conditions, to misguide e peoples into belief in life here on this planet as an end in elf — as, indeed, the only end for a humanity entitled in its n right to easy conditions and a high standard of living with a nimum of effort, and without the merest shadow of frustration. en tend to forget that frustration is the call to achievement and such a necessary function of personality; they mistake the ans for the end; they seek here what can obviously only be ılized hereafter; they prefer ease to struggle; they rush to surnder the substance of that destiny which struggle offers hereafter grasping at the shadow of easy circumstances here plus guaran-d protection from the cradle to the grave.

The Welfare State is sound in principle, and the first instalnts already introduced must be welcomed by all right thinking n and women. But its dangers for the spiritual life of humanity e so patent as to justify the warning that its premature develop-nt would threaten spiritual degeneration if pursued as an end itself; rather it must come progressively as the natural expres-n of high-minded peoples actively realizing a spiritual destiny.

The most grievous tendency of the age is in fact towards scientific materialism misguidedly seeking, as the be-all and end all, a workless heaven on earth for future generations who will have done nothing towards it and will clearly, having regard to the manifest evil strains in human nature, not have attained the perfect state of character so necessary for life in a perfect world. The only way in which this tendency, and the other danger already mentioned, can be met is by recalling mankind to religious faith in a spiritual destiny to be sought by achievement in the face of difficulties and inspired by a strength from on high.

In short, what is needed is a living religion which brings home to everyone a sense of destiny and of personal responsibility to seek it here and now. Every man is 'the Adam of his own soul.' Arks of refuge may survive the floods, but they cannot provide permanent schools for soul-making. Welfare States may promote proper living conditions, but they cannot provide for mortal bodies a substitute for that spiritual immortality which they should strive to advance for the souls developing within those bodies. Without real living religion the human race may well be heading for ultimate disaster, because it is drifting towards mirages instead of being steered towards the vital objectives of spiritual destiny.

This is the situation as we find it to-day. This is the challenge which this Conference is asked to recognize and towards which we are hoping to find the response. The Anglican Church is uniquely situated to serve as the spearhead of just such a movement, and it is the privilege of the Modern Churchmen's Union to seek to make a constructive contribution to the response which should be forthcoming from free and untrammelled exercise of the Divine Gift of Reason as the ally of Intuition inspired by Revelation.

II. The Modernist Conception of Religion

For insight into the Modernist approach, one cannot do better than turn to the considered statements of that champion and pioneer of Modernism, Dr. H. D. A. Major. He has given us a classic presentation of the basic issues in his U.S.A. Nobel Lectures published by the Harvard University Press in 1927 under the title *English Modernism*. I have drawn heavily on this work in thinking through this address, and would urge you all to read it as an inspired treatment of the problem. The critical note is immediately struck in the Introduction:

> 'By the English Modernist true Christianity is seen as the product of the operation in human history of the Spirit that was in Jesus Christ and the aim of the English Modernist is to set free that Spirit from those archaic dogmatic shackles and ecclesiastical burdens, great and grievous

to be borne, which are hindering it from exerting its full and proper influence in the modern world.'

'The supreme authority for the Modernist is not that of the hurch but of the Spirit.' The Modernist creed is based on belief God as Spirit, through Whom men can become the sons of God llowing in the steps of their Leader and Prototype, Jesus Christ. *C'est un des grands principes du Christianisme, que tout ce qui t arrivé à Jésus Christ doit se passer dans l'âme et dans le corps chaque Chrétien*' (quoted, *op. cit.*, p. 139); so spoke that early postle of Modernism within the Roman Church — Blaise Pascal. et this is not to join hands with the older Unitarian formula in garding Jesus as merely an outstanding prophet and great ader; neither should we fall into the older Trinitarian attitude nich indubitably tended to establish the heresy of Tritheism or ree Gods. It is possible that the Modernist approach opens up e way whereby 'the newer Unitarian' and 'the newer Trinirian' may well reach a higher synthesis, in the thought of 'God Transcendent, Incarnate, Immanent,' *i.e.* of 'God in Creation, Christ, and in Conscience' (*op. cit.*, p. 105).

This is indeed to present Christianity as the Religion of the pirit of God — active both in the physical Universe and in the ner lives of human beings. Through His life-giving Spirit, God fers Revelation of Himself and His Creation. But the Revelan covers all forms of spiritual culture and enterprise and the esponse, tempered as it is by the individual capacity, alone nits and qualifies the experience and understanding which are so ndered possible. For the Modernist,

> 'Revelation is implied in the very structure of the human mind so that the processes of thought, conscience, affection, truly understood, involve the recognition of the Infinite and Eternal' (*op. cit.*, p. 119).

s Modernists, we should be willing to follow wherever Reason ads; to see Science, Art and Philosophy as equally paths of sponse to Revelation if sincerely pursued; to trust to Reason as e interpreter of Intuition, provided always

> 'Reason be understood to include not merely intellectual conclusions, but also moral and spiritual judgments' (*op. cit.*, p. 123).

Yet central to all is the belief in Jesus Christ, as the very title Christianity denotes. A living Religion must be focused rough a living Personal relationship; for the Christian believer is is based on the conviction

> 'that he has in Jesus, His Personality, His Gospel, His Spirit, the unveiling of the Divine nature in its innermost moral and spiritual aspect' (*op. cit.*, p. 147).

The destiny of man and his relationship to God are revealed and inspired by

> 'man's possession of that moral, rational, and spiritual nature which is essentially Divine and is most perfectly perceived in Jesus, Who is not only the unveiling or reflection of God to man, but also at the same time the human moral and spiritual ideal which man was created to achieve' (*op. cit.*, p. 153).

It required the 'the powerful dialectic and weighty erudition of Dean Rashdall' to establish the basis of Anglican orthodoxy as involving the belief in the pre-existence of the Logos which was incarnated in Jesus, but not in the pre-existence of the human personality of Jesus. This aspect of the Person of Jesus Christ, as the Prototype of humanity, must have critical significance for the Christian doctrine of the origin, nature and destiny of man.

Yet, the Christianity of the future will only find its true expression if it emphasises, in line with orthodox theology both in the Old and the New Testament, that man is akin to God in his innermost spiritual nature; and, as such, is potentially a son of God. In Jesus, we see perfectly manifested the kinship of God and Man, and it is through the Eternal Christ as the Spirit of God indwelling Jesus and the Focus of spiritual humanity, that the Christian finds both the vision of his destiny and the energy for its attainment. Dare the Modernist repeat for the future this orthodox teaching of the past and add, with Dr. Major, that 'it follows that the indwelling of God in Jesus Christ differs in degree, but not in kind, from the Divine Indwelling in sons of men who are potentially sons of God'? (*op cit.*, p. 159).

The Church to-day seems to be reduced to preaching ethics because of the uncertainty as to what doctrinal teaching can be offered in the light of modern scientific and historical knowledge. Such uncertainty, if continued indefinitely, must be fatal to the Church's aspirations. Christianity can only claim to be distinctive insofar as it is focused on the Eternal Christ; and it is only through that distinction that it can offer itself confidently as the religion of the future. Let us, with St. Paul, turn from Jesus of Nazareth to the Eternal Christ Who is to be identified both with the Spirit of God active within the human soul and with the Spirit of Nature so manifest in the creation and control of the physical world. Was it not Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, who identified the Spirit of Nature with Newton's Ether? Is there not hope to-day of reconciliation along some such lines between science and religion when the physical universe is found in the ultimate to be the manifestation of fields of energy under ordered control?

III. The Essence of Religion

It is idle of the Christian seeking the road of the future, to ignore the lessons of Comparative Religion as the study of religious growth over the ages. From a mass of evidence, three major principles seem to be more or less the outcome of the highest development of the main religions, *viz.*:

(i) belief in God, as the Ultimate Principle and Ground, active both in the physical universe and in the soul of man. It is the realization of this identity of ground which provides the first basis of religious philosophy everywhere, just as it should (if properly understood) for pure philosophy and for the philosophy of science;

(ii) though screened from the human soul by the temporary habitation of a body in communication with the physical environment through the senses, there is a controlling spiritual world focused on God and itself the place of destiny for souls partly-fashioned in this present vale of soul-making; and

(iii) it is the duty of each and every individual to be concerned through life here with 'the warding of the inner man,' *i.e.* the ordering of life so that the best experience of which the particular individual is capable, may be gathered and assimilated; but it is a cardinal and parallel principle that this 'warding' turns primarily on self-sacrifice in service for the community. 'He who seeks to save his soul shall lose it.' Egotistic concentration, whether in the world or in the monastery, is the way of perversion; the ego must be overcome that the soul may live.

All three principles find their highest expression and possibility of realization in Christianity which can without offence offer itself as the religion which brings to a clear focus all the vital truths and values for which the religious history of man has contended, whatever the race or age. Moreover, it is essentially positive in character, and as such holds the greatest promise for the future, so pregnant with hope and possibility, provided always the wranglings and jealousies of nations can be saved by a timely religious revival, from degenerating into a third and even more catastrophic world war.

IV. The Status of the Anglican Church

If this then is the Modernist approach, why do we as members of this Union attach such importance to its development through

the Church of England? There are many reasons, but the three outstanding are

(*a*) our belief in the unique tradition of that Church, its rich heritage both of thought and practice, and its flair for holding the balance justly between the extreme positions;

(*b*) its prestige and status among the Protestant Churches. If Reunion of those Churches is to come — and without it there can be no living Christianity of the future — it must come through the mediation of the Church of England.

(*c*) modern re-presentation of Christianity must be believed in, and actively pressed, by the ministers and clergy from within the Churches : the organization of the Anglican Church lends itself particularly to this and would ensure the means of inter-communion and collaboration with other Churches throughout the parishes given the will to lead. The Modern Churchmen's Union believes its task is primarily towards the clergy and thinking laity of the Church of England as the spearhead of a movement towards the re-presentation of Christianity as a living faith, necessarily having roots in the past, but concentrating its efforts to-day on providing a basis for the religion of the future.

It would be impossible to blink the glorious possibilities of that future, given a modicum of faith and a demonstration to thinking men and women that Christianity has a valid basis which lends itself to development and heightened expression in step with, and through the application of, modern scientific and historical research. A prominent Modernist lamented recently that his colleagues in the senior common room of an Oxford college reacted with concealed but definite boredom to items of current theological research : that reveals very clearly the extent to which the Anglican Church has been living too much in the past and the general belief that it has no message for the future. The situation is of course largely attributable to the success with which the Anglo-Catholics have stormed the key positions in the organization : now that they are in responsible possession of the inheritance, they find with dismay that they have emptied the churches. It is little use complaining to the faithful : ' Why do you attend in such small numbers? ' The situation requires a drastic stock-taking preparatory to a new crusade — but a crusade of the spirit, not of outmoded dogma and ritual.

For fifteen hundred years the Church of England has interpreted the meaning of life to the English-speaking peoples and served as the focus of their spiritual destinies. The maintenance

of that position in the future depends on whether the clergy — who alone can open up the promise — will face the clear duty to re-express Christianity in terms of modern thought and so shape it as the religion of the future.

V. Other Worldliness and the Sense of Destiny

The particular theme I am asked to stress in this introduction to the Conference is the fact of the opportunity which is involved in the challenge of modern life to the status of Christianity: the greater the challenge, the greater the opportunity! All thinking people are convinced that far-reaching developments are pending for the reshaping of society, its mode of life and its ideals. The moulding force of this period of reconstruction should be, indeed must be for a hopeful issue, a revivified Christianity.

To capture the initiative the Modernist urges a turning forward to the future, instead of over-concentration on the past. For this two basic themes are necessary, *viz.*:

(*a*) Emphasis on the fact of the spiritual world as controlling the visible universe. Existence here can never be an end in itself. Natural law is subordinate to spiritual values. The status of the physical world can only be determined by spiritual insight: then it is seen, so far as humanity is concerned, to be a school, and normally a hard school, for the shaping of souls. This conclusion leads to the second.

(*b*) Man must recapture his sense of destiny both for the individual and the race. The modern tendency to agnostic resignation blunts spiritual enterprise and leads to acceptance of physical death as the end for the individual, whose efforts (so inexplicably altruistic) can only be directed to establishing an earthly paradise for later generations — a prospect ruined from the start by the obvious strains of evil tendencies in human nature. Spiritual insight not only looks beyond the grave for reasonable opportunity to develop the process of growth started here, but sees meanwhile through the curtain of the material environment to the higher realm of spiritual life.

The newer generation to-day is overcoming the inherited inhibitions provoked by recent world events, and is straining towards a future which they feel can be truly great. With its emphasis on Other Worldliness and its vision of Destiny, Christianity can meet the challenge and offer itself in modern dress as the religion of developing Personality seeking to achieve spiritual values in everyday life.

THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. Edward Carpenter, M.A., B.D., Ph.D.
Canon of Westminster

IT is a commonplace to affirm in these days that we cannot consider a religion apart from its social *milieu*, and we cannot do this because it moulds, and is moulded by, the environment in which it finds itself. Whatever be the hidden origins of the specifically religious response — and they are probably various — few will deny that in the early days religion was actively concerned with making it possible for man to control the mysterious forces which pressed in upon him. Storm and tempest, the untamed creatures around him, the aching need for food — these presented him with practical problems which he must do something about if he were physically to survive. Religion provided him with a technique by which he could make the universe, if not friendly, at least less hostile, for by it he could co-operate with the hidden powers, operating in the world, to bring about seed time and harvest. Thus the social organization of the tribe, and the whole pattern of its life, were inextricably bound up with its religion, and the one could not be separated from the other. True it is that the development of religion is accompanied by a differentiation of the individual from the group, and the transference of interest from the physical world without to the spiritual universe within; but the deep psychological urge, which demands that man be made to feel at home in his world, whether it be here and now or in some more distant Elysium, remains. Man is by his very nature a social animal, and therefore society is not accidental to him, but is the condition of his physical and spiritual life. Thus in the depths of his own soul, a man is influenced, willy nilly, by the society in which he lives, and when this happens at levels lower than his own awareness of it, he can do little about it. At higher levels, when he is seeking through his own religious faith, and by an exercise of his will, to re-orientate the shape of his life, he necessarily introduces into that environment another controlling factor which helps to make it what it is.

Perhaps this can be illustrated from the distinction which is so often made between the psychology of East and West. It is significant that the Hebrew emphasis on the dynamic will of God, and on the universe as being His handiwork, has led to that attitude towards it which has made modern science possible; and

this, together with Greek thought, has bred a particular response to life which has shaped the pattern of Western culture. On the other hand, the Eastern philosophies which have refrained from exploiting the universe either for the pleasure or the ruin of man, and which, by and large, have tended to withdraw from the world, have not because of this failed to leave their mark on the social pattern. Quite the reverse. The more static forms of Eastern society, preserving in some areas a caste system, represent a strange amalgam of economic conditioning, perpetuated by a particular religious psychology.

There is, perhaps, in spite of some trends in contemporary theology, no need to labour the point. Religion, on the one hand, springs from a desire to master the environment without or within; it is an effort to deal with a given situation. Yet, on the other hand, in its very effort to do so, it becomes itself a conditioning factor in the whole social structure — and this happens equally in the world-renouncing as the world-controlling religions. The latter may consciously seek to direct society to certain ends: the former, by breeding a particular attitude to life, equally affects the cultural and political pattern. Nor must we forget that the beliefs of most men are most powerfully moved not by conscious propaganda but what is assumed in the kind of society in which they live. They derive their scale of values from the spiritual and mental atmosphere they breathe.

It is for these reasons that the Christian faith cannot hope to commend itself unrelated to the social environment in which men live and move and have their being. Even if we were to accept the dangerous words of Werner Wiesner—'The Church has only an indirect relation to the organization of secular society. Its aim is to preach to the world that redemption which lies in a new, God-given world; but it cannot be its primary mission to organize, maintain or improve the world'—even, I say, if we were to accept these words it would not alter the facts to which I have already drawn attention. So long as we live in the flesh, even if we inhabit what Wiesner calls 'the God-given world,' we continue to live as social creatures in time: we make relations with our fellow-mortals day by day, and experience moral compulsions. And this is particularly true of those who find their guiding star in a faith which professes an incarnational philosophy, and proclaims that this world is God's world, which 'in the beginning He created.' Thus in the Old Testament we see that the 'social Gospel' became a reality in the minds of the prophets: they thought of the Kingdom in terms of social relationships, and the idiom through which they conveyed religious truth was taken from the pattern of their

corporate life. The writ of God, they were certain, must run through the whole sphere of the national life. Jesus, again, assumes this social background in all his teaching, both in using such terms as 'Shepherd' and 'Father' in respect of God, and also in welding his disciples into a recognizable brotherhood. So it was natural that Paul, who could not of course equate the Christian community with the Roman Empire, should yet create small, intense groups, composed of Jew and Greek, barbarian, bond and free, in order to provide a social *milieu*. He could not, like John Donne, think of love without a 'body.' True, he had some difficulty in translating the pastoral idiom of Jesus into the thought forms of the urban population of the Romano-Greek world, yet because he could not for the moment transform the world, he created a new field of social relationships within which the Christians might live their days. It was not so much a withdrawal from the world as the frank recognition of a contemporary situation, and the calling of a new one into existence to redress the balance of the old.

And so throughout the history of Christendom there has always been this concern, no matter how misconceived at times, with the life of man here and now: so much so that the monasticism of the anchorite soon gave way to the Benedictine community, which did, perhaps, more than anything else to save civilization when the Roman Empire collapsed. Surely it is one of the paradoxes of history that a movement which began as a protest against society should later come forward to protect it when it was threatened. Does it not draw particular attention to the social reference inherent in our religion?

Throughout the Middle Ages we find evidence of the same story; of the efforts to translate the Christian faith into practical, everyday terms, and to make a society in which its outward and visible manifestations reflect inward and spiritual truths. We are not concerned here with the success or failure of this endeavour; with whether the identification of the Church and a particular social pattern was good or bad; but simply with the fact that it was unthinkable that the Christian Church should live its life isolated and unheeding of the 'world.' It must either make its own society, within a resistant social pattern (as in Paul), or it must seek to saturate the whole pattern (as in the Middle Ages) and so to direct it. What happened to a serf on his lord's estate, or to a srip holder who invades another man's land, or a merchant who sells his wares in the market above the 'just price'—this was just as much a concern of the Church as the heretic who makes free with his pen. At least that was the theory of it.

And so we come to our modern age, which in a measure was ushered in at the Renaissance and Reformation, and whose distinguishing characteristic has been an increasing application of scientific techniques to all realms of human life. We have not time, and anyhow it is unnecessary, to sketch the development of this new world through the changed attitude to economic enterprise worked out by Adam Smith; nor need we notice in detail the changes in industrial and social enterprises which the machine has made possible. What we *must* notice, however, and it is particularly relevant to this paper, is that the social life of men in this country has been transformed beyond all recognition from what it was even a hundred years ago, and that this change has increased in tempo during the last fifty years. If we had to express this transformation in one word we should, without hesitation, call it 'urbanization,' physically and mentally. The balance of population, so far as town and country is concerned, has been increasingly changing since the Industrial Revolution, until now it is reckoned that 80 per cent. of our people live in urban or suburban areas. The problem of feeding the increased populations of the world has of itself contributed to this concentration, by placing the emphasis necessarily on increased production at all costs, often when this can only be done at the expense of other human values. The pattern of an industrial society is largely determined by the scientific techniques which modern industry must needs employ.

The manifold effects of this increasing urbanization I need not dwell upon, when speaking to an audience of this kind: but I cannot forbear quoting from a significant book written by Professor Alan Loveday, *The Only Way* — and remember that he writes as an economist:

> 'One factor of major importance which no doubt accounts in certain countries to a large extent both for the depth of fear, and for the decay of belief, is the complexity and indirectness of the whole industrial system. One man saves, another borrows those savings and invests them, maybe with the purchase of machine tools with which to make plant to be employed in the manufacture of goods for export. Only when the proceeds of the exported goods are spent on the acquisition of imports will the first act of saving result in the placing of goods on the domestic market available to the consumer, and the consumer may be unknown to every person in the long chain of financial production and trade. Over the whole process the individual worker can exercise only a negligible or negative influence. Activity may wax or wane and he may gain or suffer thereof from no cause he can determine. One day he may be a wanted and active member of society, the next an unemployed man unwanted and dependent. Moreover, not only is the economic system indirect and complex, but even the machinery he operates may afford

> little or no scope to the worker for the exercise of his creative faculties. The indirectness of the system deprives him of any full awareness of the relationship between his actions—his general behaviour—and the life he leads, and thus of his ethical obligation. The lack of scope for creative faculties deprives him of the means of developing his personality. Together they undermine his self-confidence and self-reliance, and lead him to claim blindly rights from the State, or to submit blindly to the State or to a party or to a Führer, or abandon not only personal endeavour but reasoning expectation, to surrender himself to insensate cynicism. This complexity and indirectness of economic organization simultaneously helped to deprive the family of many of its functions, split the neighbourhood into fragmentary groupings and deprived the churches of much of their power of persuasion. Hence the individual member of this complex urbanized society, weakly trained and led, often hopeless as well as helpless, is ill fitted to withstand the events, the forces and the causes of the fear which he experiences. He is not only puzzled but dissatisfied, and owing to his dissatisfaction tends to lose belief not only in himself but in the society in which he lives and, when that society is democratic, in democracy. . . . Is there not some factor in the whole system of dense urban society, distinct from its economic organization or its productivity, and distinct from its social hierarchy and from our day-to-day work, that is inimical to personal and hence to social harmony? If there is, then whatever our social principles, belief in them will be uncertain and unstable.'

Nor can we confine this drastic change in the life and habits of men to the towns and urban areas only, for they have invaded the countryside. The village has been profoundly affected by the same forces, and its integrity has all but disappeared. Its young people forsake the fields for the factories in the city. Easy transport invites the villager to the cinema or the dog races. The farmer has become in part an engineer. The local school has been closed and the rector absentee.

It may be that we can exaggerate the significance of these things, and some of the pages in Ferdinand Zweig's little Pelican, *The British Worker*, suggests that we can be a little too arty-crafty in our approach, and see social phenomena too much from the study armchair. Neighbourhood and craft, it would seem, have not entirely disappeared—but on the whole, few, I think, will dissent from the general tenor of Professor Loveday's conclusions.

The mental conditioning of men has, therefore, profoundly changed in the last hundred years, and even the physical landscape has changed with it. An old villager who returned after sixty years to his home some ten miles from London found that it had been utterly submerged. The field where he played, the stream where he fished, the old friends he knew — all had gone, and in their place was a sprawling disfigurement of jerry-built factories. It is not surprising that the break away from religion

has been more extreme among the working classes in the towns, and that, by and large, such people 'remain as a whole outside all religious bodies.'

Nor must we forget, as part of this general social background, the increasing power, for better or for worse, that science has placed in the hands of a few men—a Führer may speak to a whole nation — nor the existence of hidden fears in the hearts of men. There is still the fear of unemployment, which has left such bitter memories behind it in the valleys of South Wales, and the mining districts of the North, a fear which has gone a long way to condition the trade union movement ever since. No government can hope to survive unless it promises full employment. Then there is the fear of war, a very real fear indeed. The effect of its constant nagging anxiety on human conduct and the shape of society is perhaps so profound that we cannot really estimate its insidious influence at all. Life is so insecure that men demand security, or paradoxically shrug their shoulders and take no purposeful thought for the morrow.

But the dread of conflict leads to results of a more tangible character. The fear of total war makes for total preparation to fight it. The industrial and social patterns have to be shaped in order to provide the means to wage it; the psychology of people has to be worked upon so that they are prepared, if need be, to suffer its horrors, and to overcome natural scruples of conscience. This is not the place to argue the pros and cons of pacificism — though the reluctance of Church people to do this is often a scandal — but we cannot ignore the effect of such preparations for war on society as a whole, and particularly on those workers who are directly or indirectly engaged in fashioning the instruments of death. What effect does it have upon them? Does it constitute a background of life in which the distinctive insights of the Christian faith fit into the picture, making one harmonious whole? Are such workers more easily brought to the point where, with St. Paul, they are convinced that 'the greatest of these is love,' or do they suspect that, when the danger is real, the Christian just as much as anybody else needs his atomic bombs and whatever is last on the list? Some, and those perhaps the most sensitive, say pathetically with a young worker, 'Let's keep religion out of this' — but it is the one thing, of course, that we cannot do, for these very weapons are being forged for the ostensible purpose of preserving Christian civilization against an aggressive materialism. It is, perhaps, humiliating to have to remember that the Christian West, unlike the pagan Roman Empire, has proved itself a militarizing civilization, and that its wars are becoming

more frequent and certainly more destructive. To quote from the same author as before :

> 'War is the antithesis of moral progress for the warring groups preclude each other from the orbit of all, or nearly all, the ethical rules that govern their conduct. Indeed, not only is the area in which critical rules apply restricted, but completely different rules are applied to the opponents in war. With regard to them almost all virtues become vices and vices virtues. It is good to hate, to deceive, to destroy ; it is bad to sympathize, to explain, to save. In order to bring about so radical a change and upheaval of accepted values, quite primitive emotions must be profoundly stirred and a hotbed of culture of new habits must be undertaken ; the gregarious instinct must express itself in pugnacity and hate ; but above all the gregarious instinct must be stimulated and be rendered dominant.'

The effects of such indoctrination do not disappear when the dead are removed from the battlefields, but they necessarily live on, to be revived when fear of another war presses upon us again.

Such is the background of the age in which we live, though I may well have given rather a caricature than a portrait. Its planning, its industrial techniques, have been made possible by the application of modern science, and its direction has largely been taken away from man's conscious will. It is into this background, and arising out of it, that we must place what are often regarded as the scandals of our age — increasing divorce and a fabulous sum spent every year on pools and betting.

But our concern is with the introduction of the Christian faith to people living in this particular *milieu*, and this means that we must discover both the relevance of our religion and the idiom in which to proclaim it. We cannot deny, for a moment, that the environment in which twentieth-century man lives has affected enormously his whole mentality : it has broken the cake of custom ; it has made society less static, and taken away the sanction from old restraints. Professor Loveday suggests that there are four what he calls agents of transmission by means of which a social pattern is passed on from one generation to another — the family, the Church, the neighbourhood, and the school, to which I think we may add a fifth, the traditional habits of a man's craft. All, with the exception of the school, have waned in influence. The family is certainly not the unit that it was and many live their lives outside it. The Church, though it has a hard core of convinced members, does not, by and large, determine the structure of our national life. Craft traditions are disappearing, and though new skills may emerge as a result of the new techniques, it is yet true to say that at the moment increased production tends to promote efficiency at the cost of individual fulfilment. Only the school

as retained and, in fact, increased its influence, and even here onstant vigilance is necessary to secure the right balance in ducation.

Our problem, then, is a practical one. How do we commend ie faith to people conditioned in this way? Here, so it seems to ie, there are two main questions, the first, perhaps, not apparently o important yet bound up with the second and equally significant.

Religion needs for its understanding and its propagation a irect metaphor or idiom. It is trying to say something about life nd hence must make itself understood not simply to experts. In ie Old Testament, for example, faith in Jehovah is represented n the thought forms of the life which men lived and the experi- nces which they knew. The idiom is largely an agricultural one, alculated to strike home with a very lively force to a pastoral eople. 'The Lord is my Shepherd, therefore can I lack nothing.' Thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel.' These are ot so much poetic fancies, but imageries culled from the web and oof of everyday experience. The life of the nation, its politics nd strategy, are all brought within the thought forms of the faith. Moab is my wash pot; upon Edom will I cast my shoe: Philistia, iout thou because of me.' Those who wish to keep politics out f the pulpit should certainly go through the Psalms with a blue encil. In the New Testament, again, we find Jesus speaking the nguage of the people, and conveying religious truth through pastoral idiom, and in terms of men's ordinary everyday work. hink of the power of such a word as 'redemption' in a slave ommunity.

Now it is true to say of our doctrines and liturgy that, for the ost part, they use a language which is unrelated to the great ass of our people. By unrelated I mean that it does not strike em with the same lively and immediate force as it could do cen- ries ago. The picture of life, the metaphors and allusions (if we cept that of 'father') are foreign to their mental climate and abits of life. The geographical and political framework has little mediate interest; the approach is pre-scientific. True, imagina- ve thinking and historical knowledge can help to make the dry nes live, but the experience thus induced is quite different from e immediate impact which a religious metaphor ought to pro- ce. Jesus warned us against pouring the new wine into the old ttles, but this is what we continue to do, usually, it must be mitted, because there don't seem to be other bottles available. rue, the Christian faith was nurtured in history, and sprang from particular community living in a particular civilizational pattern, it just because of this it should be our task, not so much to lift

it out of its background, but to reinterpret it in terms of a new one: to find the language of the age in which we live: to relate it to the stresses and strains of contemporary society with its acute problems, and to speak in a way that is intelligible to ordinary men.

This was brought home to me in the following incident that came my way. A boy in a young people's fellowship had bought a powerful motor-bike and asked me to come and see it. I did so. He put the bike on the stand and started the engine. We became silent, as we withdrew and watched. For a minute at least the engine ticked over, and we stood admiring as it throbbed 'its sixty seconds' worth of distance run.' Finally he stepped forward, switched off the engine and remained still, till he turned to me and said, 'Isn't she lovely?'

A trivial story, maybe, but perhaps not so trivial in its implications. For him, the experience was in some way akin to an act of worship: he was content to withdraw and 'wonder' in the presence of this new 'deity.' Here was something which drew forth from him emotions of awe and almost of reverence. He had been nurtured in the machine age, and here was the most powerful thing he knew. To him moor and mountain, the shepherd tending his flocks, or the lilies of the field, did not strike home with the same immediate force. He had little sense of history, and as for Moab, he couldn't care less. We only need to see our contemporaries flocking to Heathrow to realize what a new kind of world we inhabit. It is not so much that people are essentially different as that they must be moved in a different way. Yet very largely the metaphor in which we approach them is pastoral and pre-scientific. It is nostalgic and romantic, just when we want to be contemporary and realist.

It may, of course, be that the machine, if it comes with great emotional overtones to people in our day and generation, yet cannot provide a vehicle for the transmission of religious truth: that, in fact, it is a dangerous metaphor just because it is impersonal, and therefore the demand for its use must be resisted since it represents the *malaise* of our age. This may be true and it constitutes our problem and introduces us to our second consideration.

In such an age as 1952, dominated as it is by urbanization, new techniques in industry and increasing mechanization, how does the Christian faith introduce itself into this complex situation? How does it guide and shape it? Since social conditioning is so strong in its formative influence, how does our faith endeavour to deal with it? Surely the greatness of William Temple as a leader (whether we agree with his political thinking or not) was that he

id stand for just this introduction of the Gospel message into the ommon life of man in the context of his mine or factory. He ccepted a collectivist economy and endeavoured to bring hristian insights to bear upon it.

Now I believe it behoves us Christians to admit (quite frankly) at at the moment we do not see how the principles of our faith late to the practical ordering of the day-to-day life of men in ociety. On the whole, we are most of us fairly clear as to what hristian discipleship means in our homes and families, and what s ethic demands as between friends: but we are uncertain and ewildered when we begin to relate it to the corporate life, to rban development, to non-personal industrial processes, to the rofit motive, to preparation for war. None of us, I suspect, know e answers, nor can they be worked out in the study by an appli- tion of abstract principles. The medieval Church had a sociology nich it believed, rightly or wrongly, to be based on Christian eology: we cannot claim in any sense to be in this position. edieval Christian sociology may have kept production low, and tarded economic progress, but at least it was coherent and in- lligible. Even Adam Smith, mistaken as I think he was, yet felt at in his *laissez faire laissez passer* he had discovered a divine w which operated everywhere. Since the Industrial Revolution e Church has had no consistent teaching on matters of this kind -and yet these are the very things which are most strongly forma- ve of the character of man, and this is where his interests lie. It in part because of this that vast sections of our people, particu- rly amongst what are known as the working classes — that is, ose who were caught up in the Industrial Revolution — have no ne for or interest in 'organized religion.' In so far as they think out it at all, it is identified, again rightly or wrongly, with the ry tyranny against which they have fought across the years. 'They always preached against us,' an engineer told Ferdinand veig. The appeal of Communism is often that it walks in step th social forces.

It has been said of the Churches that they were feudal under udalism, capitalist under capitalism, and socialist under social- n. This may not necessarily be a criticism, for to be adaptable a new environment is sometimes the means of directing it, but it her suggests a lack of prophetic testimony, which is the breath vital religion, and a desperate anxiety not to offend. Yet our ld question remains. In an environment where people are in- easingly conditioned in work and leisure by the collective, and ust be unless the whole application of science to industry is to reversed, what is the Christian message? What does atonement

and sacrament mean in this context? The Church cannot remain aloof from these conditioning factors, for they are more powerful in moulding the shape of society than its own official propaganda.

Yet, and this only adds to our problem, in the application of its own principles to this *milieu*, the Church must somehow move in the world of the possible. Its final word cannot be merely to enter a protest; to condemn the path which men have taken; and to state that in this way lies disaster. I say this cannot be its only message unless it is prepared to take people out of society altogether and fashion an exclusive one of its own. Prophetic denunciation is perhaps a part of its message, but it can never be the whole. The arty-crafty gospeller, with his sandals, may-pole, organic manures and horse-drawn ploughs, may be a useful reminder that the machine from becoming a servant has transformed itself into a master: but he will not help us in solving serious technical problems, nor in feeding the hungry multitudes of the East and securing for them a decent standard of life — one of the really great problems of our day. It is far too easy to talk romantically of the natural life of the countryside, and to become lyrical over mother earth, but this will not alter the fact that the vast mass of our countrymen do live, and will continue for generations to live, together in towns. Perhaps it may be more helpful to remember that Greek life flourished in the cities, and that the supreme achievement of the Italian genius flowered in the industrial centres of the north.

What is wanted, so it seems to me, is a frank recognition that society has changed through the impact of modern science, and a humble recognition that these changes have been so rapid that we have lost control over them: yet at the same time a conviction that they have the seeds of good within them as well as evil. The prophet is right to make us halt and to see our peril; but the priest is equally necessary to provide us with a day-to-day ministry within the pattern of existing things, and to encourage the good to flourish and the evil to wither. But for this to happen, it is necessary for us to work out a Christian sociology which is relevant to the world in which we live: and here, hard and intelligent thinking, with technical and economic knowledge, is as necessary as a sure hold on moral theology.

But for the moment it is well to confess our ignorance. We have no coherent body of informed Christian sociology, and what is so often presented to us is mere nostalgic protest ideology or naïve anti-Marxism which can only encourage and lead to frustration. What does our faith say in concrete terms about the profit motive; about the depersonalization inherent in modern industrial

methods if increased output is to be secured; about the new housing areas; about the Press and propaganda generally — I mean realistically within the realms of the possible? The Welfare State has many dangers as well as blessings, as Professor Loveday has pointed out. Unless it is accompanied by a high level of ethical behaviour in its citizens, it will need an excess of planning in order to maintain full employment. If such should prove necessary we cannot but ask, with the Professor, whether

> 'the activities of Van Gogh, when half starved and more than half oblivious of the very existence of a market, he made apple orchards flower for ever, or the meanderings of Davies before he published his first songs as a tramp, would be classified by a bourgeois government or even by advanced economists as work.'

And so we might go on. Press, radio, newspaper and easy travel mean that we can no longer screen people from facing up to these problems. The clash of colour is one of the dominant social problems of our time, and a detached observer might well wonder what the Christian Churches are prepared to offer to its solution. Is Dr. Malan, a Christian minister, or Paul Robeson, a Communist, the better exponent of the mind of Christ on this momentous issue?

To put the matter, finally, in brief. If human personality is sacred, an end in itself because created by God for Himself, what does this mean in terms of an environment which never before in all human history was a more powerful conditioning factor? Escape from it man cannot. I do not know the answer, but upon it depends the relevance of the Christian faith to men and women of 1952, and the possibility of creating in our day a really indigenous Christian culture. The easy way out, of course, is to assert that the Kingdom is wholly other-worldly — and then our problem obligingly disappears. But the Modern Churchmen's Union is not likely to do this, and my only regret is that I shall not have the pleasure and the privilege of hearing the answers to so many questions which leave me perplexed and bewildered.

DOGMATIC RELIGION AND THE CLIMATE OF OUR TIME

The Rev. Canon L. W. Grensted, D.D.

IN a brief broadcast shortly after the end of the war, Dr. Jung startled and enlightened those of his followers who only knew him and his work at second-hand by pointing out the dual significance of the mandala. Now the mandala, the cross in the circle, was the perfect symbol of balance between man's four functions, Reason and Sensation, Intuition and Feeling, of balance between male and female, heaven and earth. It was the symbol of which the appearance and development in dream and art was the sure precursor of health, and itself the means by which that health is achieved. It had been for many years the holy of holies, at once the inner shrine of the Self and its guardian. But now, Jung said, and some of us can confirm his testimony, the mandala was beginning to show itself in dreams as something dominant and threatening. The day of the Wotan archetype, foreseen long ago by Heine, with its threat to culture, civilization, and to Christianity itself, predicted by Jung from the dreams of his patients some ten years before the war in which it was fulfilled, had passed in flame and devastation. It was the dawn of the new day of the mandala, of balanced law and order, of conference, treaty, and adjustment, of charters of human rights, and of authorities that must be obeyed. But the mandala itself, ambivalent as all the energic symbols of the racial unconscious are ambivalent, was revealing itself not only as the new hope of mankind, but also as the new danger. Authority was a pressing need, for nations and for individuals, but it had brought authoritarianism in its train. And since authority, which is the self-government of free and responsible men expressed through a free and responsible society, is a hard thing to attain, men and nations were everywhere turning to authoritarianism, which is the surrender of freedom and responsibility to some current orthodoxy, making loyalty the supreme virtue at the cost alike of reason and of charity. The unmistakable trend towards dogmatic religion to-day is the most fundamental and ultimately the most dangerous version of authoritarianism, the work, deep in the unconsciousness of our race, of the dominant and threatening mandala.

Jung's mandala is, of course, a symbol of an archetype, and sometimes Jung uses the term as though it were the archetype itself. This is simply because the archetypes themselves are

singularly difficult to define, Jung's own language about them being far from clear or consistent. But that is not the fault of Jung's theory but of the archetypes themselves, since these can only make themselves known in two ways, which, indeed, in the last resort are one. They may give rise to symbolic images, in art and in dreams, expressing their fundamental character. Or they may give rise to symbolic action, in itself non-rational at the conscious level, and only to be explained as arising from the energy of the archetypes, an energy all the more powerful because it operates at levels beyond the direct reach of normal rational control. Dogma, so far as it is to be distinguished from reasonable doctrine, is the attempt to provide rational grounds for this symbolic behaviour. Since these rational grounds can, at the best, bear only a secondary relation to the truth, which lies in energies of the psyche far removed from conscious observation and reasoning, dogma, unlike sound doctrine, demands not reason but faith, and faith, in this context, is not the personal trust of the Gospels and of the evangelical theology of all the Saints, but the uncritical and unchallengeable credulity of the child. It is the *fides implicita* of St. Augustine and the Schoolmen, and however necessary (like the easy belief through which childhood begins the process of learning) in certain stages of the Christian life, it is not its finished product and goal, *fides formata per caritatem*, the personal faith in Jesus Christ, Lord and God, Saviour and Friend, which lies beyond dogma and doctrine alike and alone supplies their ultimate meaning. For as the unconscious looks towards the conscious, so dogma, even in its negations, looks to sound doctrine, and sound doctrine, though ever mindful of the claims of reason, looks to Christ.

It is a commonplace to say that this dogmatic temper is characteristic of our time, part of its climate, an unmistakable quality, for good or ill, in the very air we breathe. Its influence is by no means confined to religion, though any movement in which it is strongly in evidence has something of a religious quality. The most obvious example of this, frequently noted, is the truly religious character of the political controversy with Communism, in which the doctrinaire philosophy of Marxianism is an object less of understanding than of faith, demanding an implicit, an uncritical, and an absolute loyalty. To this Christianity, if it can do no more than oppose dogma with dogma, has no effective answer. The issue must be decided at another level than dogmatism. The same principle shows itself in many forms: the doctrinaire Socialism which demands the welfare State whether it can be paid for or not, the doctrinaire type of inter-nationalism which ignores the

significance of race, geography, and tradition, the doctrinaire type of pacifism which has sometimes turned an obviously right and rational interpretation of God in Christ into an impatient and strident creed, the doctrinaire anti-vivisectionism which the real and alleged suffering of animals has often blinded to the suffering of man. In all these instances, and in many more, great and small, we are dealing with issues which lie far deeper than the ostensible programmes and philosophies in which they are expressed. We are face to face with a deep need, human and universal, for *some* principle which will bring order and balance into life itself. The passion and self-devotion with which such principles, even quite irrational ones, are defended, is a testimony not to the truth of the principles, but to the depth of the need. And it is because that need is so deep that the principle which underlies all principles, the absorbing and consuming demand for some principle which can give order, balance and shape to life, can become the means not of salvation but of destruction, the communist, socialist, pacifist, or anti-vivisectionist becomes a fanatic, and the truth of his cause perishes in the flames of his fanaticism.

To say this is not to say that all communists, socialists, pacifists or even anti-vivisectionists are fanatics. All of us to-day, of whatever political party, are in fact socialists, and many, including myself, are pacifists, without making the fundamental mistake of turning an honest opinion, however strongly held, into a creed which denies others the right to an honest opinion too. We must bear this fact in mind when we turn to consider the dogmatisms of religion. There is, as Aristotle might have said, a right degree of dogmatism and a right place for it in the development of the freedom of the faith. A dogmatism that is not excessive, that does not conflict with reason, and that does not deny the right of others to have their dogmatisms too, will probably always be a necessary element in the manifold life of the Church. But it will always carry with it its own special danger. The mandala that secures life may at any moment become the mandala that destroys life in order to preserve itself, and loyalty to some dogma take the place of faith in God.

That dogmatism of this dangerous kind is characteristic of the religious movements of to-day few would deny. Even those who are themselves dogmatists, with their own particular streak of irrationality, deplore the dogmatism of others, whose streak happens to be a different one. It may perhaps be true that some of the older controversies over details of ritual are much less in evidence than they were fifty years ago, as men have learned something of the possibility of meeting and accepting one another's ways in things

unessential. Christian charity has not been without its fruits, though the scornful comment of outsiders has had its influence too. But upon points of doctrine, and of Church organization and ritual where those supposedly rest upon doctrine, the hardening is manifest. The striking fact is not the hardening but the desire, plainly evinced by many sincerely religious people, to have it so. There is an increasing desire for dogma, and apparently, on the evidence, for dogma as such, with an increasing disregard for its rationality and for its basis in historical fact. The very obvious drift towards the Church of Rome, sometimes defended, naively enough, on the ground that men turn naturally to a Church which knows its own mind, is only one case in point, though a suggestive one, since the mind of the Roman Church is upon more than one issue unintelligible rationally and unsupported historically. Neither the doctrine of Papal infallibility nor that of the Assumption of the Mother of our Lord seems to play any part in restraining a succession of men of the highest ability and intellectual integrity from the Roman allegiance. Yet the doctrine of Papal infallibility seems to bear no conceivable relation to the recorded teaching of Jesus, still less to the truth, characteristic of the New Testament, that 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty'; and the newly promulgated dogma of the Assumption, while perhaps not meaningless as a pious opinion, has no historical foundation whatever, resting, as it does, upon a sixth-century Ethiopic romance. The defence, curiously reminiscent of that great doctrinal rationalist, Bishop Butler, that we must expect the ways of God, like those of Nature, to be in some part inaccessible to human reason, is a good defence when it leads to doctrinal humility, but not when it leads to dogmatic arrogance, and it most certainly does not explain the immense attraction which the system in its totality holds for so many and such sincerely honest minds. We are in fact not in the presence of rational theology, making its appeal to reason, but of the archetypes, grouped as it were about the mandala, and the mandala is not only life-giving but threatening. Its offer of security is illusory. The price which it demands is real, and such as a reasonable man, once aware of it, might well hesitate to pay.

In taking the strong attraction of the Church of Rome as an example, I am by no means forgetful of other things that ought in fairness to be said. Despite certain aberrant and unmanageable boulders, there is much and increasing liberalism in Roman theology, and often Rome sits much more lightly to its rules of faith and ritual than do some of her imitators. And not least among our grounds for hope in the future is surely the existence of a Church,

universal in scope and in desire, hardly if at all compromised by the conflicts of the nations, and handing down, sometimes under bitter persecution, even though it may be with some accretions, the faith once delivered to the Saints.

And indeed this desire for dogma extends into every part of the religious field. In the last two missions to the undergraduates at Oxford it was very noticeable that the whole demand was for instruction, and that groups for questioning and discussion fell very much into the background. Where the speakers were challenged or criticized it was largely by those who had already taken up some dogmatic position, and who were disturbed because they did not hear the familiar phraseology which gave them the required sense of security without the obligation of thought. It is a similar sign of the times that the long and honourable tradition of the Student Christian Movement, with its invaluable interchange of witness between differing traditions, is to-day being strongly and dangerously challenged by denominational fellowships and conferences. The loss to the S.C.M. in evangelistic vigour and effectiveness is very great. I do not see it in any degree compensated by a corresponding gain in the work and witness of the denominations or other more dogmatically defined movements.

Two of these movements illustrate this dogmatic trend in very different ways, and both are movements which have played and will play an important part in Christian witness to the world. The first of these is the movement now usually known as Moral Rearmament. I have always had, and still have, the very greatest respect for the whole-hearted devotion and loyalty of its members and have watched with thankfulness their methods of widespread and effective evangelism. But it has been quite obviously true that for many the acceptance of team-guidance and of the team way of life has been in the strict sense dogmatic, a substitute for the liberty of the Spirit, and not its expression. A friend said to me the other day that Moral Rearmament lived upon the faith of Frank Buchman. The phrase was an obvious exaggeration, though an exaggeration that does no more than justice to a great religious leader, but it expressed clearly enough the archetypal drive towards dogmatism which has brought in so many of his followers, sometimes at no small cost to their independence and breadth of outlook.

Of the other movement, that known to us in the Universities as the Inter-Collegiate Christian Union, I can only speak with sorrow, for its history has been one of the tragedies of my University life. When I first knew it in Oxford, nearly fifty years ago, the O.I.C.C.U. and the S.C.M. were one, and from that one

Christian fellowship came the inspiration and the leadership for most of the missionary work of the Churches, for the Edinburgh Conference, for Copec, for the Life and Liberty Movement in the Church of England, and for the wider movements for co-operation and inter-communion between the denominations. That all those movements have found themselves frustrated or half-crippled by various dogmatisms is in no small part due to the dogmatism of those who have increasingly brought about the separation and, in effect, the isolation of the Inter-Collegiate Christian Unions. And solation, however enthusiastic, is isolation still. It is nothing less than tragic that these whole-hearted young preachers of Christ and of the promises of Scripture should find it necessary, necessary ultimately to their own security and certainty, to separate themselves from the great missions to the University in which practically all other Christians join, and to insist upon a mission of their own, couched in their own dogmatisms. That these dogmatisms, like those of Rome, which in spirit and application they so much resemble, are most irrational just at the points where they seem strongest, in the dogmas of an Atonement conceived and stated in terms of criminal law, and of the verbal and actual inerrancy of Scripture, a doctrine wholly incapable of proof, is evidence, if evidence were needed, of the primitive and archetypal nature of the hidden energies which have made this woeful separation possible. Perhaps I should not have been distressed, as in fact I was distressed, that a bishop should come down to preach the opening sermon of their mission, despite the truth that episcopacy, whatever else it signifies, stands for catholicity. I should have remembered, with St. Paul, that whatever the hidden motive, 'so every way Christ is proclaimed.' But what is startling is the enormous attraction of this kind of movement in the Universities and recently, in schools. Once more, reason and reasonableness are at a discount. The demand is simply for dogma, and though the dogma must have the Christian label, it all too often derives its force not from its content but from its character as dogma. It is no small matter that men should be offered a clear and sure Gospel and an equally clear and sure way of service and witness. We can only be thankful that in this case so much of the Gospel proclaimed is true, that Christ is indeed preached, and that the charity of the living Christ is infinitely wider than the formulae of those who proclaim Him.

I have taken my illustrations mainly from the life of the Universities. They could be multiplied many times over by extending our survey to the general life of the Churches, of which indeed the religious problems of the Universities are only a reflection. For

Anglicans the hardening of theology among Anglo-Catholics and their fellow-travellers is the most serious problem of to-day. It is not only that it is difficult to recognize, in much that is taught to-day, the theology of Hooker and Waterland, or even of Archbishop Laud. There have always been Anglicans, and Anglicans of undisputed loyalty, very hard to fit into the Anglican picture. The difficulty lies not in the doctrines, but in the hardening which has transformed them from doctrines into dogmas. And it is not only striking, but to the psychologist immensely suggestive, that those who preach these dogmas, and translate them into practice when such matters as inter-communion or the marriage of divorced persons are involved, are in a majority of cases the most charitable and most accessible of men. The hardness imposed upon them by the demands of the threatening mandala is confined to the dogmas in which these demands are symbolised. And so it is not surprising that the dogmas which not only block the way of the Oecumenical movement but even threaten the unity of the Anglican Communion — unless, as seems possible, the part succeeds in swallowing the whole — are precisely the dogmas of which it is least easy to give a rational account. Thus: (1) The Apostolical Succession of our bishops seems to be a historical fact, and certainly is such a fact from the third century on. But that is a very different matter from the dogma that the valid administration of the Sacraments depends upon that Succession. (2) The Sacrament of Baptism has been from the first the sign of admission to the community of the Church and therewith the pledge, effective as we claim its fulfilment, of the remission of sins. But that is a very different thing from saying that a child baptized in an African jungle and then left without Christian environment or teaching has had, *ex opere operato*, some change or character superimposed upon it, so that missionaries returning after many years could detect a visible difference between children who had been so baptized in infancy and those who had not. I was shocked to hear that this had been proclaimed as Anglican teaching by a well-known Anglican missioner in one of our Universities during the past year. It is teaching that makes no reasonable sense, and it is precisely for that reason, lying as it does beyond rational criticism, that it has so strong a power of appeal. But the appeal is derived neither from revelation nor from reason, but from the deep archetypal levels which must have dogma, however cramping, lest security goes, and we lose all. (3) The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Jesus has been from the first the sign and effective means of our fellowship with one another in Him. That it came to be involved by the early Church in its disciplinary system and so in the end became the

supreme symbol of disunion was a tragedy, though the historical background of the tragedy makes it easy to understand. But this negative aspect of the Sacrament has come to be stressed beyond either reason or historical necessity. It was one of the triumphs of the Church of England that it very largely broke away from it for two centuries or more. Its reassertion to-day in oecumenical discussions and, in particular, in connection with the Church of South India, is not only disastrous but irrational, but there is no doubt of its appeal in the dogmatic climate of to-day.

Let us be fair about all this. I have spoken of the dogmatic hardening among Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics. Modernists, or, if you prefer it, Liberals, are not in the least exempt from this same hardening. And if their dogma has not turned to Bible or to Pope, I am by no means sure that it has been any improvement when, in the name of liberty of judgment, it has turned back to themselves. I find it hard to forget the excellent member of the Modern Churchmen's Union who declared a year or two ago (unless the papers misinformed me) that as Christians we must insist upon the denial of the Virgin Birth. Dogmatism is not improved by wearing liberal colours. Yet, little as we may like the admission, Liberalism might poll many more votes if it offered people not sound reasoning, high ideals, and common sense, but a good hard irrational dogma.

What is the lesson to be drawn from all this? Let me work it out once more in the language of Jung's psychology. The living mandala, the effective symbol of integration and balance which is also growth, is energic, fluid, and ever-changing, even while its character of proportion and balance is preserved. When it appears in the dreams of a neurotic patient it develops, usually from small beginnings, sometimes as a pattern dimly discerned amid chaos, sometimes as a small germ or seed which is gradually enriched through a series of forms until it becomes determinant of the whole. Even so, it should still be fluid, living and capable of growth, unlike the complex and static mandalas of Tibetan Buddhism, so strikingly figured and interpreted by Jung and Wilhelm in *The Golden Flower*. A mandala developing in this way takes all the different functions of the psyche into its scope, and its appearance in the dreams brings both interpretation and healing to the neurotic symptom. It is a very different matter when a rigid and fully-formed mandala appears at the very beginning of the analysis. For then the appearance of completeness and balance is illusory and the rigidity is the significant element. Unless that rigidity can be broken, by first shattering the mandala and then bringing it to life, the prospects of cure are slight. The mandala is now guarding

the neurosis instead of healing it. Its solution of life's problems is superficial and spurious, yet the patient clings to it as to the only life-line he can see. He dare develop none of his four major functions. Feeling, sensation, intuition, and reason all frighten him, for they threaten the security of his one stronghold. He has become a man of principle, and his principle, whatever it is, may not be challenged. And that is why, in spite of our respect for them, we sometimes have a very uneasy feeling about men of principle.

The parallels with the disease of dogmatism are obvious, and so are the sources of its attraction and strength. It is always an escape, in thought or action, drama or ritual, from the free and growing life of the Spirit. The dogmatic sect, or man, will always be found to be withdrawing from the challenge of some fundamental function of the psyche, instead of bringing that function into the free movement and growth which alone can give the Spirit of God His perfect opportunity in us. It fears the expression of feeling and so makes rigid its rules of marriage and of intercommunion. It fears the seductive, but perfectly natural, power of sensation, and secures itself by various forms of rigorism and asceticism, binding upon men burdens which neither Nature nor Nature's God ever intended them to bear. And so vegetarianism or teetotalism, right enough in their own place and order, may for some become obsessive and arrogate to themselves the wholeness of the Gospel. It fears intuition, the self-assertion of hunch against hunch, and therewith exalts the authority of the Church over against the guidance of the Spirit, and makes the priest the arbiter of doctrine to the exclusion of the prophet. And above all it fears reason, dreading the loss of assurance, and unable to accept a faith that dare submit to questioning. Yet a faith that can be questioned is the only faith that is capable of growth. An unchallenged faith is the prison of the soul. Fortunately for man, even the prison of his own choosing and making does not shut out Christ. Under the shadow of any and every kind of dogma, men still find Him and learn from Him that highest kind of faith which is love.

CHRISTIANITY TO-DAY: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

'Aims, Methods and Results of Religious Broadcasting'

By the Rev. Francis House, M.A.
(Head of Religious Broadcasting, B.B.C.)

I AM not an artist, for artists concern themselves with composition: I try to become a mirror.' This quotation from the title-page of Lady Kelly's recent account of her travels in Russia* would be a good description of a broadcasting organization, and particularly of one which, like the B.B.C., is an independent public corporation. British broadcasting is indeed a kind of mirror of our culture. It is true that there must be a constant process of selection, and that some subjects and events are far less suitable for reflection in broadcasts than others, so that some distortion is unavoidable. But, by and large, an independent corporation like the B.B.C., protected as far as possible from all political or commercial bias, and devoted to the service of all sections of the public, is bound to reflect the tastes and interests, the belief and unbelief, the moral and aesthetic values of the community which it seeks to serve. Through its outside broadcasts, news bulletins, talks and discussions, and still more perhaps through drama and feature programmes, such an organization presents by loudspeaker and television screen a continuous talking picture of the kind of people we are — or the kind of people we like to think ourselves to be. (The popularity of contemporary family-chronicles like 'Mrs. Dale's Diary' and 'The Archers,' which do this kind of thing most directly, would astound those who have never become addicted to listening to such programmes.) It might be worth while for some members of this Conference to make a systematic study of the total output of the B.B.C. simply with a view to discovering what aspects of the national character and of contemporary standards were thereby revealed.

The religious life of the country finds its place in that general picture of twentieth-century Britain both directly in the specifically 'religious' broadcasts, and indirectly. And this is the reason for the inclusion in this series of papers what might at first seem to be a limited and technical subject. My main concern is not, in fact, with the technique of religious broadcasting, but with the evidence regarding the religious state of the nation which can be discovered

* *Mirror to Russia,* Marie Noele Kelly (*Country Life* Ltd., London, 1952).

from a study of the development and results of religious broadcasts over the past twenty-nine years. Most of what I have to say applies as much to television broadcasts as to those on 'sound only,' and in general I shall use the term 'broadcasting' to cover both.

Before we consider the content and conduct of the broadcasts, we must answer the question: Who listens to them? There are three sources from which answers may be obtained: correspondence from listeners, observations by parish priests and ministers, and the B.B.C.'s own Audience Research organization. (*a*) Correspondence provides little reliable evidence regarding the size of the audience for a particular broadcast or its quality. Letters from listeners to a preacher may be as many as 1,200 or as few as 30, and are often provoked by some incidental comment which has little to do with the main subject of the broadcast. On the other hand, broadcasts on some subjects will draw a large correspondence irrespective of the merits of the treatment they receive. All one can say is that in general these letters only provide some evidence regarding the preferences and prejudices of the kind of people who have the time and inclination to write to public bodies like the B.B.C., but that occasionally individual writers give forceful expression to opinions which may be those of a large number of listeners. (*b*) It has been possible to make a systematic study of the observations of parochial clergy and ministers and other students of religious public opinion in Scotland, but the complexity and scale of the English ecclesiastical scene are too great for any similar research to be done in England with our available resources. Nevertheless, a certain amount of sampling has been attempted, and of course the B.B.C.'s network of Regional and National Religious Advisory Committees provides a means for discovering the opinions of leaders in the Churches on broad questions of policy.[1] (*c*) The reports of Audience Research are much the best source of statistical evidence regarding the size and composition of the audiences for religious broadcasts. These are based on the results of 2,500 interviews a day, so arranged as to cover an adequate cross-section of the population. It should be noted that these interviews are not concerned with matters of opinion or of the

[1] The names of the members of these Advisory Committees are published in the *B.B.C. Year Book*, and a systematic review of the subject was made recently by a Commission of the British Council of Churches and published under the title *Christianity and Broadcasting* (S.C.M. Press, London, 1950). This publication also includes the Audience Research figures for listening to the main religious broadcasts.

ndividual's possible conduct in the future (as are most 'public pinion' polls) but with the plain question: What did you listen o yesterday? The results for any series of similar broadcasts now a convincing consistency over a period of time. The vidence thus provided regarding the *size* of the audience for par- cular programmes is supplemented by reports on *reactions* to nem by members of large 'panels' of listeners and viewers.

The basic fact which Audience Research reveals regarding the ludiences for religious broadcasts is that on a typical Sunday omething like *a third of the adult population of the United Kingdom hear at least one religious broadcast.* That means about velve million people. The aggregate estimated audiences for all ne religious broadcasts on a Sunday is over eighteen million, ut the figure of twelve million, or two-thirds of the total, is the gure reached when we are concerned not with the audience for ach particular programme but with the number of individuals who ay they heard one or more of these programmes. (It should be oted that these listeners are distributed somewhat unevenly over ne country. The proportion is lowest in the London and Birming- am areas. Higher in the North. Higher still in the West and outh-west, and highest in Scotland and Wales.)

How do these figures compare with those for churchgoing? Mass-Observation estimated that 10 per cent. of the population of 'Metrop' attended church 'fairly regularly.'[2] Dr. Highet gives figure of 15 per cent. for Scotland.[3] Seebohm Rowntree's gures,[4] which he assumes to be typical (p. 345), show that the ggregate attendances at all places of worship equalled 13 per ent. of the adult population of York and 10.5 per cent. of the dult population of High Wycombe. Comparison of these gures with those provided by the B.B.C.'s Audience Research ndicates that on an ordinary Sunday *twice as many people listen o at least one religious broadcast as attend any place of worship.* o put the point even more sharply: it is estimated that the peaker in the Light Programme's 'People's Service' at 11.30 n a Sunday morning has a 'congregation' about equal to the ggregate of all the church-congregations worshipping at that time. nd the significance of these figures becomes clearer still when we ld that other investigations show that *regular churchgoers are nly a minority of the audience for every Sunday religious*

[2] *Puzzled People,* p. 50 (Gollancz, London, 1947).

[3] Dr. John Highet, *The Church in Scotland To-day* (Jackson, Son & Co., lasgow, 1950).

[4] Seebohm Rowntree and Lavers, *English Life and Leisure,* pp. 341-5 ongmans, Green & Co., London, 1951).

broadcast and often they are only a very small minority (*e.g.* for the 'People's Service,' already mentioned, the ratio is probably as small as 1 in 10).

What is the bearing of these facts on our consideration of the religious situation in the country? There are many different indications which point to an overlap between the audiences for religious broadcasts and that considerable section of the population, amounting to something like 40 per cent. of the whole, who lie between the 10 per cent. who are active church members and another 40 per cent. who are 'indifferent but not hostile' to Christianity. The 40 per cent. we have in mind may be described as 'uncommitted Christians.' They are not conscious of any difference between their notions of right and wrong and fully Christian standards. Many of them say their prayers intermittently if not regularly. They attend services on national occasions, at Harvest Festivals, when they are staying at holiday camps and from time to time when 'they feel like it.' Like a much larger section of the population, they expect the churches to provide for baptisms, marriages and funerals. They probably listen regularly to the B.B.C.'s 'Sunday Half-hour' of community hymn-singing and rather less regularly to other religious broadcasts such as 'The People's Service' and 'Lift up your hearts.' But they rarely or never read the Bible. Their prayers, even in late adult life, are likely to be those they learnt in childhood. They have little or no sense of the obligations of church-membership and contribute very little to the financial support of the churches. They have the vaguest conceptions of the central truths of the Christian Gospel, consisting mainly of muddled recollections of Sunday School teaching. They have no sense of the calling of all Christians to be missionaries and evangelists and witnesses to their Faith in daily life. And while they have an unexamined respect for Jesus, they show little signs of commitment to Him as their personal Lord and Saviour.'[5]

The existence of this large section of the population, who though they are 'uninformed' and 'uncommitted' yet claim unreservedly to call themselves 'Christians,' should, I think, be taken very seriously by all who are concerned with the 'Conversion of England.' There are theologians and writers on evangelism who have nothing but scorn for what they condemn as 'British' or 'vestigial christianity'—as a form of spiritual 'inoculation' which renders those who have received it 'immune to a full Christian faith.' But, in so far as there is a real danger here, it

[5] cp. *Puzzled People*, pp. 156-9, and references to 'Church of England churchgoers' *passim*; also 'Towards the Conversion of England,' chapter i.

n, I believe, be met in advance by a resolute refusal by evan-elists to pander to it by propagating any half-hearted or merely ntimental version of the Christian Gospel.[6] We will return to is point later. The main plea I want to make now is that the eds of these people should be given a high priority in the rategy of evangelism. We have abundant evidence in corre-pondence from listeners that they are not wholly 'dead souls.' A sire for goodness, a love of God, a capacity to respond to the eds of their neighbours, is still alive in them however low the me may flicker. The spiritual life of multitudes of these men d women is 'smoking flax' that we dare not attempt to quench *Matt.* xii, 20). Let me give two very simple examples. One morn-g recently the story read in the Light Programme broadcast Five to Ten' concerned a man who spent his life trying to help ople to live at peace. The next morning the producer received cryptic postcard, which read: 'After "Five to Ten" this morn-g, instead of sending a letter to the Town Clerk, I went to see a usiness Manager and made peace with him.' Some time ago a an wrote in to say that some months previously, while shaving, e had tuned-in to the latter part of a broadcast of a Service of oly Communion 'by accident'—for he had long ceased to be a mmunicant or churchgoer and rarely listened to religious broad-sts. The result of this apparently chance hearing of what had nce been a familiar service had been his return to full communi-nt life in his parish church. These examples could be paralleled any times over in our experience. Such letters come mostly—ough not exclusively—from writers who had been 'uncommitted hristians' rather than from the wholly indifferent or hostile. They ad us to give very special attention to the needs of 'those ho listen to religious broadcasts but who take no part in the life a local church.' I believe that this policy is of wider applica-on. All who are concerned with the transmission of the Gospel Britain to-day would be wise to give great weight to the need o recover the lapsed' as well as 'to strengthen the faithful' h the one hand and to challenge the careless and the hostile on e other.

There is one related point of wider significance which arises om a study of the Audience Research figures for religious broad-sts. This is the fact that the *overwhelming majority of the diences for the main Sunday religious broadcasts are working-ass.* The most important figures are: 'Sunday Half-hour' and The People's Service'—four out of five listeners are working-

[6] See Herbert S. Newell's article on 'England's Fourth Religion' in *The ontier* for March, 1952, pp. 117-22.

class; Morning and Evening Services in the Home Service—two out of three listeners are working-class.[7] Now for more than a generation we have heard the complaint that 'the churches have lost their hold on the working-classes,' and except in churches of certain denominations in particular areas, it is certainly true that the number of working-class people in the active membership of the churches is disproportionately small. One very severe critic has even spoken of the danger that the traditional churches may become 'middle-class ghettos.' The figures for listening to religious broadcasts which I have given should, I think, be some encouragement to those who are thinking in terms of the Church's mission to the whole people. And here, too, there is supporting evidence from correspondence received by religious broadcasters and the B.B.C. A very considerable proportion of the letters arising from broadcasts such as 'The Silver Lining' (a series of weekly talks in the Light Programme designed to help 'those who are in distress') and 'The Parson Calls' (week-day talks in the North of England Home Service) come from working-class homes. One who has studied this correspondence has recorded his opinion that 'the appeal of these programmes has come about through the disappearance of the Parish Priest as such and the Family Doctor as such. . . . This is due to the progressive urbanization of society and not because either profession has failed in its duty or sought another duty. But it is clear from the correspondence that people often write to the B.B.C. or to the broadcasters because they are of the opinion that their doctor would think they were foolish and that their parish priest would not understand.'[8]

I hope that I have now said enough to explain and justify the statement that the primary aim of the main religious broadcasts is 'evangelistic' in as much as the majority of the listeners are 'non-churchgoers.'[9] I come now to questions of the content of these broadcasts and of the conduct of them — in so far as these matters are relevant to the main theme of this Conference.

It is an elementary principle of broadcasting that it 'should begin where listeners are.' This applies even to the Third Pro-

[7] The sociological basis of this definition is an analysis which distinguishes in the population as a whole a proportion of 75 per cent. 'working class,' *i.e.* weekly wage earners, who have had 'elementary' education only, and their families.

[8] Quoted from a private report prepared for the Head of Religious Broadcasting.

[9] See p. 6 of the published version of the address on 'Moral Values in Broadcasting' given by the Director-General, Sir William Haley, to the British Council of Churches on 2 November, 1948.

mme, and with much greater force to 'purposive' broadcasts the Home Service and Light Programme. Unless the listener persuaded that the speaker or preacher is talking to him per- ally, or has at least something to say about a subject in which is interested, he will switch off or tune to another programme or metaphorical plugs in his ears and start a conversation on a ally different subject with his wife. Outside the staff of the B.C. and professional critics, no one feels any sense of obliga- n to go on listening to a programme he does not like! So there a constant search for ways of presentation which will be likely catch and hold the attention of the kind of listener for whom h programme is particularly intended.

But this is for the most part only at the level of 'presentation.' all serious broadcasting by a responsible public corporation it n be allowed to have only a very small influence on the *content* the programmes, whether these are concerned with scientific coveries, political events, the Christian Faith, or 'the search truth' which Sir William Haley believed to be the highest ponsibility of the B.B.C. In each of these aspects of life the n of broadcasting must be to give expression to the best avail- e thought and knowledge. In relation to the Christian Faith, e aim of religious broadcasting has been defined as being 'to lect and proclaim the Faith of the Church as it is actually found the Bible and in the living traditions and liturgical life and aching of the visible Christian churches. . . . Broadcasters ould be constantly on their guard against the danger of fostering kind of 'disembodied Christianity' or 'radio religion.'[10] This tement recalls in a particularly striking way the image of broad- sting as a kind of mirror.

The aim of the staff of the Religious Broadcasting Department n thus be quite simply described as being that of the constant empt to discover what informed opinion would consider to be e most living and faithful expressions of Christianity in each of e different traditions, and to find how this life and truth may be st effectively communicated through broadcasting. We are phatically not concerned to broadcast *either* the lowest common nominator of all interpretations of Christianity found in this ntry, *or* to put out only what would be most 'popular' or most ceptable to some hypothetical 'man in the street.' I believe that y attempt to adopt either of these two roads in other forms of ristian witness would also be wrong. It is the full Christian

[10] Statement of policy approved by the B.B.C.'s Central Religious Advisory mmittee in 1948 on the basis of a review of the aims and achievements of gious broadcasting during the twenty-five years 1923-1948.

Faith which we are bound to proclaim—not some pale ghost in the ecclesiastical machine!

This is a matter of principle. In practice there are, of course, many difficulties to be faced. One which is particularly relevant to the work of this Conference is the time-lag between the acceptance of fresh and fruitful reinterpretations of the central truths of the Christian Revelation by the most intelligent and forward-looking members of the churches, and their incorporation into the forms in which they can be assimilated by men and women with less education or of a more conservative outlook. From time to time a prophet arises who can in some measure bridge this gap, but only too often something which we believe to represent the best in contemporary Christian thinking appears to many listeners to be irrelevant or to be in conflict with their most cherished beliefs. A friendly critic of the life of the churches in this country as he saw it reflected in the ordinary run of religious broadcasts, such as the Sunday broadcasts from churches in the Home Service, once told me that he was coming to the conclusion that 'the churches on the whole are still ministering to an eighteenth-century, rural, settled and peaceful England rather than to a twentieth-century, urban, extremely unsettled and very worried England.' I fear that there is some substance in that charge, and the difficulty of meeting it is increased by the fact that a considerable and particularly articulate section of the audiences for these broadcast services are elderly, conservative-minded people 'who love to have it so' (*Jeremiah* v, 31).

Another difficulty is that many of the 'god-fearers' who still reverence Christ, think of themselves as Christians and listen to religious broadcasts, are very suspicious of the churches. Readers of *English Life and Leisure* and of *Puzzled People* will have no illusions about the prevalence of this loss of confidence in 'organized religion.'[11] This is a criticism to which religious broadcasters who know that the majority of those who listen to them are able-bodied people who could and should be active members of a Christian congregation are particularly sensitive. But though exposition of the integral place of the Christian community in the scheme of salvation, and exhortations to exchange the armchair of the sitting-room for a pew in the church at the corner, do from time to time find a place in religious broadcasts, there is little evidence to show whether or not such direct attacks are fruitful. The quality of the corporate life of the local church itself is certainly a far more important factor.

[11] Seebohm Rowntree, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-53. *Puzzled People passim.*

Correspondence from listeners shows that there is a strong demand for more guidance concerning the practical expression of Christian Faith in daily life. This is a hopeful sign in as much as it reveals a certain impatience with what Sir Richard Livingstone has described as the lack of 'the cross-fertilization of theory and experience' in contemporary church life.'[12] But for the same reason it has proved extremely difficult to find men who can meet this demand. It is above all the place at which we need to be able to call upon Christian laymen and women to help their fellow-teachers, doctors, nurses, trade union members to see what it means to be a Christian in their daily living. But though there are many individuals who are indeed living as Christians in their respective vocations, it would appear that there has as yet been far too little serious or corporate thinking on these subjects in the churches in this country. The result is that it is extraordinarily hard even for those who have had the necessary experience to formulate their convictions in their own minds or to communicate them through any kind of broadcast. Here is one field in which religious broadcasting is even more than usually dependent upon new developments in the life of the churches; but it is now more than seven years since the Archbishops' Commission on Evangelism urged that 'the Christian laity should be recognized as the priesthood of the Church in the working world, and as the Church militant in action in the mission fields of politics, industry and commerce,'[13] and there are few signs that this recommendation is yet being taken seriously by the Church at large.

To sum up on this question of the response of audiences to the Christian Gospel as it is presented through religious broadcasting: there is remarkably little evidence to show that the ordinary man or woman who listens to religious programmes at all is put off by references to the miraculous or to what might be described more generally as the 'numinous' element in the Christian tradition. On the contrary, the man who can speak with evident sincerity and in plain non-technical language about such great fundamentals of the Faith as the existence and Fatherly rule of God, His manifestation in Christ, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection, and the power of the Spirit, will usually receive in correspondence evidence of a positive response, and sometimes the letters coming from listeners who appear to have heard little of these things either through preaching in a local church or in any other way during their adult lives, are very impressive indeed. On

[12] cp. the passage from pp. 24, 25 of *Education for a World Adrift*, quoted in paragraph 10 of *Towards the Conversion of England*.

[13] *Towards the Conversion of England*, paragraph 138.

the other hand, there is certainly a demand for more help in working out the implications of Christian Faith for daily living; but so far we have found too few broadcasters who can meet this demand.

Coming now to the 'conduct' of religious broadcasting, I have only two things to say. The first is that in the interests of the 'evangelistic mission' to those listeners with whom the churches have no effective contact except through broadcasting, we are being forced to move further and further away from the notion that every active local church ought sooner or later to expect 'to have a broadcast.' The speed of this movement towards a greater concentration of broadcasts in the hands of those who have proved their ability to use this medium effectively is influenced by many factors, including the climate of opinion in the churches. As talks to public meetings about religious broadcasting invariably produce a crop of requests from correspondents for broadcasts from 'our' church, it is only fair to say here that experience has proved again and again that the fact that a man has a well-deserved reputation as a parish priest or as a pastor or preacher is no guarantee at all that he will be able to communicate through a broadcast. And, conversely, some of the most 'successful' religious broadcasters — and by this I mean those whose broadcasts appear to evoke the most signficant spiritual response — are men who are not otherwise outstanding preachers or pastors. Our main objective is, therefore, to find, train and use again and again those who have a special gift for religious broadcasting.

The second practical point is the need for the churches and for religious broadcasting to get away from an over-intellectualized presentation of the Gospel, and to develop forms of communication which make a greater appeal to the imaginations of those who are addressed. Canon Bryan Green justifies this emphasis when he reminds us that 'no man will ever be morally changed through intellectual arguments alone or through more will-power; only when his imagination is gripped by the truth will his emotions be stirred so that he discovers the power to be different. True conversion to Christ, therefore, if it is to re-orientate our lives around Him, and to direct them in His service, must stir our emotions by firing our imaginations, as well as turn our wills.'[14] I do not think that the contemporary churches have taken sufficient account of the fact that Jesus Himself taught the multitudes in parables 'and without a parable spake he nothing unto them' (*Matt.* xii. 34). There is a striking coincidence of conviction on this matter

[14] *The Practice of Evangelism*, p. 33 (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1951).

among psychologists, evangelists and missionaries,[15] but it seems to have had little practical effect on the form of much that is said and written 'towards the conversion of England.' Besides seeking to find and use individual men and women who have this gift of appealing through the imagination, we are also attempting in religious broadcasting to supplement the normal forms of expression of Christianity in services, sermons and talks by the occasional use of religious drama and poetry. But we are considerably handicapped by the dearth of suitable material springing out of the normal life of the churches. It would be particularly helpful if more of those who are concerned with the subject of this Conference could turn their attention to this aspect of 'the problem of communication.' It is not enough that our ideas should be 'clear and distinct' and truly related to the realities of our predicament: they must also be clothed with flesh and blood if they are to 'come alive' for the great majority of our fellow-citizens. This is one of those matters in which 'the children of this world' are showing themselves to be 'wiser than the children of light' (*Luke* xvi, 8).

I must end with a reference to the most serious limitation on what might be accomplished through religious broadcasting. Broadcasting can indeed be much more 'personal' than the film or the newspaper — the other two media of 'mass-communication.' But one the less, it falls far short of a living contact of man with man. Experience shows again and again that while there are remarkable examples of 'conversion' as a result of broadcasts, these are exceptional, and on the whole the main work of religious broadcasting must be 'pre-evangelistic.' It can correct misunderstandings, modify prejudices, convey information, revive memories of religious teaching received long ago, nourish a flickering flame of conscience and spirituality, and create some sense of the ongoing life of the Spirit in the Church and the world. All these things are worth doing, and, under the providence of God, it may well be the case that the B.B.C.'s practice in religious broadcasting over the last thirty years has been more influential than many realize in checking the drift towards mere secularism. But normally the process of conversion by which men and women are brought into new personal relationship to Christ and active membership of His Church is the work of the Spirit through the contact of living persons. The harvest sown by the devoted work of religious broadcasters can only be reaped if the broadcasts are followed up by more effectively by practising church-members. But church-

[15] Some of the evidence in support of this statement is published in *The B.B.C. Quarterly*, Volume V, No. 2 (Summer, 1950), and in the *Cambridge Review* for 5 November, 1949.

people generally seem to be hardly aware of the opportunities for personal witness which broadcasting creates. The Archbishop of York, who was chairman of the B.B.C.'s Central Religious Advisory Committee during its formative period, has said that in the early years of religious broadcasting the attitude of the churches was one of veiled hostility; now it is benevolent neutrality, but it has not yet become active collaboration. The truth of this statement has been newly demonstrated in the two Scottish Churches' Radio Missions. Wherever there was active support by the members of a local church the response to the Mission was most encouraging. Where this support was lacking, a few 'irregular' churchgoers became more frequent in their attendance, but there were few other visible results.'[16]

The Religious Broadcasting Department of the B.B.C. will continue to do all it can to arouse church-members to a more lively sense of the opportunities for Christian witness which are created by these programmes. But, in the long run, this is not simply a problem of religious broadcasting. The really urgent need is for the churches in this country to come alive to the fact that they are now in a 'missionary' or a 'post-Christian' situation. They must 'evangelize or perish.' They must re-examine the pattern of their own corporate lives, the disposition of their manpower, the training of their members and the allocation of their resources, in the light of their primary evangelistic responsibilities. If this Conference can contribute to this reorientation by reaching a juster appreciation of the challenge of contemporary society to Christianity and the Church, arousing a greater sense of urgency on the part of members of the churches, and pointing the way towards a more creative strategy for the Christian Mission in Britain, it will have been well worth while.

[16] See *Success and Failure of a Radio Mission,'* by R. W. F. Falconer (S.C.M. Press, London, 1950).

THE CHRISTIAN CHALLENGE TO SCIENCE

By C. D. Curling, M.A. (Cantab.)

THE five centuries that separate us from the birth of Leonardo in 1452 have been a time of great development in scientific thought, and the emphasis placed in those years on the importance of an increase in scientific knowledge has profoundly affected the history and progress of the Western European and North American races. This development was uniform until about fifty years ago. At this point the ideas set down by such men as Bacon, Galileo and Newton had come to their culmination in the work of scientists like Clerk-Maxwell, Pasteur and Darwin; and at this point, too, the cleavage between scientists and Christians who clung to their tradition became open and public.

It is the events since that time that enable us to speak of science and Christianity in terms of challenge rather than of antithesis or of conflict. For there has been a profound change of viewpoint; and this has meant not only a shift in the way in which science is developing, but also a rethinking of the nature of scientific knowledge and a reshaping of every department of thought affected by the scientific movement.

The challenge is of course two-edged, and I shall not confine myself to one side of it, but try to describe this change as I see it and its significance to the theme of this conference.

At the beginning of this period of fifty years the popular view of science as a source of instructional and diverting recreation was rapidly changing to the belief in science as the philosophy of a new age and the key to utopia; people would say

> When science has discovered something more
> We shall be happier than we were before.

This is not often said nowadays. More often science is regarded at best as a protection against one's enemies, natural as well as human. Thus the development of the techniques used in television led also to radar; after X-rays and radium came the atomic bomb; with the jet engine came not only faster air travel but also better fighters, bombers and the new guided missiles; after plastics came penicillin.

Alongside of this, the brilliant individual scientist who was often master of more than one of the many fields of science has been replaced by the research team; and the names of boffin or back-room boy do not carry with them the same air of cultured respectability that was formerly attached to the great men of science. Even in the research team it is often difficult for a

scientist working in one field to communicate with his fellow-scientist working in another field; and those few who attempt to talk to non-scientists are often rewarded with misinterpretation by their audience and abuse from their colleagues.

This failure of communication has come about through the dispersal of the sciences, and this has made it particularly difficult even for the scientist to understand and clarify the change of viewpoint to which I have already referred. Certainly the scientist, far from being complacent, is more likely to be confused or even frightened. Professor Dingle has pointed out that the ideas about science held by scientists of repute are frequently so different that the situation would be comic were it not made tragic by the course of events. And I find that few except the Christians and Marxists are prepared to give other than a simple economic reason for their attachment to science.

Thus what you will find here can only be the views of a particular person at a particular time, though the views of one who has held for some time now that Christianity and science are compatible, and in fact that a tension between them can only be due to a failure of understanding on one side or the other.

With this stipulation I shall attempt to show that the change to a new belief about the nature of scientific knowledge, linked as it was with a shift in the popular view of science and a corresponding change in the status of the scientist, has implications that demand a reinterpretation of human existence.

The change of viewpoint came about because scientific theory had outrun many of the ideas the founders of science had given to it. It became obvious, too, that it was beginning to outrun common sense. This was more serious, because science had begun as organized common sense; the first task of scientists had been the correction of the mistakes of commonplace experience. The resulting reorganization of the foundations of scientific beliefs, of which quantum mechanics and relativity theory are only a part, and which is by no means yet in a satisfactory state, was very sweeping. As Whitehead puts it, every scientific proposition which the great scientists of the mid-nineteenth century entertained was erroneous in the sense that it was then construed. Their doctrine of space was wrong: their doctrine of matter was wrong: their doctrines of evidence were wrong.

I confess that it is unlikely that the scientists of the mid-twentieth century will find their doctrines to be more enduring, for the reorganization is still going on. Scientists have abandoned the belief that a scientific explanation is an exhaustive one; and prefer to talk even inside their own subject in terms of complementary

descriptions, so that, for example, a wave-description is said to be complementary to a particle-description. This implies a decision against the reductionist who would assert that an analysis can be exhaustive, and ignores the different emphases given by different methods and different levels of abstraction. As the scientific conception of the world came to differ more and more from the commonsense conception, it became no longer possible to say things are not what they seem. Science is no longer organized common sense, and nearly all physics nowadays has as its aim no more than a description of phenomena by a scheme of symbols connected by mathematical equations.

The conclusion we shall make is that the scientific world, and indeed the commonsense world, are deductions from experience, and that we need a reinterpretation of experience that will enable us to be consistent at the level of attitude or will, while admitting the possibility of several complementary descriptions of that experience.

This conclusion points to the importance of a proper understanding of the process of symbolization in every department of thought, aesthetic and theological as well as scientific, so that we may find out how these complementary descriptions are built up as men seek through symbols to hold and make permanent a feature of the transitory flux of events we call experience. Such symbolization is necessary for communication, and probably for any thinking at all. But it carries with it dangers for the unwary, and in particular that of compulsion by the logical form. It is certainly true in science that the structure of the minimum vocabulary of scientific intercourse has had very far-reaching effects. Eddington was the first to work this out in any detail for physics, though Whitehead had pointed to the danger much earlier. Eddington's work was the forerunner of the recent developments in a branch of communication theory known now as information theory, and MacKay, a colleague of mine, has shown that an analysis of the nature of scientific knowledge in terms of the acquisition of information leads to the general principle that the limit to scientific observation is the limit of our logical vocabulary. This means that at the foundation of quantum physics is linguistic, and that the uncertainty principle, the nature of entropy, and the applicability of induction as a scientific method are consequences of the atomicity of the fundamental language of science. Science and Christianity are usually treated as two sides of our experience expressed in one language; may it not be that they are in fact one experience expressed in two languages, or perhaps one language used at different levels of abstraction?

It is obvious that with so much of the ground of old arguments cleared away it has become harder to talk of conflict; but the traditional concept of nature is in the melting pot and a challenge remains. But before this is stated there is one more point to be made about the recent developments of science which affects more particularly our concept of man, and the sciences of biology, physiology and psychology. The rapid progress in low-power electrical engineering has produced the radio, television and radar; it may well cause much more sweeping changes in our everyday life, and even, it has been suggested, a second industrial revolution by the establishment of automatic factories. But of chief importance is the question which has been raised by the performance of computing machines utilizing large numbers of radio valves. The question is how far such machines can in principle exhibit the kind of mentality which has often been said to differentiate man from the rest of nature. At the symposium of the Aristotelian Society held this summer on the subject of mentality in machines, the thesis was (I think successfully) defended by MacKay that as far as we can find words for tests to distinguish between mentality in man and mentality in a machine, these tests can in principle be met by the machine. This does not mean that there is no difference between mentality in a machine and mentality in the full human sense, but it does mean that we cannot state this difference. And it also means that we must not expect to find in the brain or elsewhere anything outside the reach of the analysis of the scientist.

If, then, it is true that our concepts of nature and of man both need rethinking, and indeed the evidence for this that has accumulated in the first half of this century is much more than I have been able to state here, then our ideas about the relationship between God, man and nature must be involved, and this presents a challenge as much to the churchman and theologian as to the scientist. The medieval conception of this relationship was in terms of a teleological hierarchy of Aristotelian forms, with God at the top, and man intermediate in reality and importance between Him and nature. With the coming of the new knowledge, at about the time of Galileo, this picture became altered. God was conceived as the creator of the atoms, the existence of man and nature being independent of each other and of God. To picture God as this kind of cosmic mechanic, though this is a notion that has been with us for many centuries, will no longer do. If I may venture on to the less firm ground of speculation for a while, it seems to me that only a view that does full justice to the continuing presence of God in the creative process and His Will to redeem both

an and nature can be adequate. Perhaps then we shall be able
o say as Dante did:

> 'God made what moves through mind and space with so great order that they who look on it may never be without some taste of him.'

It now remains to state the challenge as this emerges from the nange of viewpoint I have been describing. As the simple security the laboratory and the old orthodox assumptions about weight nd measurement, about material, space, time and energy, have ssolved away, the scientist has found himself expected to bear n increasing responsibility to nature, his fellow-men, and God; e is confused about his own subject, and he knows that the powers at he is developing may well enslave him and destroy his science. is power to influence the nature of human existence grows as uickly as his knowledge, but now, perhaps for the first time, there no agreed philosophy by which he can judge the results of s work. Is his vision good or evil? This is a question which is ways with the scientist; and with it goes the responsibility of nderstanding and explaining the implications of his work and the ature of his results.

If he is a Christian he has the further duty of resolving the sues of his theology and his science so that he may worship God ith all his heart and all his mind. This is not easy, and is not to e confused with squaring theology with physics, which usually ads to bad theology based on inadequate physics. This is easily ustrated by an example. In an attempt to square the Transguration of Christ with the Cartesian concept of matter as exounded by nineteenth-century science, some have suggested that e Transfiguration was a psychic or psychological event, or even at it did not occur as part of Christ's earthly life at all. This ems to me to be a mistake, for I believe that this was a physical ent as much as the whole of Christ's life, and the Transfiguraon is important to the scientist as a demonstration of the redempon of creation. With the passing of orthodox materialism it may e possible to recapture the richly confused notion of the flesh nich has always been part of the heritage of Christianity.

The challenge to the Churches is as immediate. It is now ossible to hope for a 'new Reformation' from the Christian side. he first battle for religion has to be fought on the ground of uth, and in the name of Him who said 'I am the Truth.' If velation is truth as encounter and faith is knowledge as enunter, as Brunner declared, then surely scientific knowledge and ith, scientific truth and revelation, can acknowledge a common urce in that experience of God and the living Christ from which

we deduce our concepts of the world. Too often the theologian has been tempted into making the assumption that Christ is dead, and therefore the problem is to make true propositions about Him; if Christ lives, then the question is how can we know Him as truth, and truth as Him. The Augustinian-Franciscan principle that God is truth (and, therefore, immediately certain more than anything else, including myself) began to be lost, according to Tillich, when Thomas Aquinas interpreted it in Aristotelian terms and said that God is immediately certain for Himself but not for us. If God is He without Whom not, He on Whom we can lay no hold at all, if God is truth in this sense, and we follow Christ who said 'I am the Truth' in the power of the Holy Spirit who will lead us into all truth, then the way is open to an interpretation of the symbolizing activity of man, whether it is in science or elsewhere, as based on a common experience of God as truth. It is a big task; but it is a necessity demanded not only by reason but also by charity.

THE PRESENT STATE OF BIBLICAL STUDIES

By Rev. Professor S. G. F. Brandon, M.A., D.D., Professor of Comparative Religion in the University of Manchester

I

IN his *History of the Jews*, which was first published in 1830, Dean Milman advances the following explanation for the notable fate of Lot's wife:

> 'Lot, warned of the impending ruin, fled with his daughters. His wife, in contempt of repeated warnings, lingering behind, was suffocated by the sulphureous vapours, and her body encrusted with saline particles which filled the atmosphere. Later tradition, founded on a literal interpretation of the Mosaic account, pointed to a heap or column of salt, which bore perhaps some resemblance to a human form, and was believed, even by the historian Josephus, who had seen it, to be the pillar into which she was transformed.'[1]

Such a rationalised explanation of an incident recorded in the Bible was at that time portentous, and the significance of Milman's work in this respect was recognised by his friend, Dean Stanley, when he described *The History of the Jews* as

> 'the first decisive inroad of German theology into England, the first palpable indication that the Bible could be studied like another book; that

[1] *Everyman* ed., vol. i, pp. 40-1.

the characters and events of sacred history could be treated at once critically and reverently.'

We have travelled a long way since Dean Milman first introduced into England the rationalistic methods of Biblical study which had been established in Germany, and we may well wonder what the good Dean would think, if he were to return and realise what has been achieved by the methods which he so early commended by his example. What would be the likely tenor of those reflections I shall not attempt to divine: my task is to endeavour to evaluate the general consequences of that critical study of the Bible, which has now been carried on for more than a century, and to relate them to that greater synthesis which Christian thinkers must ever be constructing of their traditional faith, of the new knowledge which is constantly being won by scientific research, and of experience of living in this world of promise and fear, which our science and our sins have created.

We shall naturally begin our examination by noting the main trends of critical research in the Old Testament. The present position in this field may best be described as one of flux — of the perplexity which may mark the beginning of a reaction to a movement which had itself been a reaction to the first great achievement of Old Testament research.[2] This original achievement was, of course, that scheme, associated with the name of Wellhausen, which explained the Pentateuch as a composition built out of a number of sources, of which the chronological sequence could be distinguished: these sources, designated by the letters J, E, D, and P, have become familiar to several generations of students. In 1931 the Danish scholar Pedersen began a serious criticism of the Wellhausen hypothesis, alleging that it had largely been conditioned by the contemporary presuppositions of Hegelian and evolutionary thought. Pedersen maintained that, while the method of source criticism had a certain validity in determining the order of events, it largely failed when applied to describing the culture of a people, for a culture is a thing so complex that it is fundamentally hazardous to attempt to divide it into successive stages and to equate those stages with hypothetical sources.[3] Together with this anti-evolutionary trend has gone a lively study of the evidence of cultic prophecy, which has tended to show that the earlier assumption of a serious opposition between prophet and

[2] For recent surveys of the situation see the essay by C. R. North entitled 'Pentateuchal Criticism' in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, ed. H. H. Rowley (Oxford, 1951); O. Eissfeldt, *Geschichtsschreibung im Alten Testament* (Berlin, 1948).

[3] In *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, xlix (1931), pp. 173-5.

priest in ancient Israel had been unjustified.[4] Then there has been the influence of the so-called 'Myth and Ritual School,' which undertook to show that there was a common pattern of myth and ritual connected with the concept of divine-kingship in the ancient Near East and that many of the beliefs and practices of Israel are to be understood in terms of it.[5] Research along these lines, which is particularly associated with the Uppsala school of Old Testament studies, is still a dominant feature of Old Testament study; but there are signs of growing opposition and of interest in other directions, and, despite all, it would seem that the earlier system of sources, J, E, D, and P, is still to be regarded as basically sound, for we find Professor C. R. North writing in the latest volume of the Old Testament Society[6]:

> 'There is about J at least, an architectonic quality which argues for an 'author' who flourished at some time in the ninth or tenth century B.C. He was, if we will, a 'collector,' and additions were made to his work. But it was he who gave to Hebrew tradition its abiding form, a form which was determinative for subsequent ages.'

In my opinion, however, the most significant change in our evaluation of the Old Testament has been occasioned more by the work which has been done outside the actual study of the Old Testament documents. During the last half-century, and indeed during the last two decades, the investigation of the cultures of the various peoples of the ancient Near East has made remarkable progress, especially through archaeological discovery.[7] This new information, together with a better understanding of the material which we already possessed, has enabled us to see more

[4] Cf. O. Eissfeldt in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, pp. 116 sq.; H. H. Rowley, *The Growth of the Old Testament* (London, 1950), pp. 79 sq.; E. Jacob in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, t. xxxii (1952), pp. 59-69.

[5] The classic statement of the thesis is contained in the collections of essays entitled *Myth and Ritual* (Oxford, 1933) and *The Labyrinth* (London, 1935), both edited by S. H. Hooke. Cf. E. O. James, *Christian Myth and Ritual* (London, 1937), pp. 1-41; G. Widengren in *Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the History of Religions* (Amsterdam, 1951), pp. 102-5. See the general criticism of the theory by H. Frankfort, *The Problem of Similarity in Ancient Near Eastern Religions* (Frazer Lecture, 1950, published Oxford, 1951). Cf. T. Fish, 'Some Aspects of Kingship in the Sumerian City and Kingdom of Ur' (*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, No. 1, 1951), p. 43, nt. 1; G. W. Anderson in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, pp. 296 sq.

[6] *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, p. 81; cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (London, 1952), pp. 140-1.

[7] For a survey of the chief archaeological data discovered since the end of the First World War see W. F. Albright's essay entitled 'The Old Testament and the Archaeology of the Ancient East' in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*. See also on the Ras Shamra and Mari evidence respectively E. Jacob in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, t. xxvii (1947), pp. 242-258, A. Parrot, *ibid*, t. xxx (1950), pp. 1-11.

clearly what features of Israelite religion were common to the religions of the ancient peoples of the Near East and what were significantly different. In concept of deity, in cultus, in ethics, and in eschatology, Israel has been found to be not so distinctive as was once thought; in fact there are some matters, such as the Osirian Judgment of the Dead in Ancient Egypt, which indicate a higher spiritual sensitivity on the part of some other peoples than that which prevailed among the Hebrews at the same period.[8]

The unique factor in Israelite religion which appears to emerge from this comparative study is constituted by what Old Testament scholars call *Heilsgeschichte*. This convenient German term may perhaps be best translated as 'Salvation-History,' for it means that interpretation of History, which we find running through the Hexateuch, which seeks to show how Yahweh, the god of Israel, gradually achieved his purpose of settling the descendants of Abraham victoriously in the land of Canaan.[9]

This *Heilsgeschichte* appears in origin to have been the creation of that writer or school which Old Testament scholars designate as the Yahwist or J. The achievement must certainly be ranked among the most remarkable products of the ancient world; for, by drawing upon an amorphous collection of tribal traditions, folk legends and mythology, the Yahwist fabricated a superb conspectus of the past, arranged as a coherent narrative, in which the providence of Yahweh is traced out from the Creation down to the conquest of Canaan by the Israelite tribes under the leadership of Joshua. The narrative is indeed most skilfully arranged in three consecutive episodes: the first, which we may call the Primaeval History, sets the drama of Yahweh's providence on a world-wide stage from the creation and fall of Man down to the scattering abroad of the peoples consequent on their impious act of building the Towel of Babel; from this point the Yahwist skilfully contrives the transition from the stage of world-history to Yahweh's dealings with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the great ancestors of the Israelite tribes, and Yahweh's future intention is revealed in the promises which he makes to these patriarchs; the transition from these Patriarchal Sagas is cleverly effected by the use of the Joseph legend, and so the drama is carried to its triumphant conclusion of Israel's rescue by Yahweh from the Egyptian bondage and its settlement in Canaan, thus fulfilling the ancient promises.

[8] Cf. J. Vandier, *La Religion égyptienne* (Paris, 1949), pp. 134-7. See also generally J. H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience* (New York, 1935).

[9] See S. G. F. Brandon, *Time and Mankind* (London, 1951), chap. IV and the references given in the notes on pp. 85-92.

This interpretation of History in terms of the providence of a national god is quite without parallel in the literatures of the other peoples of the ancient world. Records do indeed abound in the form of royal inscriptions in which victories are attributed to various deities, but we have no instance of the composition of a narrative, purporting to cover an immense period of time, in which the purpose of a god is shown as being gradually fulfilled.[10] We may accordingly describe the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte* as a teleological interpretation of History which was unique in its time and place.

What we then may recognise as the unique achievement of Hebrew thought became, however, a fateful influence within the life of Israel. For a people to believe that its god had directed the course of history to secure its possession of a particular land has dangerous potentialities, especially when that god is exalted into the almighty creator and controller of the universe, while the people lose the control of the land to a foreign conqueror. We can discern the consequences at work in Israel from the time of the Exile onwards.[11] The ever worsening position of Israel politically amid the great empires of the ancient Near East presented a grave challenge to the devotees of Yahweh. If faith in the providence of their god was to be maintained, some inspiring interpretation of the nation's destiny had to be found. Two possibilities offered themselves, and the choice between them, as we can see now in retrospect, was in turn a challenge to the spiritual sensibility of the Hebrew people. The one line of interpretation lay in casting the vindication of Yahweh's providence for Israel into the future and believing that Israel's destiny, still conceived of in political terms, would be gloriously achieved with the coming of Yahweh's Messiah. The other line of interpretation was that of re-evaluating the national destiny as a spiritual mission to spread abroad the knowledge of God among the Gentiles — a mission which would only be accomplished through suffering. This latter interpretation is represented to us by the Suffering Servant sagas of Deutero-Isaiah, but, beyond this noble manifestation, it has left scarcely any other memorial of itself in the Hebrew records. It was belief in the future political vindication of Israel which prevailed: its literary memorial remains in the apocalyptic literature which has come down to us; its historical memorial was the destruction of the Jewish nation in A.D. 70, for it inspired that fanatical challenge to

[10] The attempt to explain the imperial achievement of Rome in terms of divine providence, of which Virgil's *Aeneid* is the classic example, was clearly a conscious literary effort and was not inspired by, nor in turn inspired, a dynamic faith such as that which animated Israel, see Brandon, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-158.

[11] Cf. Brandon, *op. cit.*, chap. V and notes.

Roman power which resulted in the overthrow of Israel's life as a nation in the land of Yahweh's ancient promise until its restoration through the violence of 1948.

If, then, we may regard appreciation of the uniqueness of the Yahwist *Heilsgeschichte* as the most significant result of recent research into the Old Testament and its cultural environment, it would seem that we must view the course of Israel's history as a tragic drama of spiritual failure. But even more important is it that we properly realise the nature of the legacy which the Hebrew interpretation of History has transmitted to the Western World, for the influence of the Yahwist *Heilsgeschichte* did not end in the carnage at Jerusalem in A.D. 70. The transmission of that legacy lay through Christianity.

II

Christianity was the child of Judaism, but the circumstances attending its birth, and indeed the process itself, are obscure. This obscurity has been an abiding challenge to scholars, and many fine intellects in Europe and America have been employed in the task of its elucidation. Unfortunately, too many of these attempts have been undertaken in a spirit of apologetic to substantiate doctrinal presuppositions. However, even when much of this work has been thus motivated, it has had consequences of immense significance, which are surely, if slowly, making their influence felt. The most important of these consequences, as I see it, is one that is certainly disturbing, but it has an inescapable logic and Christian thinkers will be wise to face it realistically. It is the perception that in the documents at our disposal we can never make direct contact with Jesus of Nazareth; always are we seeing Him through the medium of other interpreting minds. Hence the Gospels have to be evaluated, not as factual records of what Jesus did and said, but as expressions of the opinions of Christians of the second generation, which were compounded of their own spiritual experience and the tradition which they had received.[12]

[12] See the present writer's article entitled 'The Logic of New Testament Criticism' in *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. xlvii (1948-9), pp. 144-152, where a fuller statement of this view is given. See also the conclusions reached by Ch. Guignebert, *Jésus* (Paris, 1933), pp. 56-8, and M. Goguel, *The Life of Jesus* (English trans., London, 1933), pp. 201-4, and the very cautious, and therefore significant, statement of B. H. Streeter in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (1936), pp. 274-5. Reference at least should be made here to the important new movement in Germany, initiated by R. Bultmann, to 'demythologise' (*entmythologisieren*) the Gospel: a full account is given in the symposium entitled *Kerygma und Mythos*, ed. H. W. Bartsch (Hamburg, 1948). However, the issue is significant rather for theological than for historical scholarship.

The study of Christian Origins is, accordingly, the study of a number of interpretations of the being and work of Jesus which in their present form were not composed by men who had been the original disciples of Jesus. Now this situation would require the most careful handling, even if we were convinced that we had simply to do with a number of personal interpretations of a common tradition and experience, for the development of Form Criticism has shown how complex were the factors which operated to shape the tradition concerning Jesus during its oral stage. But the situation is gradually being seen as one which is even more complicated, and there is a tendency to recognise that the conflict between Paul and the Jerusalem Christians, the importance of which was discerned long ago by the members of the so-called Tübingen School, had a far greater significance than the opponents of that School recognised.[13]

The way to clearer vision here is by freeing oneself from the impression which the magnitude of Paul's writings in the New Testament corpus naturally creates. In comparison with the writings attributed to other apostles, those of Paul bulk so large that there is an inevitable tendency to accept the fact as evidence of Paul's leadership in the Primitive Church. However, if we can resist this tendency and read Paul's letters with an open mind, we quickly perceive that their author is by no means accepted as the great exponent of the faith by the first generation of Christians. Indeed, far to the contrary: we see on a careful reading of his epistles that Paul is involved in serious conflict with other Christians. And this conflict concerned no less an issue that the status and mission of Jesus, and Paul's opponents were no other than the Jewish Christians of Jerusalem, who formed the original community of the disciples and who were, therefore, the accepted exponents of the original tradition.

The admission of this profound difference between the teaching of Paul and that of the Jerusalem Church is strenuously resisted by conservative scholarship, which in effect prefers to accept the idealised account of the Primitive Church given in the later *Acts of the Apostles* than to face frankly what Paul himself says

[13] Cf. H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen, 1949); S. G. F. Brandon, *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church* (London, 1951); M. Simon in *The Modern Churchman*, vol. xlii (1952), pp. 49-50. See also the present writer's articles: 'Tübingen Vindicated?' in *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. xlix (1950); 'Recent Interpretations of Christian Origins' in *The Modern Churchman*, vol. xli (1951). General reference should also be made to the recent article by the veteran French scholar M. Goguel entitled 'Ce que l'Église doit à l'apôtre Paul,' in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, vol. xxxi (1951), pp. 157-180.

n his letters about the situation in which he was engaged. Such n attitude is unfortunate, since it tends to conceal an issue of profound import for our understanding of the original significance f Christianity in its cultural context, and, in consequence, it bstructs the task of interpreting Christianity to our age by caus- ng it to defend unnecessary positions.

In explanation of this statement I can only set forth briefly here what I have discussed at length elsewhere.[14] It is that the erusalem Christians were so firmly anchored in the ethnic faith of srael that they could only conceive of their Master's status and nission in terms of the Jewish Messianic hope. This meant that hey instinctively saw Jesus as the one who was to play the lead- ng role in the culminating drama of the Israelite *Heilsgeschichte*: he memory of their expectation has been preserved in the words which they address to the Risen Jesus just before He ascends to he heavens — 'Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom o Israel?'[15]

Paul was inspired by his own experience and influenced by his wn cultural background to see in Jesus the pre-existent Son of God, whose death had been divinely foreordained to save all man- ind, the essential condition for participating in this salvation eing faith in Jesus as Lord. Such an interpretation of Chris- ianity contained a logic which completely negated the significance f the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte*, with its basic doctrine of Israel's nique election as the people of God — hence the vigorous an- agonism of the Jerusalem Christians.

To savour the full poignancy of the conflict which rent the in- ant Christian movement in the first three decades of its life we nust notice that Paul, supreme champion as he was of universal- sm, was agonised at heart by this contradiction of Israel's hopes. 'Did God cast off his people?' he asks with incredulity in his *Epistle to the Romans*:[16] as a Jew he cannot contemplate the nought that after such signal demonstrations of God's especial avour in their past history the present failure of his compatriots o accept Jesus must cause their final rejection, while multitudes f the Gentiles would be saved. Paul fabricates a specious argu- ient about the Godly Remnant which constitutes the True srael;[17] but the significance of his concern here lies in his instinc- ve avoidance of facing the logic of his own doctrine of salvation nrough faith in a universal saviour-god.[18]

[14] In *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church.*

[15] *Acts*, i, 6.

[16] *Rom.* xi, 1

[17] *Rom.* xi, 2-10.

[18] e.g. *Rom.* x, 12-13.

I have attempted to show at length elsewhere[19] that Paul was defeated in his contest with the Jerusalem Christians and that his interpretation of Christianity would undoubtedly have been doomed to oblivion but for an event which burst in upon the infant Church and completely shattered the pattern which the Jewish Christians were successfully imposing upon its life. This event was the Jewish war against Rome which started in A.D. 66 and virtually ended with the destruction of Jerusalem four years later.

As seen in the context of our concern here, the Jewish overthrow of A.D. 70 appears to be a veritable intervention of God to save the infant faith of Christianity from the fate which its ancient *Heilsgeschichte* had brought upon Israel itself. In other words, but for the shattering of the fabric of Judaism and the obliteration of the Jerusalem Church, the movement initiated by Jesus of Nazareth would have been kept within the confines of Israel's ethnic faith. As it was, the destruction of the Temple proclaimed the obsolescence of the Jewish cultus, which Paul had already divined, and we find this truth announced in the first Christian Gospel, i.e., the *Gospel of Mark*, composed shortly after A.D. 70, in the symbolic rending of the Temple veil at the death upon the cross of Jesus, the saviour-god of all mankind.[20]

But, although Christianity thus broke free from the ethnic constrictions of Judaism, it did not choose to emancipate itself from the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte*. The reason for this is a complicated one.[21] Paul, in his attempt to account for the fact that the great majority of the Jews continued to reject the claims made on behalf of Jesus by His disciples, had found it convenient to argue that the True Israel was not that 'after the flesh,' but that according to the spirit, which included Gentile believers.[22] This was a piece of *ad hoc* apologetic so far as Paul was concerned, and he was too dominated by belief in the immediacy of the Second Coming to exploit the theological possibilities of this thesis. However, the steady recession of the apocalyptic hope among Christians after A.D. 70, and the increasing need of presenting Christianity in a way calculated to appeal to the sensibilities of the educated members of Graeco-Roman society, naturally led to the desire to show that

[19] The above cited work, chap. 7.

[20] *Mark*, xv, 38.

[21] It may be noted that R. Bultmann, *Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen* (Zürich, 1949), believes that Jesus was fundamentally opposed to the basic concepts of the Hebrew interpretation of History. He writes: 'Auch für Jesus *offenbart sich Gott nicht mehr in der Volksgeschichte*. und wenn er auf Gottes Gericht hinweist, so meint er damit nicht Katastrophen in der Völkergeschichte wie die alten Propheten, so wenig wie die von ihm erwartete Gottersherrschaft in der Herstellung eines glänzenden israelitischen Reiches besteht' (p. 87).

[22] *Rom.* ix, 1-13, 22-33. cf. I *Cor.* x, 18.

he faith was not an upstart thing which had emerged from the ewish underworld some few years before, but that it had behind t an impressive past. Accordingly, the precedence set by Paul n identifying the Church as the True Israel suggested a fruitful ray of providing the new faith with a venerable antiquity. And so Christian apologetic was gradually elaborated which utilised the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte*, as set forth in what consequently became he Old Testament, in showing that the mission of Jesus was the ulfilment of the age-long purpose of God.[23] This meant in effect he incorporating of what was in origin the peculiar Yahwist interretation of the past in terms of the providence of Yahweh for his eople Israel into the structure of Christian theology. The conseuences of this act have been immense and they should be recogised by Christians to-day.

By wedding what was essentially a cult of personal salvation ith a philosophy of History, Christianity became possessed of a nique *Weltanschauung* and one capable of inspiring a vigorous nd confident approach to life and its problems. It embraced the hole course of Time from its beginning to its future cessation ith the catastrophic end of the world at the Second Coming of hrist. On this vast stage was played out the drama of God's an to save fallen humanity. The drama had a twofold aspect: acrocosmically it set forth in its consequent stages the majestic nfolding of the divine purpose — here the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte* was used to provide the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, and e career of Jesus was seen as dividing the ages, for with his sacrical death the new era of salvation began and would continue ntil the number of the elect was completed and Christ returned in dgment; the microcosmic side of this divine teleology concerned e destinies of individual men and women — for each this life as decisive for salvation or damnation, but by the grace of God ch could also have his part in the greater purpose through membership in the divine society of the Church. Thus life was seen, oth micro- and macrocosmically, as a drama of supreme import, nd, in turn, the passage of Time was invested with an urgent eaning, which contrasted so notably with the cyclic interpretaons of Greek and Indian thought.[24]

[23] Cf. O. Cullmann, *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich, 1946), pp. 101-3, 108-; M. Simon, *Verus Israel* (Paris, 1948), pp. 105-117; S. J. Case, *The hristian Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1943), pp. 25-29; Brandon, *Time nd Mankind*, pp. 170-1.

[24] Cf. H. C. Puech's paper entitled 'Temps, Histoire et Mythe dans le hristianisme des premiers siècles,' in *Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the tory of Religions* (Amsterdam, 1951); M. Eliade, *Traité d'Histoire des ligions* (Paris, 1949), pp. 332-349; Brandon, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-3, 180-3.

To complete the survey we must notice that the effect of modern Biblical research has been gradually to acquaint us with the factors which operated to produce this teleological conception of History, and this process has inevitably meant that, while this interpretation has come to be better appreciated in terms of its contemporary significance, as Professor Oscar Cullmann's book, *Christ and Time*,[25] shows, it is no longer accepted as an accurate evaluation of the period of history with which it professes to deal. And this growth of scepticism has, of course, been greatly reinforced by the general verdict of secular research into the origins of the human race and the early evolution of its culture.

III

Our subject has been the bearing of recent Biblical study; but it will not be outside of our terms of reference to comment briefly upon the present intellectual crisis in the world of Western Culture, for that crisis has to a very large degree been produced by the abandonment of the traditional Christian philosophy of History.[26] The structure of Western thought is essentially teleological; by instinct Western man looks optimistically towards the future, strengthened by the belief that Time is a field of high significance. But to-day our philosophers and our historians, in so far as they concern themselves with such matters, deny that there are any adequate sanctions for a teleological interpretation of the temporal process. The logic of this conclusion, if realistically faced, must lead to pessimism and negation of any belief that human life has any significance beyond that of mere physical survival. The consequences of such an attitude, if it came effectively to permeate the whole of society, needs no elaboration. Hence the task of the Christian thinker is obvious. He must carefully study the origin and evolution of the traditional Christian philosophy of History, not with a view to presenting apologetical version of it, but to understanding the forces which brought it into being.[27] For it would seem that in Man's sense of Time resides the clue to that

[25] The English translation (London, 1950) of Cullmann's *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich, 1946). For a review see *The Modern Churchman*, vol. xxxviii (1948), pp. 124-7; a review of the English version will shortly appear in *The Modern Churchman*.

[26] 'La nécessité d'une philosophie de l'histoire se trouve inscrite dans la structure même de la crise de conscience de l'Occident.' R. Mehl, art. entitled 'Philosophie ou Théologie de l'Histoire,' in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, t. xxx (1950), p. 96. Cf. H. Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London, 1949), p. 4.

[27] See the present writer's article: 'History's Challenge to Theology' in *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. l (1951), pp. 56-62.

n which he differs essentially from the other animals, because that ense of Time prevents him from enjoying a complete animal im- nersion in the here-now of present experience, it causes him to nticipate change, and, above all, to be conscious of his own mor- ality. Such a sense, which has so often inspired what might be alled anti-biological action, is not to be adequately explained in erms of neural adaptation to environment[28] nor as a mode in which nought expresses itself:[29] it is clearly that sense which has im- arted to Man that innate feeling of insecurity and discontent hich has inspired his cultures and civilisations. The Bible eveals to us one of the most significant of Man's attempts to in- erpret the meaning of Time; but there have been many other ttempts which have found expression in the great religious and hilosophical systems of the past. There is thus an immense field or analytical and comparative study, and it may truly be pproached in the conviction that Man must persist in his search or some abiding significance in the unceasing flux of Time.

[28] 'Mind, recognizable mind, seems to have arisen in connection with the otor act. Where motor integration progressed and where motor behaviour ogressively evolved, mind progressively evolved.' C. Sherrington, *Man on ; Nature* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 213.

[29] Cf. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, 1948), p. 126; G. le, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1950), pp. 226 sq.

RELIGION IN THE UNIVERSITIES

By M. B. Foster, M.A., Student of Christ Church and Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion

Recent Developments

I SHALL speak of recent developments in the state of religion in the universities, say within the last ten years, so far as I have been able to observe them.

1. In the *official relations* of universities to religion there has been a movement in several universities, which were founded in the nineteenth century on a secular basis, to acquire theological departments. The importance of this in itself should not be exaggerated, but it is significant of a turn in the tide of opinion. It marks the end of the confident belief in the self-sufficiency of the secular university, and of the idea that education and culture have only to cut themselves loose from the leading-strings of religion in order to flourish and progress.

2. As regards the *students* (when one speaks of religion in universities one thinks first of students) my experience is mostly confined to Oxford.

If we compare post-war with pre-war Oxford, it shows a marked increase in the interest in religion on the part of undergraduates. To some extent this has taken the place of an interest in politics. This does not mean that political interests are not still important; but the *religious* interest which in pre-war days showed itself in political forms (in such things as 'Red' political clubs, marching with the unemployed, passionate interest in the Spanish Civil War) is turned into religious channels.

Symptoms of this interest in religion are the existence of a discussion club in Oxford — which has existed ever since the war and has attracted varying, but sometimes large, numbers—which provides an open forum for the discussion of religious questions, or questions to which a religious answer is relevant. Christian missions to the university attract large numbers to hear an exposition of the Christian faith; and in Cambridge annual courses of lectures, in which distinguished lecturers (among them Professors H. A. Hodges and H. Butterfield) have been invited to present their faith to general university audiences, have had a large response. I have heard that Professor Hodges some years ago, speaking on 'The Logic of Christian Thinking,' had an audience of five hundred, that twelve discussion groups were formed to discuss what he had said, and that a term or two later the lecturer

was recalled to answer questions emerging from these discussions. But I do not think that this increased interest is reflected in a proportionate increase in the numbers of those who profess themselves Christians and who are active in Christian student organizations.

Among Christian students there has been an increase in a fundamentalist approach to their religion. The movement has been away from an intellectual approach and towards worship and Christian community. This has shown itself in the growth of the 'Inter-Varsity Fellowship,' and of the denominational religious societies. Professor Grensted noticed these developments in his paper. He thought they were symptomatic of a flight to dogma, and of a 'withdrawal from the free and growing life of the spirit.' I do not doubt that this is sometimes the case; but I do not agree that it is always so. On the contrary, I think these are movements in search of the life of the spirit, but in a different direction.

Perhaps I may try to illustrate what seems to me to be the position in this matter. I had an American pupil (he was nominally my pupil, but he taught me more than I ever taught him) who was writing a thesis on the religious and social philosophy of T. H. Green, the influential Balliol tutor of the mid-nineteenth century, who was one of the pioneers of the spirit which characterized nineteenth-century Oxford and to some extent still characterizes it. I learned from him that Green, in some letters to Scott-Holland, expressed his opinion of the conversion of Gerald Manley Hopkins, which took place about that time, to the Roman Catholic Church. This step seemed to Green to be a flight into ecclesiasticism, to show a cramping regard for individual sanctity; whereas the true course seemed to him to be to step out boldly and lose oneself in the work and service of the actual world (in 'simple religious citizenship') and to find God there.

I was reminded of this antithesis of Green's by what Professor Grensted said. But I do not believe that the choice which Green describes (I cannot say how accurate it was as a description of the alternatives before Hopkins) is open in these terms to a Christian student of the present day. He cannot find that religious fulfilment in the secular world which Green and his contemporaries could; he cannot make secular society his Church in that way. His turning to Bible study, worship, prayer and Christian community is a seeking for the 'free and growing life of the spirit' in other places than those in which his predecessors found it.

3. *University teachers.* The past ten years have seen the beginnings of a Christian movement among university teachers, parallel

in some ways to the Student Christian Movement among students, but (this is a striking fact) starting sixty years later. Of course dons have been engaged in the Student Christian Movement since its beginning — often to their own great benefit, as I and many others could testify — but it is not the same thing to be concerned as a 'Senior Friend' with a movement directed towards students as it is to be engaged in a movement directed towards dons themselves. It is not always easy to make the transition between the two attitudes, and I do not say that it is always completely made; but the new movement contains the implication that dons themselves are, equally with undergraduates, in need of evangelization, conversion and confirmation in the faith.

This movement began in this country during the latter years of the last war, when a small number of university teachers were drawn together by a common concern for the university — a questioning of what the task of the university was, and how far the contemporary university is performing it. They met together several times and corresponded over a period, and there emerged from their considerations a series of University Pamphlets, published about 1947 by the S.C.M. Press. There were twelve of these; the authors were Professors John Baillie, Dorothy Emmett, L. A. Reid, H. A. Hodges and others. (I should mention that previously and independently Mr. Arnold Nash had published his book, *The University in the Modern World*, which was a pioneer work.)

The authors of this group came to think that their conclusions should be put in the form of a book, and Sir Walter Moberly, who had been a member of the group, undertook to write it. The book which emerged was his *Crisis in the University* (1949). In January, 1949, while this book was still in page-proof, a four-day conference of university teachers was called at Swanwick by the Christian Frontier Council and the Student Christian Movement, acting jointly, and Sir Walter Moberly's book was made the basis of their discussions. About ninety attended.

The result of this conference was to call into existence (or to stimulate where they already existed) informal local groups of Christian dons in many universities, very varied in character, composition and durability. Some began as discussion groups for the discussion of the book. The conference also, before it disbanded, set up a central continuation committee, which continues to exist under the name of the 'Dons Advisory Group.' It consists of about twelve members, most of them university teachers, and meets about twice a year. It tries to act as a centre of communication between the local groups.

As I shall speak more about this movement, and shall probably tend to magnify it, I should like to stress now how slender and tenuous the whole set-up is. The groups make probably very little impact in any university upon the public consciousness. They are handicapped, as all such activities in universities are, by the difficulties of finding time. (I think, if I may say so in parenthesis, the difficulty of time is primarily not a mechanical but a spiritual problem, and that if we had solved that it would be a sign that we had solved much else also.)

A second conference of university teachers was held at Swanwick in March of this year, 1952, on the subject of 'The Vocation of the University Teacher.' About 130 attended. There were two representatives from the continent of Europe and a strong American delegation. (There is a similar movement among American university teachers, whose problems and approach are strikingly similar to our own.)

'The Crisis in the University'

I can perhaps best give some impressions of the ideas underlying this movement if I try, in a few sentences, to give what seem to me the main points of Sir Walter Moberly's book.

It arose—this, I think, is important—out of a concern for the university (not out of a concern for religion). It finds that the university is failing in its *educational* task; it is confining itself increasingly to the imparting of specialized techniques, while it affects neutrality in the important matters of belief and attitude to life, a neutrality which is itself partly an evasion, partly a sham. In these important things, therefore, the student gets no help from the university as such, and his opinions are left to be formed by 'agencies of a sub-university grade,' such as wireless, cinema and newspapers.

It might seem to be the obvious conclusion that the Christian should work for a 'Christian university.' For cannot Christianity pre-eminently supply precisely that guidance on these matters which the university is failing to provide?

It is the distinctive feature of Moberly's book that he rejects this conclusion. It is inadmissible for Christians to claim a privileged position for their religion in a national university when they are only a minority in the country; and such a privileged position, if it were conceded, would be damaging to the cause of Christianity itself.

The business of the Christian is something different. He has to 'help the university to be the university,' not to exploit it for

purposes which are not its own, even when these are Christian purposes. The Christian aim for the university is, therefore, that it should be a place in which fundamental issues are not ignored, but in which the students is confronted with them; and in which Christianity has no privilege, but the freedom to confront the student with its claims.

It is perhaps not unfair to say that this is a renovation of the idea of the liberal university, with a deepened understanding of what liberalism involves.

Some Comments

1. Moberly gives a diagnosis (it seems to me a masterly one) of the situation, but very little prescription. This may seem disappointing, but perhaps it is right. Perhaps there is not a 'Christian plan' for the university, as there is not a Christian plan for the world. Professor Jacques Ellul says in his *Coming of the Kingdom*: 'In order that Christianity may have a point of contact with the world, it is less important to have theories about economic and political questions than it is to create a new style of life.' The Church works on the world by existing in it, and perhaps this consideration throws light on the task of Christians in the university.

If we ask what *results* Moberly's book has had, it has stimulated the formation of Christian groups among university teachers. Of course, it is relevant to ask what these groups do; but, apart from that, it is not unimportant that they *exist*. I believe it has happened more than once that two university teachers, who have known each other for years as colleagues, have each discovered for the first time through meeting in such a group that the other was a Christian. One group keeps a list of names, the qualification for membership being willingness to have your name on the list. This is a kind of profession, and such recognition by Christians of one another is a beginning of the Church within the university.

Church suggests 'churchiness.' It is possible for groups of Christians to become exclusive and self-regarding. But whatever the faults of the existing groups, I think this fault is not in general characteristic of them. In fact, some of them seem to me almost to lean over backwards in their determination to avoid it.

2. I should like to mention, partly as a parallel, partly as an example, a Christian movement which has sprung up among medical doctors on the Continent. It is one of those lay movements on a professional basis which Mr. House referred to in his talk. It arose out of a common concern for their patients which different doctors felt. In spite of the great progress and striking

chievements of modern medical science, they felt conscious that he technical equipment which this science gave them was inadeuate to enable them truly to heal their patients. It was specialized, nd could treat a part, but genuine healing demanded a treatment f the patient as an individual and as a person. Such treatment alled for an understanding of the meaning of human life, death, ickness. Technical medicine did not give them this, and they urned in search of it to the Bible.

Dr. P. Tournier, of Geneva, who is one of the leaders in this ovement, has described how they summoned a conference at the cumenical Institute at Bossey, in Switzerland, to try to get light ogether on this matter. They were in a dilemma about Bible tudy, for experience had shown that, as ordinarily conducted, it ad a divisive effect. The members present came from a great ariety of Christian denominations, and Dr. Tournier recalled an xperience which he had had previously of a conference of scienists in Germany where there was the advantage that they were all f the same denomination, but where, when the clergyman conucted the Bible study, some attended, but some of the ablest cientists went for a walk in the park. To avoid this consequence hey substituted general discussion for Bible study, and exchanged heir ideas with general satisfaction on the subject of body, mind nd spirit. I forget exactly what terminated this discussion. It is bvious that a meeting would before long talk itself out on such a ubject, and Dr. Tournier relates how after a while they turned to Mlle Susanne de Dietrich, who was a member of the staff of the nstitute, with the request that she should give them an address on he Biblical doctrine of man.

The address which she delivered in response is described by Dr. Tournier as a remarkable performance. The point which bove all others remained in his mind is that Biblical conceptions nd ways of thought are unlike modern ones (with the result, if I ay add this gloss myself, that when we turn to the Bible we equire to unlearn some of our modern modes of thinking). On his stimulus they embarked upon the study of the Bible, and heir association returns each year to Bossey to continue it. Dr. Tournier has recently published some of the results of these enuiries in his remarkable and instructive book, *Bible et Médecine*. This attitude to the Bible may perhaps be called 'Fundamentalsm,' but it is not the Fundamentalism with which we are familiar. t does not set the Bible against science in those things which cience is able to determine, but turns to the Bible in those matters n which science shows itself (the more clearly, the more it proresses) unable to supply it.

It seems to me that this is an example of living Bible study, and that this association is, on this small sector, a part of the living Church. In this connection it seems to me important to notice that this association and this study were not sought by these doctors as a pious extra. Their discontent was not based on the fact that their medicine could cure only the bodies of their subjects, and that they wanted something else in order to care for the health of their souls. On the contrary, they were driven to them by consciousness of their inadequacy to do their own medical job solely with the technical science at their command.

I expect that the same compulsion will drive Christian university teachers along the same road.

CHRISTIAN MORAL STANDARDS AND CONTEMPORARY LIFE

By the Rev. F. A. Piachaud, M.A., B.D., Vicar of Christ Church, Chelsea

AT a time when an increasing number of people are accustomed to describe the twentieth century as the century of decadence in the way in which the nineteenth was regarded as the century of progress, it is worth pondering upon a problem which we are told occupied Mr. Gladstone towards the end of his life : ' How it was that a nation could apparently suffer a spiritual decline and yet be energetically employed in moral progress, the evidence for which was the steady removal of social ills by means of far-reaching parliamentary measures.' To this problem there are several contemporary answers proffered by Christian people. One would deny the fact of moral progress. Another would accept it with qualifications but would attribute it to a sort of delayed spiritual action — ' living on our spiritual capital ' is the phrase. Yet others would see a close correlation between the decline of a spurious spirituality and the fact of moral progress.

The question is not easy. But to ask it does lead us some little way into the vast territory covered by our subject, ' Christian Moral Standards and Contemporary Life.' The subject is complicated by the fact that neither term is capable of exact definition. What is ' Contemporary Life ' when we live in a period of flux, when the dominant note is change, when all that we can say is that we are passing through the eclipse of the post-Renaissance period, when the new is struggling to emerge, but what form it will take no one can tell? And again, when we recall how they have

varied over the centuries, can we give any final definition of Christian moral standards except to point to their original? But a greater complication is due to the fact that at any given period Christian moral standards and contemporary life cannot be isolated from each other. Christianity has again and again expressed itself in the ideological forms of the times, and conversely the thought and practice of any age in the Christian period has been shaped to some extent by Christian presuppositions. The process of disentangling the complex of genuinely religious factors from the ideological elements with which they are combined, and through which they seek to express themselves, is extremely difficult. For example, 'Who will be confident that he has ever spoken the last word concerning the tangle of economic motives, nationalist aspirations, intellectual reawakening and genuinely religious conviction which produced the tremendous reorientation of the European mind which we call the Reformation?' Critics, indeed, both from within and without the Church, and for opposite reasons, have not been slow to emphasize the fact that the Church's moral teaching is usually coloured and conditioned by the direction of social development, so that, as they put it, it is 'parasitic' upon the actual course of events rather than the prime cause of them.

For the early Christians their moral life was largely a matter of personal ethics, and Caesar was the arbiter of his proper realm. It was only by degrees, as changing circumstances produced new situations demanding responsible action, that moral considerations were extended from one sphere to another, involving each time a readjustment of conduct. So the Church was forced to take grave moral decisions, *e.g.* over its attitude to war and to civil government, when it found itself left with the religious and moral leadership of an elaborate imperialist society. In a memorable passage A. N. Whitehead declared 'the progress of humanity can be defined as the process of transforming society so as to make the original Christian ideals increasingly practicable for its individual members.' He goes on to add that, in the present state of society, 'a literal adherence to the moral precepts scattered throughout the Gospels would mean sudden death.'

Now I would submit that the significant fact of contemporary life is the extension of moral fields, the realization that areas of human activity, formerly resigned to other governance, are in fact under human control and therefore are subject to moral laws. This extension of the moral field has curtailed the sphere of the unknown and therefore, to those who identify new learning with heresy, has appeared to infringe on the sphere of the divine and so

to be impious. Every extension of the moral field involves a conflict with stratified religion. This is as true of the prophets of Israel, who enlarged moral vision under the inspiration of religion, as of secular reformers who have fought against religion.

In this clue we begin to see something of the answer to the problem that agitated the mind of Gladstone. The changing pattern of life in the break-up of *laisser faire* capitalist society has been accompanied, part cause, part effect, by a changing moral pattern. Not all the change has been for the good, as we shall see, but I would submit that the significant clue is to be seen in the extension of the moral field to cover new areas of activity, and that the problem of Christian moral standards in contemporary life can only be understood in this perspective. To illustrate this thesis I shall select three groups of moral factors, beginning with the economic and social.

I

We must look at the contemporary scene against the background from which it has emerged. Some of the governing ideas of the *laisser faire* period were 'that a man can do what he likes with his own,' and 'his own,' owing to the conditions of work, meant the lives of a particularly helpless section of the population; that morality and self-interest in business coincided; and that society rested on a natural and universal harmony of interest between men and nations. So firmly held were these ideas that even a philanthropist like John Bright could oppose, on principle, legislation to relieve the lot of miserable children employed as chimney sweeps on the ground that it would be an infringement of both natural and moral law. Throughout the nineteenth century various men and women made, as it were, expeditions across widening moral horizons, but these were sporadic, individual and unco-ordinated. The Wilberforce who championed the negro slave saw no reason to legislate for his fellow-countrymen. But progress was made on an ever widening front. Where, in the first place, it was the motive of pity, compassion for human suffering and misery that moved the pioneers, it was the recognition of moral rights and obligations that set the train to widespread action. The decisive change came when men began to realize not merely that practices, hitherto condoned, were harsh, but that these practices were in no sense part of the fixed order of things but could be brought under rational control and modified at will. When the so-called iron laws of economics were seen to be neither inevitable nor immutable, but subject to the overriding social purpose of the community, then it was as if a whole new field of human activity had come under

moral jurisdiction, and Christianity had discovered a lost world. When this stage was reached, nothing could exonerate those who had the control of affairs if they did not proceed to make such alterations in the framework of society as were practicable, which would have the effect of reducing the destitution, ignorance, squalor and fear of unemployment under which vast numbers of people lived. In former times the dominant philosophy had taught that such conditions must be accepted as inevitable. Religion had too often interpreted them as providentially ordered and declared that it was the mark of a truly religious soul to accept the status into which it had pleased God to call him. It is the realization that these things are not only bad but morally wrong, *because they can be altered*, that gives the driving power to the whole movement for social reform as it sweeps across the face of the earth among nations professing diverse religions or none.

That Christian insights have made a unique contribution to this release of moral power is obvious, as have individual Christians, but that the Christian Church is not always able to claim this movement for God, nor to reap where the Spirit has sown, is a tragic commentary upon the past—yet need not be determinant of the future.

The significant fact of the post-industrial age, then, from our point of view, has been the general recognition of the extension of the moral field to cover the whole material background of human life. What the best thought of the Middle Ages had accepted, but could not always implement, *viz.* that economics was a branch of ethics, has had to be argued again as a novel and revolutionary idea in the last hundred years. As the emergence of an idea it marks a point in affairs from which there is no turning back. Though it still encounters much opposition, it has had its victories, and continues its missionary drive with unflagging zeal o'er heathen lands afar.

But if we say that as Christians we must surely rejoice at the growing recognition that social and economic life must be brought under some higher moral direction, we must next take note that this invitation to rejoice will seem to many to be premature, ill-judged, or downright wrong. We need not spend much time dealing with the last attitude. It seems to be based on dichotomies between natural and supernatural, material and spiritual, temporal and eternal which can hold little meaning for an incarnational religion.

More widespread is the other attitude, which is best illustrated by the concluding sentence of Professor Butterfield's book *Christianity and History*. 'Hold to Christ,' he says, 'and for the rest be

totally uncommitted.' This attitude of non-committal and neutrality from the social and moral struggles of ordinary humanity seems to be deeply influenced by the current intellectual fashion, sponsored by Spengler and Toynbee, of belief in historical decline, not to say decadence. When a form of civilization is on its way out it is as well not to be too closely identified with it. But as Professor E. H. Carr writes, 'It is of course possible that this country or Western Europe may be doomed to perish in the near future in some sudden cataclysm from within or without. But to accept this possibility as inevitable would be in a famous phrase "the treason of the intellectuals".' We cannot and should not remain 'totally uncommitted' in our current predicament. Nor do we, in fact, remain uncommitted. To refuse to choose is to support the *status quo*. Sociologically the attitude of non-committal is as obviously conditioned by the prevailing climate of opinion as were any of the doctrines of the nineteenth century which are so rightly criticized. Theologically it is based upon a critique of the idea of Progress, which was one of the dominant ideas which Liberal Protestantism shared with secular Utopianism. What are we to say of the idea of moral progress to-day?

Greater insight into man's ethical situation has shown that much in modern culture and the assumed Christian components in it presupposed not so much the Christian as the Renaissance faith in man and his moral possibilities. In consequence the summons of the Law of Love in the Gospel was regarded as capable of a relatively direct and simple translation into the machinery of social life. It is now easier to see that so far as the individual is concerned there would appear to be no such thing as cumulative moral progress. There is a social accumulation of knowledge and enlargement through that knowledge of man's power to control both nature and other human lives. But both lines of development are morally neutral in so far as by themselves they lead to an enhancement of his capacities for both good and evil, and science can be used 'either to alleviate pain or to sharpen the fangs of ferocity.' On the other hand, it is surely legitimate to speak of moral progress in the way in which Whitehead describes it, and his definition may be amplified to say that social progress may be measured by the degree of equality and respect for individual personality expressed in the distribution of power and in the institutions of law and property, etc. In other words, social health can be judged by the degree to which a community offers opportunities for living the good life to all its members, though neither legislation nor institutions can guarantee that individuals will so use their opportunities.

It is interesting to find this theme worked out in a quarter where secular optimism was, until at least recently, a major force. The editor of *New Fabian Essays* goes back on not a few of his predecessors when he roundly declares that there is no evidence of any continuous upward line of social progress. He writes :

> 'So far therefore from viewing history as a steady advance towards freedom, we should regard exploitation and slavery as the normal state of man and view the brief epochs of liberty as tremendous achievements. They could only be preserved for a few generations by constant cultivation, and they cannot be expected to become the general rule.'

The wheel has indeed come full circle!

The theme of this Conference is 'Challenge and Response,' and all I have tried to set out emphasizes the point that to the challenge of our times there must be an answer not of non-committal but of Responsibility. This applies to all men of good will, but *par excellence* to the Christian. Just because the Christian has insights, more penetrating than the humanist's, into man's nature, status and destiny he should be able to labour wholeheartedly for the lifting of burdens from the backs of his brethren, for the extension of moral horizons, and in his tasks be saved both from sentimental estimates of what is possible as well as failure of nerve that all will be lost. Love, he knows, is the law of life : yet it has to register itself fragmentarily. It has to express itself in the struggle for justice, and continue seeking what is beyond justice. This ethic of fertile hope, which is purged of illusion and self-righteousness, is profoundly appropriate at a time when so many are ready to cry that nothing but decline and decadence lie before our path.

Of course, some will say 'We cannot do it.' After immense deliberation solemn assemblies announce that technical changes have outrun moral progress. This may be a sober estimate of facts. On the other hand, it may be just a new variation of what everyone evading responsibility has said since the first man put up the excuse, 'The woman thou gavest to me, she gave me to eat.'

Some will say, 'The threat to freedom is overwhelming. The concentration of power at the centre has increased and will increase.' And to that we can add that it is not likely to be decreased by redistributing snippets of economic power or political rights like parcelling out a field. In the future religion may well be the one restraint upon a centralized autocracy—the stubbornness of those who seek a city not of this earth.

Some will say, 'The Machine Age is killing the soul of man.' But how much nonsense is talked about the machine! Is it not humans who have abused the machine? Is it not just in its rudi-

mentary stage with immense promise for the future? Has it not already replaced human slave and serf? Does it not for the first time since man trod this planet hold out the promise — which good men and wise have never imagined could be possible except for the few — the possibility of the conditions of the good life for *all* men?

Here are great dangers: here are undreamed of possibilities. Progress is not inevitable. It depends on the response of Responsibility. So a cautious critic of our time writes:

> 'The essential nature of the crisis through which we are now living is neither military, nor political, nor economic, but moral. A new faith in a new moral purpose is required. It is not knowledge that has failed us but will, not experts but leaders. Our civilization is in danger of perishing for lack of something with which it has dispensed for two hundred years, but with which we can dispense no longer: a deliberate and avowed moral purpose, involving the call for common sacrifice for a recognized good' (Prof. E. H. Carr).

If this is not the most clear version of a 'come over to Macedonia and help us' call, all I have said is a complete waste of time.

II

We turn now to the second group of factors in contemporary life with which we have to deal.

However limited a vision is indicated by the popular tendency to equate 'immorality' with sexual irregularity, it does serve to remind us that perhaps the greatest alteration in *mores* in recent years has occurred in the field of sexual behaviour. The evidence for this is all too familiar, though how accurate it is is not always easy to ascertain. However, we have such incontrovertible evidence as the Registrar General's statistics for 1939, which showed that one bride in six was pregnant on her wedding day.

While there is, obviously, a great moral problem here, it is important to see it in proportion, and to realize that we are confronted not with the comparatively simple issue of the rejection of an ethic considered too high or too rigorous, but that here again we are involved in the complications caused by the overlapping of abnormal war and post-war conditions with a genuine extension of moral frontiers, in so far as the emancipation of women has brought the possibility of new freedom and the responsibility for moral decision that goes with it. Indeed, there is a good deal to be said for the view that the most significant aspect of the contemporary scene, and the most far-reaching and permanent in its effects, is not to be found in technical and economic changes to-day, but in the altered status of women and the new conception of her 'rights.'

From any reasonable standpoint the change is, or should be, to the good. A new quality in marriage, real co-operation within the marriage bond, the comradeship of mind with mind — these gains are accompanied by an increased sense of responsibility for the care and upbringing of children. On the other hand, in practice woman's altered social and economic rôle has often broken up the unity of the home and brought disillusionment to herself. There is more truth than we sometimes care to admit in such words by Gerald Heard:

> 'We have to recognize as the most vital anthropological evidence for the last fifty years that with the female half of the population, emotionally frustrated, religiously unsublimated, disappointed in their liberty, wearied by their employment, there is present a ruthlessness and a resentment all the more massive because repressed.'

What will be the ultimate effect on family life it is too early to say. After all, the changes consequent upon the emancipation of women are of comparatively recent date, are bitterly opposed in some quarters on both political and religious grounds, and have not worked themselves out fully. What is clear is that the possibilities of disaster are real if a materialistic philosophy of self-indulgence penetrates too far. On the other hand, with the break up of the old marriage pattern, in which women were economically dependent, absorbed in child-bearing, and denied such a full cultural life as was open to men, there now is a possibility of a richer life for both partners, in which psychically as well as physically they would be complementary and co-operative. This indeed always happened to some degree in the best marriages of any period. There is hope that this might prove to be far more common than it has been. When there is so much shaking of heads over the sad state of the family as an institution it is worth remembering that now, voluntarily, the attempt is being made to achieve a new construction in which two equal partners accept the most exacting and responsible of trusteeships. In the new relationships growing up between men and women a significant change, again, is to be detected in the changing emphasis placed upon different aspects of their relationship — *e.g.* kindness, consideration, etc., are, as it were, rising in the scale of moral esteem, whereas sex itself becomes of less importance.

The extension of the moral field in the sphere of personal relationships is most sharply focused in the matter of contraception, for here is a moral decision that few can evade. Fifty years ago most Christians regarded birth control as unnatural and immoral. To-day only the most reactionary take that view, though it is not impossible that even within the Church of England the deci-

sions of the Lambeth Conference which gave it modified approval will be challenged by those who look to Rome for guidance. This is, indeed, a test case where the Christian is called upon to define his attitude to new facts and prove his claim to possess a constructive ethic.

But this particular question is only a first instalment. Now we are beginning to realize the force of Bishop Barry's prophecy, made a generation ago, that 'with the perfection of scientific controls, many new fields of moral perplexity will be disclosed to the Christian conscience.' The President of the British Association only a few days ago gave it as his considered opinion that the most significant development in a scientifically controlled world is the vast increase in human fecundity producing a situation in which available food resources cannot keep pace with an increasing population. A recent book entitled *Fertility the Modern Dilemma* by R. C. Cook, is summed up in the sentence 'Wiping out a series of communicable diseases in a population which does not have enough to eat and brings a torrent of new babies into an economy that cannot support even the people already born, is an invitation to disaster.' It is indeed a pertinent question that asks, 'Can you find anything in Christ's teaching to cause us to welcome unrestricted population increase when its direct outcome is a vast growth of human misery?'

Another question we shall soon have to face is: how is love of our neighbour to be applied to a situation where we are confronted by an alarming increase of degenerate stocks and are informed by eugenic investigation that such inherent degeneracy cannot be treated by environmental betterment, but is a consequence of dysgenic changes the ultimate origin of which we are ignorant? It is hardly necessary to add that no race, no family, thinks itself rightly to be classed as inferior.

There is no simple answer. Yet answer we must. We shall not find the answer in any straightforward application of the Decalogue, nor of any formulation of the Church's moral law made at a time when the new problems had not yet emerged.

To take one more example. We are told that in a committee set up to enquire into the problems raised by artificial insemination, the Dean of St. Paul's differed from his colleagues in that he did not feel able to condemn insemination of a woman by anyone other than her husband as necessarily contrary to Christian principles. It is, we hope, not unfair to sum up his attitude by saying that in this new problem formulations of the past are not a sufficient guide, for the terms of reference are novel. In such a case we must go back to fundamental principles, the duty of Christian

to love one another which alone is unqualified and binding. We may or may not agree with the particular judgment. But the method of arriving at it is surely right. It was the method of the prophets of Israel, who went back beyond the formulations of the priestly code of sacrifice to enquire into the moral relationship of God to man. So it was of Jesus in His dealings with the Pharisees on the question of Sabbath observance. And this is the way of moral advance. If we face grave moral problems now we can be certain that we shall have many more to face in the future. Euthanasia and brain surgery only point the way to horizons still obscure but nearing when 'social engineering' will be able to control both the psychical and physical foundations of life, changes of which we have only an inkling now. What is a matter of the greatest importance is that the kind of answer we give has to be decided, at any rate on principle, now.

III

I have purposely left to the last the consideration of problems discussed at length in *English Life and Leisure*, by Rowntree and Lavers. In many discussions of moral questions these occupy the most prominent place, and evoke many fiery diatribes against 'wickedness in low places.'

The vast increase in gambling, which, we are told, on its commercial side 'employs about as many people as the whole cotton industry and twice as many as the total strength of the Royal Navy,' is to-day, according to Dr. Trevelyan, an even greater social problem than 'Drink.' There has undoubtedly been a deterioration in honesty — of which the variety of euphemisms for what used to be called stealing is evidence — and perhaps also in truthfulness. Of the decline in sex conduct we have spoken already. One of the most disconcerting features is the growth in brutality, which several years after the end of the war still shows no sign of decline. The particular value of *English Life and Leisure* lies not so much in the conclusions of the authors, nor in their suggestions for dealing with the problems, but in the mass of evidence they produce to show that these problems are symptoms of a deeper *malaise*—the result of confused moral values, uncertainty of purpose in life, and lack of moral and religious sanctions on top of years of war when moral standards went by the board. This is particularly true of the group of problems usually lumped together as 'juvenile delinquency.'

'The Yahoo at Home' was one reviewer's estimate. Yet there are hopeful signs. Always in the background one has to see the dislocations of the war and of the uneasy peace, and instead of

general decline there seems to be more of confusion in moral pattern with new emphases emerging gradually and uncertainly. Against deterioration in such things as we have already mentioned must be set the genuine extension of the moral sphere into new fields, reflected in a great upsurge of care for the weak and needy, for old people and children. A wider extension of enlightenment has brought yearnings for good literature, good music and beautiful scenery — and these stirrings of intangible qualities are closely related to God. So the authors of *English Life and Leisure* conclude by saying:

> 'Without attempting to strike a balance, which would be a meaningless subjective judgment, we record our opinion that the situation has real perils on account of a decline in certain essential virtues, but that there are also important signs of a deepening of other virtues, and a strengthening of the national character. Certainly all is not well, but, equally certainly, all is not ill, and we believe that the balance may be on the side of "well" rather than "ill".'

To sum up very briefly. First, these problems weigh on all men of good will, and one of the hopeful signs of the times is the increasing concern of scientists with the ethical consequences of their technical achievements. From ethical to metaphysical search is a natural step, and here already we can see perhaps something of the beginning of a new Natural Theology which, according to the oldest stream of Christian thinking, must precede a full understanding of God in Christ.

What, then, of the Christian attitude? Foremost we need to recognize more clearly the scope and implications of what I have called the extension of moral frontiers in the contemporary situation. It means that more and more regions of life formerly considered part of the 'thusness' of the universe, providentially ordered, are coming under human control, and therefore present inescapable problems which demand answers of responsibility, not of evasion. There is great danger that in this shifting stage of our time we try desperately to hold on to props disappearing or unreal. There will always be those who see in every extension of human knowledge and control a restriction of the sphere of the divine, and who meet every change with the cry of 'Impiety!' We must see these changes, with the challenge they bring, as coming from the hand of God.

There are others whose answer is to fall back on some authority of the past. They follow Hilaire Belloc's advice in his *Cautionary Tales*,

> 'Always keep a hold on Nurse
> For fear of meeting something worse.'

It is natural that in these times they should run to the Nurse with the loudest voice, greatest rigour, and most confidence in her infallible rightness. The pity is that it is not more widely realized that this infantile regression is itself part of the moral problem with which the Christian spirit has to contend. Back to authority — of Church or Bible — is no doubt an essential discipline so that we can learn again of the originals of our faith and of what Christians thought and did when they were most alert, but by itself is not a sufficient answer with which to meet entirely new problems. That we can only do with Christian insights illuminating our minds, with the conviction that the world is God's, that our Lord has opened the Way, and the Spirit guides us on it, so that we can be confident that in every dilemma there is a way out and onwards. There is need for hard thinking about new moral issues. There is always need for integrity, truthfulness, love. In particular, we need to work out relevant patterns of Christian living for people of different occupations in the new industrial age. There are experiments being made on the Continent and in this country that may be fruitful, and we are not without our prophets. But much more needs to be done.

CHRISTIAN STRATEGY TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

By the Rev. C. S. Milford, M.A., Secretary for West Asian Missions, Church Missionary Society

IF I have any qualifications for reading this paper, it is certainly not that I am a learned theologian. It can only be that, having been for the last thirty years working as a missionary in India and more recently at the headquarters of a missionary society, I have been continuously concerned with the challenge to our Western Christian thought and culture of the non-Christian religions of the East, and of the secularist movements now looming so large in that part of the world; and also with the challenge which the Church in its turn presents to the non-Christian world, and with the strategy of this presentation and all that is involved in it.

We are all familiar with the revolution which has taken place in Christian thinking about these matters in our own life-time chiefly as the result of radical changes in the world situation. Up till 1914, or even perhaps up to 1930 in this country, it seemed as though the expansion of Christianity were part of an almost inevitable world movement. When I myself became a missionary we still shared the confidence of Macaulay and his contemporaries that Christian education from the West would quickly bring about the collapse of the ancient oriental religions. We have now realized that all this was largely a part of the cultural expansion of the West, which has been challenged by Nazism, by Communism and by the renaissance of the Eastern faiths which is largely the result of the nationalist movements inspired by just that Western culture against which they are now in revolt. All this is excellently summed up in an article by Dr. John Baillie in the *International Review of Missions* for April, 1952.

The recent history of ecumenical conferences shows very clearly the impact on Christian thinking of this changing world situation. The following words are taken from the report of the Stockholm Conference on Faith and Order held in 1925: 'Christians pray "Thy Kingdom come; thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven." This means that Christians are called to be God's fellow-workers in preparing the way for the coming of God's Kingdom on earth.' Certainly such a straightforward expression of the liberal optimist view would not find favour to-day in such a gathering.

At the Tambaram Conference of the International Missionary Council in 1938 the delegates from the Younger Churches, especially those from India, and also the Americans, still retained much of the 1925 outlook. But the continental and specially the German delegates had moved to a much more pessimistic position. The German delegation submitted a special statement in which they said: 'In spite of the changes which have taken place in the aspect of the world and history since the days of the Apostles, we believe according to the Scriptures that through a creative act of God His Kingdom will be consummated in the final establishment of a new heaven and a new earth . . . Only this eschatological attitude can prevent the Church from becoming secularized.' And among the practical conclusions which they drew was the following: 'Being between the times, the Church has not to bring into force a social programme for a renewed world order, or even a Christian state. It cannot redeem the world from all inherent evils.'

We notice here that the Germans based their argument on a return to the Biblical outlook. And it is of course a fact that this trend had been set off by Schweitzer long before the modern decline of Western influence in the world became apparent. But there can be no doubt that this type of thinking received a powerful stimulus from the political and cultural disillusionment which hit Germany before other countries. The interaction of these theological and political factors is something which has to be taken account of in discussing Christian strategy.

At the World Missionary Conference held at Whitby, Toronto, in 1947, the delegates from the rest of Europe and from the Younger Churches had come to share something of the German pessimism as regards the present world order, though on the whole the Americans were still confident that victory in the war might herald a rapid advance towards peace and happiness through the agency of the visible Church. At the further conference just held at Willingen in Germany even the Americans were much more diffident in expressing their hopes, after their disappointments in China; and were correspondingly more ready to attend to the theologians who are seeking to give full weight to the eschatological aspect of New Testament teaching. Similarly, from the meeting at Rolle in 1951 of the Advisory Commission which is planning for the next Assembly of the World Council of Churches, it is reported that those who were sceptical of an excessive emphasis on eschatology 'were most anxious to make it clear that they had an utterly realistic sense of the limitations of human possibilities in this world; they dissociated themselves most emphatically from the optimism of the older theology of the Social Gospel.'

It would be unrealistic to discuss Christian strategy to-day without taking these trends of contemporary thought into account. We welcome the renewed emphasis on the fact that we are to proclaim not primarily a set of principles or even a way of life, but our faith in what God has done and will do in history. We welcome the reminder that we are to proclaim and wait for God's Kingdom rather than try to build it ourselves; and that it can come in a fallen and sinful world only by the supernatural act of God, though we must hold fast to our conviction that this supernatural action will always and to the end show itself as love and never as mere power. Furthermore, the emphasis on our hope that God will sum up all things in Christ, and on the earnest expectation of the whole creation, does when properly understood safeguard us from any individualistic or pietistic interpretation of the Gospel. All these points are of great practical importance in facing the challenge to Christianity from the philosophic religions of the East.

Before, however, trying to discuss practical strategy I would venture to rush in like a fool and suggest two particular points in which the maintenance of a liberal emphasis is specially relevant.

1. Biblical theologians who use 'philosophy' as a term of abuse, suspecting always the illegitimate incursion of Greek speculation, do not always agree with one another. Thus Culmann says of Barth: 'In his interpretation of the New Testament concept of time and eternity I see a pernicious philosophical influence.' Though in this case I agree wholly with Culmann's 'naïve' or 'commonsense' view of time, I take courage from their difference to confess that I do so largely because it is commonsense, *i.e.*, on philosophical grounds. This is a very practical question. The sense of temporal urgency, of being 'those upon whom the end of the age has come,' undoubtedly is very strong throughout the New Testament and not only in the early Pauline epistles. The return to the Bible in this particular matter has again and again led to the attempt to recapture the driving sense of urgency by suggestion that the end of the ages may really be coming at last in our own time. We to whom the course of history has already revealed in actual fact so much longer perspectives and to whom science has opened vistas of duration undreamed of by the Biblical writers, must claim the freedom of readjustment and of adapting the Biblical climate of thought. Only so shall we have a proper perspective for our strategy.

2. In holding to our faith that it is the supernatural act of God and not our own human efforts which establishes the Kingdom, we need not believe that the working of God's providence is unintel-

ligible or contrary to our reason. A test case for this is *Matthew* vi, 33, 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.' Are we to understand that our material needs will be met as a reward for our obedience, but in a way which is miraculous in the sense of being wholly outside our understanding? Or does it mean that God has made this world such that obedience to the law of love, and working together in community, are conditions without which in fact men's material needs cannot be met?

This distinction also is of vital importance in presenting the Gospel to adherents of the non-Christian faiths of the East, which have deeply rooted in them a belief in a moral chain of causation in the individual life, the working out in rewards and punishments of the consequences of all our deeds; but no adequate recognition of the horizontal effects of our actions on our neighbours.

To put the same thing in another way; Christians have been compared to a resistance movement in enemy occupied territory. Their duty is only to maintain contact with the liberation army, which eventually will come in overwhelming force. Should the Church not rather be compared to the pioneer farmer, who does indeed depend entirely on the sun and rain and the fertility of the soil, but who nevertheless forms himself a vital link in the process by which the jungle is conquered?

Turning now to actual Christian strategy, I would suggest first some general principles which arise out of the foregoing.

1. We shall mistrust arguments from urgency and refuse to countenance work which may be scamped because it is hurried, or which sacrifices quality to quantity. Especially must we remember this in such matters as education where the building of human character is involved. It is one of the curious paradoxes of human thought that those who have taken the most optimistic views about human progress have often linked this optimism with the fact of evolution. This should logically have led them to expect a very long and gradual process; but in fact when dealing with social or political developments they have lapsed into utopianism, which looks for immediate and sensational results, just as much as did Shelley or Godwin in the pre-evolutionary era. This has, of course, been one of the cruder errors of communism, and it was curiously illustrated also by Gandhi. As a Hindu he held that man's spiritual progress could only be by very slow stages involving many reincarnations; 'there are no miracles and it may take ages,' he said to a Christian when discussing man's search for

salvation. But again and again he fell into the most naïve perfectionist optimism in practice, believing that his followers could be quickly educated into following his own austere creed of non-violence in a short time. And almost at the end of his life he insisted on the abolition of rationing and of many controls, on the ground that a free people could be trusted to co-operate; with disastrous results.

We must therefore refuse to be hustled either by humanist optimism or by apocalyptic adventism. A particular illustration of this is the situation in tropical Africa, where primary education has been for the most part entrusted to the Church, and the pressure for quantity at all costs is almost overwhelming. The Churches are under constant pressure to scatter their educational missionaries over as wide an area as possible, when they know that only by concentrating them will they be able to have schools that are really Christian or educationally effective, even though this may mean incurring the odium of leaving numbers of children for the moment without education at all. The fact has to be faced that this may bring serious unpopularity upon the Church and the missionary societies in a situation which already has many explosive possibilities. But this risk must be taken if we really believe that we are building for a long- and not for a short-term future; and that men and women are the instruments whom God uses and on their quality will depend the quality of the structure.

Another general consideration of a somewhat similar kind arises from a realistic appraisal of the stiffened resistance of the non-Christian religion of Asia, which is part of the new world position mentioned above. As long as the tide seemed to be flowing from West to East, carrying with it our European and in particular British culture, it was possible for a few outstanding educational missionaries, specially of the Church of Scotland, to influence deeply vast numbers of Indian students; and more recently for fairly large numbers of young graduates from this country to do very useful work in colleges where a comparatively small number of Christian teachers could maintain something of a Christian atmosphere, and within the Western tradition of education they could produce 'Indian Christian gentlemen' and bring a friendly influence to bear on a number of Hindu students without engaging in any very deep spiritual conflicts. Those days are going or gone. Not a few in recent years who have tried this way have been frustrated by the increasing pressure of secular and non-Christian atmosphere, stimulated by the national self-consciousness in the newly independent countries. There is indeed a

continuing opportunity for Christian higher education in India, and perhaps a greater need of it than ever at this time when India and the neighbouring countries are likely to be the scene of the next trial of strength between the ideologies of the communist East and the West. But it will have to be done in a more concentrated way, and by teams of missionaries who are very sure of the Gospel which they proclaim.

Turning now to some of the concrete situations which face the Church to-day, let us begin with China, where just because the communist revolution has come so quickly the object lessons have been perhaps clearer and more dramatic than in Europe. An enormous amount has been said and written in recent years about the Church's strategy in the face of the advancing revolution in China, and much of it has been quickly overtaken by events.

Any sort of co-operation with communists and emphasis on the common elements in their programme and that of Christian sociologists has proved to be a will-o'-the-wisp. The following words are by a missionary recently home from China: 'They are wrong, because once they have taken that position they have lost their freedom of action, freedom to criticize, to apply Christian principles to the situation. In China they rightly support land reform, but they are not able to protest against the methods of terrorism and barbarism which are used to carry it out. Caught in the toils of the communist system, they are used as instruments of communist propaganda. If we want to provide the Christian answer to communism, we must do so before communism takes control of a country. Afterwards it is too late, for the Church has lost its essential freedom.'[1]

I will return later to consider the last sentence; but what of the Church when it does find itself under a communist *régime*? It was hoped that the experiments in Christian community living like the 'Jesus Families' in China itself, or simple educational institutions on a self-supporting basis such as are being tried by Gandhi's followers in India, would be so 'close to the ground' that they would escape the notice of a totalitarian *régime*, or would at least disarm all criticism. This hope, too, has proved to some extent at least illusory. 'The Church as the community of grace, is then a centre of resistance to totalitarianism at a deeper level than the superficially political; the struggle for freedom to proclaim the Gospel and maintain the purity of the Christian faith then becomes the only possible way of struggling for total social righteousness. The implications of this witness and resistance are often more fully

[1] L. Constantine, *I.R.M.*, April, 1952.

recognized by the totalitarian enemy than by fellow-Christians in other countries: '"The Party" knows its own enemies.'[2]

Under such circumstances every congregation and every Christian may face at any time the alternatives of wholly identifying themselves with the *régime* or being denounced as enemies of the people. They will find themselves, indeed, back in the atmosphere of the New Testament, and will have to follow what has been called the 'strategy of the remnant' as we find it expounded in the Epistles. It has been said that the *distinctive* attribute of the Christian community was that it consisted of people who loved one another. And 'The character so formed is one in which humility is the outstanding virtue.'[3] They rejoice if they are called to suffer for the name of Christ; but then, above all, they 'lift up their heads, for their redemption draweth nigh.'

It has been suggested that in a period of chaos such as might follow a third world war, bands of missionaries might be called for who would have to be 'expendable'—probably supporting themselves and giving what witness they could through humble service and the bringing of relief. For the time being it would seem that this is not likely to be the pattern of events, and that Christians will find themselves definitely on one side or the other of the Curtain. In that case virtually all that we can do for those on the other side is to pray for them.

For us on this side, but faced with a world which even here is largely post-Christian, the strategy will be primarily that of infiltration, into secular and State agencies which have taken over spheres of service in which the Church was formerly the leader. This is a commonplace to-day; but I would draw your attention to the parallel between the situation in Europe, where a new industrial society is developing its own bases of cohesion through the trade union movement and in other ways which have grown largely outside the Christian tradition, and that of the Church confronting non-Christian societies overseas; the parallel indicated by the Abbé Godin's phrase 'France, Pays de Mission.' Faced by a strongly cohesive Hindu society in India, Missions have met their chief response in the underprivileged fringe, the outcasts and the tribes, whose conversion has hardly effected the main core of Hinduism. And just as in Paris or in Sheffield the Church is now seeking ways of penetrating the industrial community from which it finds itself largely excluded, so, too, a number of missionaries are now seeking ways of penetrating the closely integrated caste

[2] *The Christian in the World Struggle,* M. M. Thomas and Davis McCaughey.

[3] *Not Many Mighty,* John Drewett.

groups of village India; and are making some interesting experiments to see how the Gospel can be shown to be relevant to the needs of the whole village community and not merely to the individuals or special groups which compose it. This is certainly going to be a baffling task, as is the corresponding one in the industrial society of the West; but here is undoubtedly one of the strategic points for the Church to-day.

I quoted earlier the remark of a missionary from China, 'If we want to provide the Christian answer to communism, we must do so before communism takes control in a country.' This is obviously one of the primary tasks to-day in all the countries of Asia which have not so far come within the communist orbit. Hunger is the trump card in the hand of the communist propagandist in India and other Asian countries to-day. When I was in Bombay last February there was an international exhibition, and the chief feature of the Chinese section which attracted very great attention was enormous bins of rice and wheat. By them stood Chinese boys explaining that China had been a famine-stricken country like India, but that in two short years the People's Government had solved the food problem. The important point here is not whether these claims were true, but that the Indians certainly believed them, and that India is in fact desperately short of food.

Humanly speaking, the Colombo Plan and similar schemes for helping Asia to increase production are probably the only *short-term* answers to the threat of communism. I believe we can claim that these plans are in a real sense the outcome of our Christian heritage in the West, without which we should not have either the resources or the goodwill which are needed. Here is one of the points where the ultra-pessimistic estimates of our culture can be challenged. But it is also true that these plans are at present much too small to be effective; and it may be a vital matter for Christian strategy for us to press for a much more generous provision for this purpose, even if for the present it means greater sacrifice and austerity at home. This case is argued in a pamphlet *War on Want*, published by the Association for World Peace.

The long-term answer to communism must certainly be given in spiritual terms, and in this the Churches in the Asian countries, with our assistance, will have a vital part to play. It is a sobering and challenging fact that the greatest communist successes in the recent Indian election were in Travancore, which is the most Christian and, largely for that reason, the most educated part of India. Certainly part of the reason was that the Gospel had aroused men's consciences and made them determined that poverty and oppression should no longer be tolerated; but they did not

find that the ancient Churches of Travancore are awake to these issues, and to my knowledge some young Christians have become communists from sincere idealism because they have despaired of the Church.

In this situation the Reformed Churches are by no means inactive. They are doing vigorous evangelistic and welfare work among the under-privileged, and have established small but effective centres of Christian community life. Moreover, some very able young men who became communists have been won back, and are now devoting their energies to helping their fellow-Christians to face the communist challenge. One is now Secretary of an Institute for the Christian Study of Society, associated with the central Theological College of the Church of South India, at Bangalore. They are uncompromising in their opposition to communism on theological grounds; but are convinced that Christians should play their part in stimulating revolutionary political action on a liberal democratic basis, drawing their inspiration from the Bible and specially from the insights of the prophets, and those which lay behind such institutions as the Law of Jubilee. These young men are in the front line of the battle to-day and greatly need our prayers.

Other issues should have been mentioned had there been time: among them the question how far co-operation with non-Christian religious movements is possible or permissible. This is specially relevant in India to-day, where Gandhi's Hindu disciples claim to have the answer to some of the pressing social, economic and educational problems and are showing a consistency and self-sacrifice which puts many Christians to shame.

But one further thing I must say. Diversity frustrates the progress of the Church in every direction. Therefore it was a great inspiration to me during my recent tour to see for the first time the Church of South India in action. There can be no doubt that five years of union have released new energy and have enriched rather than impoverished the common life: there has been no question of watering down to the highest common factor. Those who were formerly Free Churchmen have learned genuinely to love and value episcopacy as a genuinely pastoral ministry; in a discussion recently with the Lutherans one of the Church representatives, an ex-Congregationalist (or, as they prefer to be called, Congregationalist-plus: for they do not admit that they have ceased to be Congregationalists or Methodists through entry to the wider fellowship), is reported to have said, 'We will never give up our bishops.' The traffic has, of course, been two-way; the Anglicans-plus are coming to understand in a new way the vital

place of the congregation and the church meeting in their polity —the judgment of the congregation is given a vital place in the call to the Ministry.

May I call your attention to two special points of controversy?

(1) The Church of South India is not a denomination, but a National Church. By its nature it cannot propagate itself outside India, but at the same time it seeks full fellowship with all its parent bodies. This is something new and unique in Christian history. The world-wide Confessional Churches may be compared to ribbons of many colours, each encircling the globe. At one point four of these have been cut and woven into a rainbow fabric. In this way something has been lost, but in the hope of atttaining a deeper unity. But it is here that the most valid criticism can be made. Will the bonds of fellowship with other Churches be strong enough to maintain the truly international character which is the great asset of the Confessional Churches, and above all of the Roman?

(2) The union is based on the mutual recognition of the ministries of the uniting Churches as real, and in particular, from the Anglican side, on the view that by maintaining our own rule of Episcopal Order we do not pass judgment on other ministries. This, which may be called 'Headlamism,' dominated the Lambeth Conference of 1930, but in Anglican circles there has been since then a move to a more rigorous position, and great efforts are being made to accelerate this. Criticism centres on the maintenance of fellowship, and above all of occasional intercelebration with the non-episcopal parent bodies. If this movement is unchecked there is a great danger that the Church of South India will be isolated and that the great development to which it should lead will be abortive.

REVELATION, INSPIRATION AND FAITH

By Prof. H. D. Lewis, University College, Bangor

WE are apt to fight rather shy to-day of enthusiasm and inspiration; and this is certainly an attitude one would not be surprised to encounter in a Conference of Modern Churchmen. There are many reasons for this suspicion, some of them deserving of the highest respect. Has not the whole of our civilization been brought to the brink of destruction by savage fanaticism and mass hysteria? The enlightenment on which we prided ourselves has shown itself to be a plant of gentle growth needing much care and nurture if it is to survive the cold blasts of modern material-

ism and the blighting of so many eager hopes. Progress has become for many a will o' the wisp which it is naive to chase. Men of thought have been hurled out of the cloisters in which they airily dreamed of the imminent dawn of a golden age, and they have eased the shock to their complacency by aligning themselves so shamelessly and readily with the harsher forces that threaten to supplant them as themselves to encourage the bitterest cynicism. Tough-mindedness, expediency, the dogmatic bludgeoning of any form of idealism, the outright rejection of metaphysics, these seem to be the perversions of genuine realism to which men cling in a desperate hope of finding firmer foundations for themselves somewhere in the ruin of the gentle optimism to which they trusted before. Even in academic circles partisanship is replacing genuine controversy, restricted subtleties being far more esteemed than soundness of judgment or breadth of vision; the claims of objective truth, and even more of objective value, are dismissed with an assurance which their votaries can hardly emulate without repudiation of the very principles they wish to uphold. To believe in an absolute distinction of true and false is becoming a sign of naïve immaturity in modern thought, and this is not without obvious affinities with the political dogmatisms which have plunged us into wars and social disorders. I think it would not be too much to say that the likelihood of modern large-scale war would be *nil* if even the imperfect (but very substantial) freedom of opinion now enjoyed in democratic countries could in some way be extended behind the iron curtain. Whether that itself will come about without war does not concern us now. But few can doubt that the overt enemy, in politics as in matters of thought, to-day is the spirit of fanaticism and unreason, often presenting itself in attractive disguises. Nor is the recent record of religious thought a good one here. For much that is most influential and impressive in religious thinking to-day has been seriously marred by denunciations of reason and contempt of its claims. Here also obscurantism trades on generosity and mere dogmatism masquerades as the assurances of faith.

In this situation members of a modernist movement have an obvious part to play. We expect them to rally to the defence of reason and sanity of thought. But this is by no means as simple a matter as we used to think. There is a crude form of rationalism which is as much the enemy of religion, and as far removed from wisdom, as blind unreason. In setting ourselves to oppose the latter we must not succumb in turn to obstinate dogmatisms about the powers of reason itself. To disregard the complexities of our own nature and the part played in our lives by emotion as well

as understanding, or to attempt an easy solvent for all kinds of mystery, even those that seem most irreducible, is to be ourselves obtusely indifferent to the main lesson of the upheavals and disorders through which we have passed.

This is true even of elevated forms of rationalism such as the idealism which dominated European thought at the turn of the century. Faith is not an *a priori* assurance of rationality which we bring to the interpretation of experience, nor any extension of this to spheres which go beyond anything we in fact encounter in our own experience. It has to do with that which is complete and ultimate in ways of which we can form no explicit conception. Its object is not an abstract principle but a living God in the enjoyment of whom we find a peace to which nothing else approaches. Religion is just not continuous with other experiences; it goes beyond them all, and if it did not do so it could not provide the contentment which is lacking to us everywhere else. Being limited, we crave the unlimited, and we crave it, not as the ideal posited by the radical incompleteness of reason itself, but positively and specifically as informing the life we now live. This will never be attained by trying to build up various elements in human life and history, as understood in the secular way, into a religious view of the world. Non-religious factors will never add up into a genuine religion, however cunningly we manipulate them; religion is not educed out of something else, and this needs stressing quite as much to-day as in the past. For in spite of a much finer understanding of the transcendent character of religion we still seek ways of coming to terms with this on the basis of purely finite considerations. That is what has marred so much of the recent emphasis on the historical element in religion; men have turned to history for substantiation of general religious ideas. This is to misunderstand altogether the nature of those ideas themselves, and to fail to present at all properly the true religious significance of history. Religion is *sui generis*, it is unique as nothing else is unique, for the object of it is God, and the attitude it involves is worship. Man only worships when he bows before God; to surrender ourselves in the way worship requires to any reality less than God is doubly blasphemous; it is a violation of our own nature and of that of God. The element of mystery in religion is thus essentially irreducible. God is altogether 'beyond,' and we we cannot lay hold of Him except as He makes a gift of himself to us. But for that reason we must not look for Him either by futile efforts to lift ourselves wholly out of our finite condition of creaturehood or by means of the sort of transition from one fact to another by which we make sense of our normal experience. God

is not a term in a relation. We can thus only find Him as He himself invests experience in certain ways with peculiar religious meaning.

This does not annul the experience in which God reveals himself or deprive it of its prior significance at its own level. On the contrary, it extends and sanctifies it. Meaning and value, as we find them at the secular level, are transformed in religion, but the religious significance which gives them its own *imprimatur* presupposes their suitability to receive it and is enriched by the richness of the medium. Secular values are thus endorsed by religion, not abrogated as has sometimes been suggested of late by our most ardent transcendentalists. The line between the secular and the religious is a sharp one but the commerce across it is extensive. In setting limits to the claims of reason religion enhances them; it also deepens our respect for all values and duties. Reason is likewise brought especially into the service of religion because it enables us so to relate the distinctively religious factors in experience as to bring out a pattern within them in the light of which they shine more brightly. This bears closely on the relations of religion and history and on the vitally important task of detecting the genuine and the spurious experience in phenomena where many incidental complications cloud our vision and make judgment difficult. These are all matters which call for close attention to-day, both for their inherent interest and as part of the evangelism which is appropriate to our age. Religious appeals must include more thought about religion now than at any other time, the proper directing of our attention being all important; and the grasp which religious thinkers now have of the essential transcendence of God should predispose us to turn one another's minds to those forms and inter-relations of experiences which, viewed in one way, may seem wholly secular, viewed in another deeply religious. These tasks we have hardly begun; we have barely reached the threshold of what religious thought and theology can be to-day and the much heightened part they must play in any true culture and civilization of the future. But it is also evident that no mere refinement of intellect will suffice. At no point is the religious problem a purely intellectual one; it is rather the sustained and rigorous application of thought to the transformation of thought itself and of other experiences which true religion involves. Thinking and acting in religion are organic to the total creative religious experience.

Perhaps this will become a little less cryptic if we view it in relation to the present state of culture and social existence. The dominant factor in modern life is science. There are some who

deplore the rapid advance of science, but they are not persons one expects to meet at this conference. The time is past when we could regard the unhindered pursuit of truth in any sphere as anything other than the ally of religion. Something is seriously amiss with a religion which cannot allow this. But that does not mean that the relations of science and religion are simple and present no problems. We only think so when we are prepared to merge the one in the other, as many modernists were much inclined to do until lately. The truth seems to me to be this. Science has altered extensively the conditions under which we live, and it will drastically alter them again; it has also given a new bent to our thoughts. But this means that there is no permanent setting or structure of life in which religion may shape itself. It cannot subsist as an abstract belief, it must embody itself in experience. For this reason there is also needed a sense of the past, both in the way of secular historical continuity and of the awareness of a pattern of religious significance developing within that. To-day, however, we have been so torn from our roots that the past is not able to succour us in this way. The religious problem is therefore many-sided. Within the rapidly changing perspectives of modern existence, some permanent pattern must be established. This is the socio-political problem, but its solution is vital to religion. The relevance of the past to the appropriate patterns of existence for to-day must also be discovered, both at the level of secular culture and of the religious inspirations that are organic to culture and social tradition. This, in turn, is bound up with a further task that is even more peculiar to our situation. The set given to our thoughts, alike as laymen and as experts, by absorption into the work of understanding our natural environment and subduing it to our purposes, needs to be corrected by renewed consciousness of sides of existence which are not amenable to scientific treatment; and this does not mean trying to map out precisely the province of the sciences so much as discerning everywhere modes of significance, especially those which have to do with the factor of particularity, which do not admit of scientific analysis. The latter are themselves altered for us by our intellectual advances and the wider sweep of intellectual activity to-day. Nor can we expose ourselves to the blunt impact of the world by simply projecting into a civilized setting the primitive modes of reaction we have now outlived. No perversion is more insidious than a sophisticated cult of barbarism; it is nauseating in itself and especially disastrous because of the delusion of sincerity which it induces. Only those who are slightly mad play at madness, and recent calamities should warn us off this sort of

play, no less in the cultural than in the political sphere. Our task is rather to find the civilized equivalent to primitive realism. This is distinctively creative work and requires more of us in the measure our sophistications inhibit us. At no point can intellectual rigour be relaxed. But there must also be that newness and refinement of experience as a whole which mere intellectual alertness and honesty cannot ensure. Nothing is more important for cultural and social existence to-day than that our total environment should be made articulate in this special creative way. Vision and prophecy become more indispensable as civilization advances. Without them the intellect itself may atrophy if our skills do not ensnare us first—there are distressing signs of both contingencies already. Balance of mind and vitality alike require the renewal of life in visionary experience. For this we must rely partly on the proper fusion of the past with the present, but there are also appropriate attitudes of receptivity to be maintained, most of all in religion. 'Waiting on God' is not the listlessness of apathy but the highest kind of attentiveness, as the originator of the words knew well. It is to the cultivation of this attentiveness that we are summoned to-day.

In spite of our estimable caution and concern for intellectual integrity, and notwithstanding the distaste and alarm with which we properly view outbursts of irrational fervour, our prime need is thus more than ever for the sort of illumination which reason itself does not provide. This is the 'scandal' to which our minds must adjust themselves. We must trust ourselves again to enthusiasm and inspiration if we are to have the saving assurances of faith. This is going to test us to the utmost; it will humiliate intellectual arrogance at the same time as it calls for intellectual effort. It will be a kind of judgment in so far as it exposes the bankruptcy of much of our present culture, and it will summon us to achievement which is not guaranteed by clearly defined and established standards or safe conventions. Much that we value will appear to be dross and we shall find ourselves induced to abandon cherished customs and habits of mind. Smoothness and security will give way to tension and doubt, we shall find ourselves deeply committed and at the same time acutely critical, wavering between great certainty and despair. It is through these agonies alone that newness of life is found, and the one need above all else of the present age is for this newness of creative experience which will bring our interests as a whole abreast of intellectual advances. Science has made all adoration difficult for us, because it calls for the attitude of adoration at a new level and in new settings. The old will not suffice; it becomes dilettante and in-

sincere if indulged in solely for its own sake. The outstanding achievement of science is thus to push all other activities to a higher level, or to compel them to do this or fail. That is the judgment of science which has brought us to our present crisis. There may be no great rigidity about such changes, and one hesitates to use the word dialectic in connection with any historical process, so much has the idea of dialectic been abused in historical interpretation. But there is this evidence of some kind of dialectical movement of history, at least to-day, that the advance of science and the general enlightenment it has brought with it call for a correspondingly greater measure of illumination of the kind not provided by science. It is to achieve this that we must risk so much and venture into modes of thinking and feeling where the border-line between insight and delusion is not so sharply defined as in the activities more directly subjected to formal intellectual discipline. That we may merely make fools of ourselves is a constant danger, but it is not so considerable a danger at present as that we should forswear all the perils of the more creative existence which is possible now out of fear of making fools of ourselves. The intellectual is always inclined to play for safety, and the outstanding characteristic of our age is that it is more thoroughly intellectual than any other. We are more self-conscious than men have ever been, and we cling more keenly for that reason to whatever is familiar and safe. We hate to expose ourselves, but it is only in so far as we venture into realms that have not been charted and surveyed for us beforehand, with a readiness to cut what figure we will in this unknown terrain, that we can hope to maintain the momentum of our lives at the rate which is essential now if we are not to lapse into barbarism and despair. We have been awakened too completely to be content with anything other than the creative insights which are commensurate with our intellectual advances, and without the rounded achievement which these make possible personality becomes misshapen and starved; we shall seek false emotional satisfaction and turn our energies to ends which have in them the seeds of social and cultural destruction. In this situation our enemy is the philistine, no longer a mere source of irritation but a truly sinister figure; our friend to whom we must turn more than at any other time is the enthusiast. Better that he should sometimes impose upon us than that we should wilt altogether under the stare of the philistine. There is so much at stake that can only be saved by boldly facing the risks of creative living.

This may seem a far cry from religion. But that is just where we are inclined to make a major mistake. For religion is nothing

when divorced from life; its problem is also the problem of culture and society, and it is only by dealing with the latter that we shall begin to see the relevance of religion to present need. To many people this will seem like a surrender of the distinctive claims of religion, and I must at once confess that I fully share their fears. Few things can imperil more to-day the true life of religion than that it should be interpreted solely in secular and social terms. The perils of this kind of humanism are still with us, and they are not less menacing when humanism is gilded with a superficial coating of orthodoxy — as in many recent accounts of religion and history. We must thus remind ourselves constantly to-day that religion provides something which cannot be attained at any merely secular or humanistic level. Its object is God, and its truth is God-given truth. But we have also seen that this truth can be significant for us only if it finds embodiment in present experience. This raises many problems with which it is hardly possible to deal here. But if we accept the view that religious truth comes to us as a transvaluation of other values, the core of our religious problem will also be found where our cultural and social problems are most acute. It seems to me that this is especially true to-day. It is with God that we are being confronted in the present situation of men and societies, and the newness of life which is needed to redeem our culture from stagnation and to save society from recurring disasters, is that which is possible when the voice of God is heard in the strains and stresses of life as we find it now. It is in the perception of God-given truth by those who sense most keenly the complications of our present situation that life can be breathed into social and cultural activities, and it is only as these become alive in that way that there can be a re-birth of religion.

This also points the way for us to the only sort of safety we can fairly expect. The excesses of enthusiasm and the extravagant practices to which it has so often led, and of which Monsignor Ronald Knox has so gently reminded us of late, seem mainly due to the divorce of religious inspiration from the social and cultural setting in which it appeared. The original impulse springs from a certain situation, not in the way of a consummation of secular processes but as the exhibition within them of a religious significance; but it is apt to continue too much on a momentum of its own; and the incidental manifestations of its working, such as the special excitation of interests that have already a heavy emotional charge, are apt to induce even in those most genuinely subject to spiritual influence a false estimation of its real worth and import. The visible signs of the working of the Spirit tend to be cultivated

for their own sakes, and the further we are removed from genuine religious inspiration the more extravagant and scandalous are the attempts to simulate it or to induce it artificially. Even these are not without considerable interest to the student of religion. They are distinctively religious occurrences. But to those who do not understand their proper relation to the true working of the Spirit of God they will be only an abomination and a scandal which bring the whole of religion into very ill repute. When revivals are past it is by incidental extravagances that they are often remembered best, even by those well placed to notice fruits of a very different kind. But if we are to form a fair estimate, and especially if we are to avoid a spurious spirituality or the prostitution of genuine spiritual power by diversion into activities that are not manifestations of its own working, there can be few more urgent precautions than that we should at all times remind ourselves of the integration of spiritual truth and experience with other processes which have standards of their own that are not abrogated in any way by the religious activity that supervenes upon them. Religion does not distort the activity which it animates, it does not suspend secular standards. There is thus no cover for unreason in religion, and there could be no greater disservice to religion than the theological sanction which some writers have given to violent subversive forces of late. The movement of the Spirit is certainly not a smooth process which we can anticipate and direct as we would a normal process of reform, it does not proceed by the usual computation of needs and resources. 'The Spirit bloweth where it listeth.' The vision is given of God to those who submit themselves to it. But it involves also the enhancement of other powers, and although this is not the immediate test of its worth, it affords one valuable way of proving the spirits whether they be of God or not. This does not mean that we should at once forswear or discourage all manifestations of religious disturbance which do not conform to ordinary standards. For there seems to be recurrent need for the medium and symbols of religious life to vary and depart from the course of normal experience. This is not hard to understand, and we must not presume to judge too smugly and nicely in such matters. But we must also be wary how we stray from the paths of normality and endeavour to keep ourselves in the way of genuine spiritual life and religious discrimination by maintaining the deepest respect for standards of worth and reasonableness which are independently evident to us.

This does not imply that religion has no contribution of its own to make to the formation of value judgments. On the contrary, the relation is reciprocal and we owe the refinement of our

sense of right and worth largely to religion. The perspective which religion gives us and the general attitude of mind it induces predisposes us to discriminate better in all spheres of interest. The ideal should be for religion to permeate all activities, but it does not eliminate them or absorb them wholly into itself. For this reason they provide in turn a means of concretion which helps substantially itself to direct and evaluate religious experience.

A similar clue is afforded here to the problem of religious authority. The conflict between the more established formalized expressions of the religious life and the more explosive prophetic elements by which it is renewed and redirected is an old one. It raises more problems than can be noticed here. But we ought to know enough about it to-day to realize that a simple solution in favour of one factor or the other is out of the question. The problem of authority and freedom will be with us as long as we have true religion, and every age must come to terms with it in its own way according to the form it takes at the time. But the more we understand how creative the life of religion must be, the plainer it becomes that authority in religion can never be a formal matter depending only on the letter of the law. The authority must be sought rather in terms of affinities between the living experience, bringing its immediate assurances to the individual, and our sense of the real religious life of the past which has found embodiment in institutions and creeds. Only by the exercise of the highest religious imagination is this achieved, and the right relation of ourselves as individuals, or of new and untested religious movements, to established traditions and authorities is to be ensured, not primarily by legal sagacity and shrewd ecclesiastical politics, but by the insight of devout and prayerful spirits who bring an informed religious imagination to the right adjustment of the old and the new.

This is a theme which I would much like to pursue further. It extends into the questions of the status of dogma and of the inspiration of the Bible. In both these respects, enthusiasts, claiming direct divine sanction, have themselves taken up attitudes of obstinate dogmatism and intolerance. But this is again due to the misunderstanding of religious inspiration and enthusiasm which separates them altogether from other activities and relevant social conditions. In these matters also the way of wisdom is that of co-operative spiritual discrimination.

Space precludes more than mention of the bearing our theme has on the relation of religion to social and political questions. That the relation is a close one, if our view is sound, will be evident. Religion is not to be merged in social questions, or in

educational questions. It has something of its own to contribute to these, not only in the way of a refinement of social ideals as such, but in the impregnation of them with a further religious significance. But social activities in turn provide one of the main occasions of religious insights and a natural extension of religious power. Jibes there have been in plenty of late at the notion of a 'social Gospel.' But how could the Christian Gospel be other than essentially social?

The Gospel is, however, more than social, and we shall never grasp what it means to us *as a Gospel* unless we bring to the social and cultural tasks that confront us, and to our deepest personal commitments in our immediate social environment, the attentiveness or spiritual alertness, so aptly described by Simone Weil and Paul Tillich as 'waiting on God,' which will enable us to apprehend the truth that is pre-eminently given of God to us in our own experience. The discipline and direction imposed upon the spiritual life by the right relating of it to the cultural and social media which it requires has already been stressed. But even more important for us now than the protection and discipline so assured is the positive renewal of prophetic power and spiritual vision. The original source of this power we know, much though we neglect it. It is the Scriptures, and the emphasis we lay, as Protestants, on religious experience should not blind us to the equally cardinal Protestant principle of the primacy of the Bible. No renewal of religion can hope to succeed that does not take us back to proper study of the Bible. Hence the exceptional importance, for an age that has become so estranged to the Bible, of the provision for religious education in schools and colleges. But our study of the Scriptures to-day should be more informed and enlightened than at any time in the past. We should thus recover a better sense of the precise historical situations in which its message was given. To apprehend these as spiritually significant situations, illumined for us by reading the Scriptures, is a work of devotion and prayerful attentiveness as well as sound scholarship. To the extent that we succeed in this task the message of the Bible will be found relevant also to life as we find it now. Unless we seek this immediate relevance devout study of the Bible loses most of its worth; it becomes an empty act of piety. We use our Bibles best when we come out of them. There is thus a reciprocal relation between our sense of the spiritual significance of the past, as informed by a God-given message, and the discovery of that message in newer and ampler forms in the present. It is thus, I believe, that we should understand the exceptional importance of religion and history. There is a continuity in history of the dis-

cernment of the truths that are only 'spiritually discerned,' not in the superficial and untenable sense of a formal pattern of history illustrating abstract ideas, but as a relationship validated only in the distinctively religious experience of individuals. Only those who take the injunctions of Christianity seriously in all their forms, including extraordinary practical demands, put themselves fairly in the way of this renewal of religious life. This is one of the ways in which the emphasis on 'Response' in this Conference is especially timely. 'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in Heaven.' These are aspects of Christian allegiance which I have myself often ventured to stress. There can be no faith 'without works.' But likewise faith is never works alone. It is works and purity of heart informed by the sense of a special dealing of God with us now through the strange events described in the Scriptures. This the Bible puts simply as 'walking with God.' But it is not a matter of easy acquiescence but of the watchful humility of the Christian pilgrim who knows that he must be always doing battle in his present existence with despair and cynicism, and that he does so best by spiritual responsiveness to the renewal of the work of Grace in his heart.

This above all is a response to Christ himself. In the topic you have set me we have found ourselves ranging over some of the main problems of the Christian religion. But no problem is more crucial or harder to deal with than that of the 'Person of Jesus.' It would be arrogant of me to pontificate about this problem in a few words in coming to a close. Yet there are some things I shall venture to say. The clue to our understanding of Jesus and of the astonishing claims He made for himself can never be found in purely formal conceptions but only in the experience of devout individuals who surrender themselves to His influence, not blindly or in a spirit of doctrinaire dogmatism, but in that subtler and more testing surrender of self to the holiness which is almost too radiant to be borne. It is only as the story of Jesus, taken in the full context of Biblical history, affects us in this way, now elevating us to the height of spiritual exaltation and now plunging us into the abyss of despair, that we can be sure of apprehending the marvel of the Word made flesh and dwelling among us.

The emphasis is thus again on wonder, devotion, and passion. All these are in turn easily travestied or cultivated as spiritual luxuries divorced from spiritual reality. But without them there is no true religion. Religious truth that does not disturb us can never be genuine. The assurance and solace which it brings is

lso an aching of the heart, if only as a measure of the depth of ur joy. These notes are not often sounded in religion to-day; we ssociate them too easily with a cheap emotional piety. But we ust overcome that fear and rescue the expressions of spiritual oods from the artificial and tawdry setting to which they have so ften been degraded. No vulgarity appals like religious vulgarity. ut we must not oppose it by a veto on all that is not amenable o direct rational discipline. The answer to religious vulgarity is efinement of true religious feeling, not its suppression. It is only s we are bold enough to respond to the inspirations that come to s anew in the fullness of present experience that we can truly nter again into the saving truths and the joys of our faith.

There are signs that this may not be too long delayed. Men nterest themselves much more seriously in religion in quite recent ears than seems to have been the case for a long time, most of ll in cultural circles. Perhaps the drought from which all our nterests are wilting may soon be ended. Or, to vary the metaphor, e may perhaps be able to say, in the well-known words of the Welsh hymnist:

> O'er those gloomy hills of darkness
> Look, my soul; be still, and gaze;
> All the promises do travail
> With a glorious day of grace:
> Blessed Jubilee!
> Let thy glorious morning dawn.

I wish I could quote more from the same source. For no one eems to have given finer expression to the moods of the religious nthusiasm we need to-day than the supreme Welsh hymnist rom Pant-y-Celyn. Is there any means, I wonder, of conveying o a wider audience the varieties of religious experience and hristian devotion perpetuated in the Welsh hymns of this notable riter? Is there any interpreting of him possible which could be elated to religious thought to-day? There is surely a rich mine or someone to quarry here. And I do not think I am straying too ar from my theme in ending on the wistful hope that more may e culled from this source for the renewal and enrichment of eligion. For it is the beauty and lyrical passion of these holy ongs that we need most of all to recover for religion to-day.

THE CHALLENGE OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY TO CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. Canon I. T. Ramsey, M.A., Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Oxford

A. What is this challenge of contemporary philosophy?

IT is the challenge associated with the phrase 'logical positivism' and it might help us both to see something of the very differen approaches covered by this phrase, as well as to appreciate bette the broad challenge they jointly make, if we briefly call to min the historical development over the last half-century. It fall roughly into three stages.

I. Let our minds first go back to the Oxford of some fifty year ago; to the Hegelian synthesis there then was of science, philo sophy and religion. Wallace of Merton, for example, can commen Hegel's insistence that 'religion and philosophy coincide: in fact philosophy is itself a divine service, is a religion' (*Prolegomen to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy*; Oxford, 1894, p. 24). H can go on to point out that for Hegel and for the many that tak their inspiration from him,

> 'all actuality when it is grasped by knowledge, is from man's side, a exaltation of the mind towards God: while, when regarded from th divine standing-point, it is the manifestation by God of His own natur in its infinite variety' (*loc. cit.*, p. 25).

A religious vision indeed!

It is not for us here to indicate in detail the weaknesses of thi view, but two points should be noticed: (1) The view — howeve inspiring — was always a parody of Christianity as a religion o historical redemption. In so far as Christianity is more tha popular philosophy, precisely to that extent was this viewpoint in adequate. Far from being dismayed, then, at the passing of thi Hegelian synthesis we may rather be relieved, and inasmuch a logical positivism has contributed to its demise, it may well deserv our gratitude. It may even deserve our warm applause if we als find that more positively it can help to re-establish the peculia empirical claims of Christianity. (2) It was another weakness, how ever, which led to the particular philosophical development i which we are interested. This was a development which reacte against the extraordinary phraseology to which this Hegelian syn thesis led. Let me give you a specimen from p. 301 of Wallace book:

> 'The first part of Logic, the theory of Being, may be called the theor of unsupported and freely-floating Being. We do not mean somethin

> which *is*, but the mere "is," the bare fact of Being, without any substratum. The degree of condensation or development, where substantive and attribute, or noun and verb, co-exist, has not yet come. The terms or forms of Being float as it were freely in the air, and we go from one to another, or — to put it more correctly — one passes into another.'

It may be that those words mean something, but it is certainly a puzzle to unravel their logic — to place them on the language map (if any) to which they belong. We have (I hope) a feeling that what they say should either be said clearer or not at all.

This was certainly the reaction of many philosophers early in this century, and it is a reaction associated most distinctively in this country with the names of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. If one word was to describe their position it would be 'clarification.' Moore it was who first used ruthlessly the question, 'What do you mean by so-and-so?' and Bradley and many others came under this analytical attack. Moore was on the whole content with cutting through all sorts of woolliness and puffiness, but Russell tried more systematically to outline a meaningful language. It would start (he thought) with very simple (or 'protocol') propositions, the significance of whose terms would be given by something like a mere pointing and saying 'that is red.' From such simple atomic beginnings the molecular propositions of a meaningful language would in due course be constructed, and it is from Russell that we have our first vision of a hierarchy of languages making up a total scheme.

Neither Moore nor Russell explicitly attacked theological sentences, but however little the challenge was explicitly made or recognized, it is plain that theology, like metaphysics, was being boldly challenged to state a case for meaningfulness. This brings us to the end of stage I of our historical survey. It sees the beginning of an empirical and somewhat anti-metaphysical approach.

II. You will not be surprised, however, to hear that, as with all pioneering, certain great difficulties were found in Russell's view, and one of these concerned what we might call the 'simple beginning.' So rather different stories came now to be told about the construction of an unambiguous language and its empirical relevance, in connection with which the names of Wittgenstein and Carnap come specially to mind. We are at stage II of our historical survey.

Wittgenstein's view (at any rate at one stage of his development) was that a significant and unambiguous language would confine itself to the empirical propositions of sense experience. Its exact formulation would yield no cut-and-dried system but was rather a matter for experiment and testing, and towards this end

the so-called 'Verification Principle' might be a useful guide. In a later form this 'principle' came to be: 'propositions have meaning if, and only if, they are verifiable in principle by sense experience.' True, since the 'principle' was presupposed by the language to which it led, being the supreme rule for its formulation, it could not itself be expressed in a sentence of that language and so was 'nonsense' — as nonsensical as a mnemonic, but just as *useful*. The trouble about most metaphysical sentences was that, while they too were nonsense, they seemed quite *useless* and irrelevant for the construction of this significant empirical language. At the same time there was for Wittgenstein a mystical fringe to his experience, and this mysticism and such *useful* 'metaphysics' as was to be found might perhaps be closely related. But again it was up to theology to state a case for its meaningfulness and significance.

Carnap was even more critical of metaphysics than Wittgenstein. It was for him based on an express violation of the rules according to which perceptually significant sentences worked. Metaphysical questions or assertions were pseudo-questions or pseudo-assertions implying a violation of the very rules according to which various words were introduced, or using words for which no rules at all had been given. All that was worth saying in a metaphysical sentence could be reduced in the end to straightforward perception sentences. Of course even Carnap had to allow for more sorts of empirical relevance than one, and he was as ready as anyone to allow a sort of derivative significance to abstract scientific words like 'field' or 'electron' or 'potential.' We might well wonder whether this is not a door through which a suitably pruned and empirical metaphysics might be squeezed as well. But with this second stage the attack on theology became quite explicit, and perhaps its most popular exposition is in A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (ch. vi.), where theology, like much else, is claimed to be absolutely devoid of meaning except in so far as it can be given an analysis in terms of propositions about sense-experience.

The argument is that theology is 'meaningless' unless it refers merely to some personal 'thrill' or 'satisfaction' or 'pleasure' or 'uplift.' For in the first place it is clear that theological words like 'God' or 'soul' have no direct empirical relevance like (on a commonsense view) the words 'table,' 'sun,' 'tree,' 'book,' or (more strictly) like colour words such as 'red,' 'blue' when these are given an ostensive definition. Nor, in the second place, have theological words such indirect empirical relevance as belongs to scientific words like 'field,' 'electron,' 'potential,' 'entropy,'

'force.' The conclusion is that the propositions of theology cannot be 'verified' in terms of sense experience except in so far as they are about our 'feelings' and bodily sensations. Theology on this view could never be more than 'subjective.'

Both metaphysics and theology were now roused to self-defence, but at any rate by the time a person like Joad had marshalled his forces the character of the attack had very considerably changed. Partly, we may suspect, from the over-technicalities of a Carnap, partly from the broader approach that Wittgenstein always left as a possibility, partly from the attacks of opponents, no matter how misguided, partly no doubt, too, because the promised perfect language seemed an awful long time in appearing, a third stage has now been reached in this recent empirical development, and for want of a better title we may call it the stage of *linguistic analysis*.

III. In some ways it is a return to Moore's 'Common Sense,' but it is a return enriched by the various insights that have since been gained into the complexities of language, and I suppose that Gilbert Ryle and John Wisdom are the two most prominent exponents of this — not so much 'view' as technique. Essentially the technique is this: When presented with any philosophical, especially metaphysical, problem, ask: How are the various words involved being used? What kind of empirical tale can be told about them? What sort of examples can be given to make an inroad into the problem? Realize, in fact, the intricacies of language, and try to get shafts of light into a problem by taking the words which are packed into it, and examining them in as many contexts as possible where the empirical relevance is clear, and their uses most straightforward. So break up a problem; 'unpack' it; set it in a framework of language empirically grounded; portray its linguistic setting; do its logical mapping. Light will dawn; problems will fall apart. Let us take an example, though no brief or single example can ever adequately suggest the detailed and particular treatment of a problem which linguistic analysis gives. Gilbert Ryle, in his book *The Concept of Mind*, rightly shows how many problems to do with 'the mind' have often arisen in the past because the concept of mind has been talked about by means of an erroneous 'ghost in a machine' model. Erroneous because, having severely distinguished between minds on the one hand, and bodies and the external world on the other, models from the external world were then used in the unrealizable hope of throwing light on our knowledge of minds. 'Mental events' were something like pale shadows of 'physical events' with a special sort of 'causation,' and so on. Far from recognizing the

intricacies of language, confusion was worse confounded by the wide use of this illegitimate model in an endeavour to construct an homogeneous language. Ryle's more positive point is that we could do much better, in talking about 'the mind,' to restrict ourselves to talking about those various and varying kinds of observable behaviour in relation to which the 'ghost in the machine' model has been misguidedly used. Drop the model altogether and rather focus attention on observable behaviour, so as to discriminate more carefully its significant and important features.

We will give yet another example because it is one which is old and secure and which would be used by Russell as much as Ryle, and indeed by many others. Suppose three people were sitting round a fire and someone was sent in to count the number of 'conscious beings.' Suppose now he returns to tell us there are four. We look naturally surprised and he answers that there are three people and the Group, which is constituted by the three of them together. The next move at this point might be to start a great discussion as to whether there is or is not some curious sort of existent over and above the three people round the fire. On the one hand there would be older empiricists like John Stuart Mill who would deny such an existent; others, of the Hegelian persuasion, would think there was something to be said for it. Russell and Ryle and many others would be concerned to bring the discussion to an end by pointing out that it was mere brawling because it mixed two levels of language, because it made what Ryle has called (not altogether happily) a 'category mistake.' Group words and member words are at different levels of the hierarchy of language, and 'numbering' cannot be used in the same sense of each. Any discussion which brings group words and member words together in the same sentence is bound to be as fruitless as a discussion which asks whether electrons are pink or not, and for the same reason. It has not realized well enough the intricacies of language: and all we need do to solve the alleged mystery is to elucidate the distinctive character of those empirical situations in which member and group words are respectively used.

In this kind of way the problems of philosophy are reduced to exercises by which the complex structure of language is revealed. When we clarify the structure of a language in this way we are said to display its 'logical structure' or 'logical syntax' or 'logic.' The criticism of theology made at this third stage would be that it fits into no significant language structure whatever; that it seems to have no relation to any empirical fact; that it is illuminated by no group of various and varying examples. Theological words

cannot in any way be plotted or mapped. They are altogether devoid of any empirical significance. A particular example of this general criticism is the 'falsification problem,' about which there has been much recent discussion.

To describe this problem — if only in outline — let us begin by supposing that someone protested against the assertion that theology was devoid of any empirical significance. The objection might be put forward that while this criticism could be made of some of the upper reaches of rational theology, it could hardly be used to attack an empirical theology. Do we not talk, for example, of God acting in the world? Do we not talk of his purposive design as seen in the Creation? Have we not traditionally spoken of God's interventions in the natural order? What of these sentences? Are not these quite verifiable, quite respectably empirical, indeed quasi-scientific assertions? Some theologians have even gone further and spoken of a 'theistic hypothesis.'

It is true that the discernible regular patterns of nature from which science formulates its generalizations have been used to suggest God's love of order and his reliability; the succession of the seasons, for example, has led theologians to talk of God's overall providence, and it would seem at first sight that all this was capable of 'verification.' The trouble is at the next move. For when irregularities occur they apparently cause no difficulty whatever, and this naturally casts doubt on the genuineness of the God-hypothesis. Somehow it is not probabilified or modified or transformed in anything like the same way as a scientific hypothesis is, though scientific hypotheses have a far more complicated structure than a naïve scientific attitude sometimes gives them when it talks too glibly of their 'verification' or 'disproof.' By having God invisible, 'wholly Other,' his ways inscrutable, and so on, there is no hope, say our opponents, of catching the theist out. Here is a 'heads I win, tails you lose' controversy. There is, in truth, no empirical situation which would lead the theist to say that God does not exist. There are no circumstances in which the sincere believer in God would be prepared to give up his belief. It is true that some have tried to reconcile the evil in the world with the goodness of God, or the occurrence of miracles with his general providence; but so far as they were genuinely religious people the end of the argument has never been for them in doubt. They would believe in God whatever happened: 'though he slay me, yet will I trust him.' So it is bound to be admitted that belief in God is a specially important brand of dominating belief which only has the most curious and distant empirical relevance. It is not at all a 'scientific attitude.'

By the more constructive critics it is said at this point that theistic sentences express rather our 'policy' or 'attitude' towards the *total language* we use; they give a certain slant on a person's *total* viewpoint. But the constructive critics go no further. Yet we ourselves cannot leave the matter there. We are bound to ask, Is such a theistic 'policy' justified, or is it mere prejudice? Have theological words any sort of empirical fact whatever to which they can appeal in defence? The challenge the falsification problem makes is to demand on the one hand that we establish some integral connection between theological words and the rest of language, and on the other hand that we give some account of the sort of fact to which theological words can appeal for their empirical relevance. We must discover the logical status of theological words—including, *e.g.*, their relation to, and difference from, the words of a scientific assertion.

I hope those examples have given some idea of the technique of linguistic analysis and of the challenge which this third stage of recent empirical development brings with it. But before leaving this historical survey there is a very important point I wish to raise, which ties up ultimately with one I have just made. It seems to me that linguistic analysis is so concerned with the complexities of language as to overlook the various questions of factual reference that are raised. At the beginning, Russell's view was pretty plain. There was a hierarchy of language, and we might have supposed it possible that, theoretically at any rate, a place might be found somewhere in such a hierarchy for metaphysical words. But the trouble would have occurred if we had asked what these particular words in the heirarchy meant. For the sentences in which they occurred would have had to be reduced until their factual reference was given in terms of sense data. While there was a hierarchy of language, there was only one brand of fact. Now like us all, by this time, linguistic analysts are quite clear that whatever empirical facts are or are not, they are certainly *not* Russell's sense data, and to that extent the challenge of the earlier empiricism is being met by the philosophers themselves. But so much else is then so often left undeveloped. For instance, in the book by Ryle we have mentioned above, it is for the most part left quite uncertain as to whether Ryle thinks that his treatment of mental concepts in terms of observable behaviour is *adequate*. If it is, then there are no mental events, which Ryle says he does not wish to claim. If it is not, then it is possible that 'mental events,' however wrongly mapped in the past, and however much Ryle's mapping will have to be incorporated in any future mapwork, are still waiting for a more adequate logic than he has given, and that

language relating only to observable behaviour will not suffice. In other words, linguistic analysis to-day is in search of an ontology; it is searching for a factual reference that is other than Russell's. Here, I suggest, is the weak spot in the contemporary armour, and for that very reason is the point which for us must have very great significance. Indeed, my general answer to the challenge of contemporary philosophy is to say that while we must welcome all the logical insights into language that recent empiricism has given us, we must somehow unite these with an approach to 'facts' which is much more Bradleian than the empiricists at one time would have dared to admit. If only Russell and Bradley could have united in their divergencies from Hegel, and the enemies of a common enemy been friends!

The whole movement of contemporary philosophy, then, might be said to be characterized by (*a*) a preoccupation with language that has questioned in many different ways the status of metaphysical and theological words, and (*b*) a concern to give all propositions some empirical relevance. To face the challenge which contemporary philosophy makes on us we must (*a*) justify a position for theological words on a language map, and (*b*) in particular elucidate their empirical relevance. Nor need we feel particularly depressed. For in our search for the status of theological words the contemporary challenge has already given us a guide, *viz.* the idea of a language hierarchy. It has also suggested that if we face up to the problem of factual reference which the linguistic analysts themselves have not solved, we may find an answer to their difficulties as well as our own.

B. A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE

Let us now see in outline the suggestions we can make to answer this challenge constructively. My remarks here are in five brief sections and are followed by one or two relevant comments:

1. *'Levels' of language.*

A language map which aims at adequacy and comprehensiveness must contain words used at many different '*levels*.' This is a point of which we have had already some anticipation, and though the idea of levels of language is by no means without its complications, for our purpose I think it can be made reasonably clear without going into too much detail.

Roughly speaking, we may say that a sufficient but *not* necessary condition for the words w_1 and w_2 to be used at two levels L_1 and L_2 is that a sentence which contains the words w_1 and w_2 should be nonsense of a particular kind. All we can do here is to

illustrate this kind of nonsense by examples : 'The hat is blue' and '$\sqrt{9} = \pm 3$' are *not* nonsense in this sense and we can therefore suppose that the words and symbols they use belong, in each example, to the same 'level.' On the other hand, 'the exponential base of logarithms is green' and '$\sqrt{\text{Pope}} = \text{Addison}$' are both nonsense, and the conclusion is that in each of these cases different levels are being confused. The way we have phrased the general criterion of different levels indicates that we can never be *absolutely* certain that different levels do *not* occur in a sentence, but, Occam-like, there is no reason why we should invent difficulties before they occur, and unless and until problems arise, there is every reason why we should suppose that different level language has not been used. For example, 'England is prosperous' and 'Mr. Smith is bald' seem quite innocent and meaningful. So far so good. The innocence and meaning is still preserved if we go on to say 'Mr. Smith is prosperous and bald.' But trouble awaits us if we also go on to say 'England is prosperous and bald'; nor are we any more content if we say 'England is prosperous and not bald.' Both the extra predication, and its contradiction, are equally plausible or unplausible, and the puzzlement that has now arisen can only be resolved by admitting that, despite our original assumption, 'England' and 'Mr. Smith' belong to two different levels.

2. *The hierarchical structure of a total language.*

Words used like this, at different levels, make up what we may call (for a reason to be seen presently) the 'subordinate languages' of any total language map, *e.g.* the language of mathematics, of the sciences, of history, of ethics, and of highly generalized philosophical discussion, indeed all the languages of discursive knowledge in general. Each language has its own distinctive 'structure,' and though that word may be no easier to define than the word 'level' to which obviously it is closely related, it is, as we have seen in the case of levels, revealed by the occurrence of problems and paradoxes by which an *apparently homogeneous* language like that of common sense is filtered out, or sorted, into a *continuous hierarchy* of languages.

3. *A hierarchy of facts.*

But if, with Russell, we admit such a hierarchy of languages, why should we not also have (what Russell has *not*) a corresponding hierarchy of facts? At any rate that is my next suggestion. With each subordinate language, I suggest, goes its appropriate

brand of ' facts,' so that with each language, *e.g.* science, or history, there go distinctively peculiar fact-pictures.

4. *'Index' words.*

From all we have said so far it might seem as though alongside Russell's hierarchy of languages we have placed something like Bradley's ' sheer relativism ' of facts; and so far as we have gone that is true. But this laminated and serial picture, with something like parallel hierarchies of language and fact, is not the whole story. In sections 4 and 5 we have now to make two important additions to the story, and it is here we begin to face more squarely the two-fold challenge mentioned at the end of Part A.

The truth of every empiricist case is that, despite what we have said about ' sheer relativism,' at some stage or other ' fact is given.' There is, as Whitehead would put it, a 'limitation,' an ' abruptness,' about the world. We cannot talk about anything we jolly well like. We do not start our thinking from absolute zero, in an utter vacuum. The curious point I would like to make is this: that this limitation is really *linguistic*—that ' given fact ' and empirical ' limitation ' express rather a demand on language than describe features of the world. They are, I suggest, a demand that our overall total language shall be *finite*, that our language hierarchy shall have something like what Whitehead would call an *apex*. The empiricist appeal to *given fact* is rather an appeal for constraint on language which shall show itself ultimately in a pattern and structure which is *finite*.

At the same time it is clear that the subordinate languages themselves are infinite—they can go on and on, and be developed further and further. This again is an empirical demand. We need therefore some other sort of language besides the infinite subordinate languages that constitute the hierarchy. Indeed, I am bold enough to think that Occam's Razor well expresses *both* these empirical demands and could rather be expressed: by all means multiply entities but always be prepared to stop, and necessarily stop somewhere. Alternatively: only necessarily multiply; and above all necessarily stop.

Besides the subordinate languages, then, a total language map will have what we may call boundary or index words. We may call them *boundary words* in so far as, like Kant's regulative use of the Idea of Reason, they round off and enclose other languages. We may call them *index words*, and use that picture, for two reasons: (*a*) They are words which are good clues to, and definitive of, the total language scheme, as is the index of a book to the words contained in its chapters. (*b*) They are words which bring to

a full level of concretion what is being talked about — which indicates the abstract in its concrete setting. They point at full concretion (*cp.* 'index' finger).

The function of these boundary or index words, then, is to supplement in various ways the infinite subordinate languages, to link them together, and so to complete our language map as a finite structure.

5. *'Index' words and their factual reference.*

But, it will be said, what is their empirical justification? When the various facts described by the subordinate languages, with their various logical structures, have been arrayed, what is left? Certainly the empirical relevance of 'index' words stands or falls with the claim that this total array of all the facts portrayed by the subordinate languages is inadequate as a picture of Fact as it is. Now if I am asked how this inadequacy is discovered, and what do I mean by '"Fact" as it is,' I should say that it is given to us in a 'self-other awareness' which each subordinate fact presupposes, and which is something that all of them together do not exhaust. The empirical justification for the index words is to be given, then, in terms of this curious awareness which (I would claim) all of us can recognize when it is suitably induced, and for which the words of any and all subordinate languages are not adequate as a description. If anyone is sceptical of this claim, my only retort is that they should first contemplate the puzzlements, *e.g.* about the 'self,' which result from its denial, *i.e.* from having nothing but publicly observable facts. My claim would be that these very puzzlements indicate the inadequacy of the alternative presupposition.

Let us try to make the point clearer by giving examples of index words which fall outside the subordinate languages and which, if we are right, would then be needed for a full description of Fact as it is, and which might therefore be expected specially to indicate the curious empirical fact of which we have spoken.

I think it is plain that for each of us 'I' would be an index word. Here certainly is a word which cannot be exhaustively described in terms of a subordinate language. Descartes' Cogito argument, I suggest, is really a claim for this curious status of 'I'; Berkeley's development of a doctrine of notions, over and above his theory of ideas, was necessitated by his discernment that 'I active' could not be treated in terms of a theory of public ideas, a point which Hume notoriously underlines though with a different conclusion. 'I' is never exhausted by any number of

public references, and 'I' can therefore be offered as an index word whose logic is not exhausted by its use in subordinate languages.

My reference to Berkeley will already have hinted that another word which belongs to the index is 'activity.' The philosophical problems of Movement, Change, Causation, Free Will, all witness to attempts (and failures) to reduce the word activity to the terms of a subordinate language. The permanent paradoxes about 'activity' suggest that it is a word of an altogether special status and will find its place in a language index.

At this point let us remember that Berkeley saw full well that we are each aware of 'I active' in a curious way. Not only did he have his doctrine of notions as such to supplement his theory of ideas; he, like ourselves, was also concerned with the curious empirical relevance which notions had. As for Malebranche, 'self-knowledge' for Berkeley is a curious empirical fact. Hence the oddness of such phrases as 'inward feeling,' '*conscientia quadam interna*,' 'reflex act,' which are for Berkeley the means by which self-existence is discovered and indicate the fact to which ultimately 'notions' must be related. As we hoped, talk about the index words has led us, like Berkeley, to the curious empirical fact we called 'self-other awareness.'

It is as well to emphasize at once, however, that for us this curious empirical fact has a subject-object structure. To deny that of any awareness is to deny it the possibility of ever being mapped at all, and to indulge in the most fantastic nonsense. This is a point at which we would develop Berkeley's doctrine of notions, as we would object to Bradley's 'Absolute awareness' which transcended all relations. It might transcend all the subject-predicate relations of subordinate languages: but it could not transcend the fundamental subject-object relation which all fact and all language presupposes.

Working on this point of subject-object structure, our next suggestion is that, as 'I' is necessitated on the *subjective* side by what we have called 'self-other awareness,' so likewise this 'self-other awareness' will on its *objective* side demand index words, *i.e.* words of the same logical status as 'I.' Such a word would be 'person.' 'Person' and 'I' have the same logical status and are index words, whereas 'me' and 'other people' or 'individuals' have another logical status, and belong to subordinate and public languages. With this background 'I and persons actively related' might be proffered as the most concrete description possible to what we have so far called 'self-other awareness.' This is to approach from the side of language what, for example,

Dr. A. C. Ewing has called our 'non-inferential awareness' of persons.

Finally, the word 'God.' This is not the place to give our detailed reasons for developing our map one stage further and introducing the word 'God.' But the word 'God,' I would suggest, likewise belongs to the metaphysical index. Indeed it would be proferred as the apex word which effects the final closing of the linguistic hierachy, that word which is the ultimate co-ordinating word to make our total language finite, and which in particular ties up the metaphysical index. We might say, in outline, that the word 'God' would be introduced in a not-unBerkeleian manner by first linking together 'activity' and 'independence' as used of physical objects, and then uniting these with the word 'person.' Further, for reasons which have led people to speak of a universal 'creaturely dependence,' the word 'God' would in the end be all-presiding. 'God' as an apex word is indeed a linguistic formulation of the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

So our general conclusion is that the words 'I,' 'persons,' 'activity' and 'God' are all index words whose empirical justification, besides that which they derive by infiltration into the subordinate languages, is to be made by reference to that curious 'self-other awareness' (what Berkeley called 'inward feeling' or '*conscientia quadam interna*') which is not exhaustively treated by any or all of the subordinate languages.

These are my outline suggestions. And now one or two comments to make the picture clearer and to fill in a detail or two here and there.

(*a*) The need for index words we pleaded by reference to 'given fact.' But it can be pleaded also from the side of language. It is perfectly obvious that within and subordinate language explanations will never be possible. There is no stage at which the question 'Why?' cannot be asked. The possibility, then, of there ever being anything which can be called 'explanation' (and the question 'Why explain?' is self-defeating) means that somewhere or other we must get outside a subordinate language — which is commonly expressed by saying that somewhere or other we must appeal to 'fact.' But where can we do this if facts and language are in mutually variable hierarchies? Only when we reach an index word, and the appeal which is then made to 'fact' is to such a curious fact as I have called 'self-other awareness.'

(*b*) It might be thought that to make 'God' an apex word, which enables us to use 'God' of everything, is to commit us to Pantheism. It may look like Spinoza all over again, or even that

we were merely substituting 'God' for Bradley's 'Absolute.' But Pantheism of the ordinary sort only follows if we make one of two errors: (1) if we forget that 'God' is an index word and further think that language is altogether homogeneous, so that we can cheerfully and without any thought of language peculiarities predicate 'God' of everything. On the other hand, even if we allow levels of language we may fail to give index words their special status, and so (2) suppose that an index word pictures fact like the words of a subordinate language, so that because the language hierarchy has one presiding word like 'God' (for us), or 'Absolute' (for Bradley), there is in the end one homogeneous fact. This was indeed Bradley's mistake to which we have already referred. Index words do *not* picture fact. The index as a whole has in relation to a total language the peculiar and special function we have tried to describe; and it has a correspondingly peculiar factual reference; being justified *in toto* by reference to the 'self-other awareness.'

(*c*) An important point, however, of which (*b*) has reminded us is that index words can be used significantly at *all* levels of language, and their peculiar status only becomes evident if ever we try, despite ourselves, to limit their use to one level when they lead us to all sorts of paradoxes and puzzlements. Furthermore, it is at such levels as characterize languages of high generalization such as philosophy that index words are most prominent; it is at levels most removed from this, *e.g.* the level of mathematics, where it might even seem that idex words could hardly be used at all. But even here, for example, a significant sentence could be made up of 'I' and (say) '$2+2=4$' ('I see that $2+2=4$'), and the function of 'I' here would be to call attention to, and so to indicate, the more concrete total fact of which '$2+2=4$' is at the time an accurate but partial characterization. Similarly, when statements are made about God's willing the laws of logic and mathematics, 'God,' while being an index word, is here being used significantly at the mathematical level. That 'God' is capable of being used in this curious way is no more surprising than the many uses Russell makes of the sign '$\exists$,' which for his analyses has almost that same presiding function which we have given to 'God.'

Here, then, broadly, is our response to to the linguistic challenge of contemporary philosophy. Here is our endeavour to give theological words a justifiable place on a language map; our attempt to outline the logical status of theological words and to elucidate their empirical relevance. We now conclude by elaborat-

ing just one or two particular examples which will, I hope, show some interesting implications of this viewpoint.

C. Some illustrative examples

(*a*) *The character of Christian commitment.*

If what we have said is true, everyone who uses language at all is committed to some index or other, some end point-language with a peculiar status, and in this sense everyone—Christian, Turk, Jew and Infidel—has 'presuppositions.' Everyone at a particular time in so far as he is 'one' person is committed to some index or other, and such a commitment can be traced through the whole language structure and also, of course, in relation to the facts which are associated with the subordinate languages. Thinking, for example, of the extended perspective but also of the highly abstract character of scientific language, we can see, for instance, how scientific language involves a *partial* commitment to the *whole* Universe. To take another example, and this time the language of personal affection, we can see that such language portrays a *total* commitment to a *very small part* of the Universe. Building on these examples, and remembering what we have said about index words and their empirical relevance, can we not say that a theological index involves some *total* commitment to the *whole* Universe: it embraces all other commitments?

This special character of index-commitment can be seen in another way. We can readily see how both scientific language and the language of affection relate, though in different ways, to a *choice* on our part. Can we, however, in any sense at all legitimately talk about choice in relation to a theological index?

It is true that no index is above what we might call internal criticism, *i.e.* it can be assessed in relation to its simplicity—whether it embraces the minimum number of boundary words or whether some reduction or re-scheming is possible; and it can also be assessed in relation to the comprehensiveness and consistency of the total language scheme over which the index presides. In this kind of way we might possibly talk about 'choice' in relation to an index.

But fundamentally a choice of index would imply a *choice* between two *total* languages, and such a 'choice' is very questionably meaningful. It implies that a total language scheme might at some time or other be totally replaced, and this is surely a curious theoretical possibility. For the possibility would imply that our total world was altogether different and that we had an altogether different series of perspectives making up our Universe. Everything, including ourselves, would be utterly different.

It is, then, hardly meaningful to use 'choice' in relation to a total language scheme. Here indeed is a linguistic approach to the phrase, 'Ye have not chosen me; but I have chosen you,' and one which enables us to see the broad reasonableness of Christian commitment. The Christian claim is that Christ expresses in himself the *total personal* claim of the *whole* Universe on us; a factual claim which properly and appropriately corresponds to the status of a theological index.

(*b*) *The status of the traditional 'proofs' of God's existence.*

Let us next exemplify the viewpoint we have outlined by glancing at the different approach which is made possible to the traditional 'proofs.'

Take, for instance, the Ontological proof. In one form it may be said to argue from the idea of God to his existence. Can this, on any interpretation, be justified? From what we have been saying, 'God' as an apex word names, defines, presides over, characterizes — say what you will — a total language map, and being a word with this status it relates, we have seen, to the most concrete level of Fact. Therefore, however much other words may be compromised in their ontological reference, which may need a good deal of linguistic elucidation, this one cannot be. What this comes to saying is that at any rate one existential proposition will be necessary, in the sense that, to the *apex word* which completes our total language map, on which all other existential sentences are given a place, *something must* correspond, and some Fact which all subordinate 'facts' in some sense presuppose. 'God exists' is therefore not only unlike a characterizing proposition, *e.g.* 'lions are yellow,' but it is also not at all like 'cats exist.' Any proposition asserting a particular word as apex, *e.g.* 'God,' has a unique logical status, and it is the claim of the ontological argument that 'God exists' needs to be analysed in this way, *i.e.* 'God exists' = '"God" is the apex word of that total language in which all "existence" is most simply, most comprehensively and most consistently talked about.' Once again we may remark that this gives to 'God' a logical status not at all unlike the '$\exists$' which is the *sine qua non* for all Russell's analysis.

The other form of the ontological argument we may now deal with quite briefly. According to this form, existence necessarily belongs to God in the same sense as the three angles of the Euclidean triangle are necessarily two right angles. On our view this amounts to saying that the word 'God' *must* have an application because (*a*) for any language we are using there must be *some* metaphysical index; (*b*) the metaphysical index has a necessary,

though exceedingly complex, existential reference; and (*c*) For reasons we are not now specifying, 'God' is being recommended as an apex word.

As a second example, let us briefly consider the cosmological argument. That it illegitimately uses the word 'cause' is a criticism at least as old as Kant, but in so far as the argument introduces the word 'God' at the end of a sequence and as a 'limiting idea,' the general intention is good. We might reformulate it like this. Begin with an existent X. When we try to trace its causal predecessors we construct a series which from some points of view we like to think of as infinite, and from other points of view as finite. This, of course, is the point of Kant's Antinomies. But from what we have said about paradox and its use to indicate different language levels, may we not remark that the sort of paradox to which this causal reflection leads is not solved by any story of a Prime Mover, but rather by seeing that some word like 'mover' will need to be introduced as a '*prime*' word, *i.e.* as a metaphysical *index*? The proof becomes a sort of sketch or outline of how a language-map can be given a theological apex; and it could incidentally be no criticism of it that it presupposes a basic 'self-other awareness,' for all language and sketching presupposes that.

In regard to the teleological argument we have time only for two points: (i) that unless we are very careful it will mislead us into giving theological words a scientific use, so that we shall regard theological assertions as quasi-scientific; but (ii) that any move like Tennant's to work in terms of *cosmic* teleology can be regarded as an attempt to establish empirically 'God' as a metaphysical apex; with teleological examples to induce the 'self-other' awareness.

(*c*) *A further point on non-falsification.*

Here we may conveniently mention again the falsification problem, to which I hope my remarks in Part B have anticipated the general answer, so that I will hardly do more now than recapitulate. All that non-falsification suggests is that 'God' does not work like a word in an observation sentence, that theological assertions are *not* scientific assertions, and what we have tried to do in Part B has been to show that the word 'God' has a different sort of empirical relevance altogether. It is a metaphysical apex which has, with the associated index, an altogether different empirical justification from the words of subordinate languages. Yet at the same time we can see how the puzzle has arisen, *viz.* because index words can masquerade, for example, in scientific sentences as scientific words.

If we are asked what would be different if God did not exist, this is really to ask what would be different if we ceased to have the word 'God' as a metaphysical index, which is a particular form of the general question, what would be different if we changed the index of our language scheme? The answer is, as we saw when discussing the character of index-commitment: everything. Even ordinary words and their associated 'facts' would be in a different linguistic patterning, a different logical structure. Our total language scheme would be utterly transformed, and there would be a complete replacement of all present linguistic patterns of facts. The word 'God' (if we have constructed our theistic map correctly) is necessarily bound up with the whole totality of facts as they are.

Which brings me to my conclusion. In the Collect for Trinity Sunday we rightly speak of the grace by which we 'acknowledge the glory of the eternal Trinity.' We rightly think there of the ability we possess to understand God by elaborating subordinate languages which contain, *e.g.* technical philosophical terms such as 'person' and 'substance,' when they occur in Trinitarian doctrine. But we also recognize that it is 'in the power of the Divine Majesty' that we 'worship the Unity.' It is, indeed, *in worship* that we use, and justifiably, the index word 'God'—the apex word which brings 'unity' to our metaphysical system. For 'worship' is the ordinary word for describing the 'self-other awareness' we have mentioned so frequently.

Here is the familiar Anglican position — with a prayer-book at its centre; here is the ideal our ancient colleges portray—learning and usefulness subsumed under worship. So does contemporary philosophy, with its linguistic and empirical interest, bring us the possibility, not only of what Joseph Butler might have called a 'reasonable divinity,' but also a viewpoint specially suited to the Anglican tradition.

THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO CHANGE

By the Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A.,
Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford

'THE non-Roman Churches of this country will not in the foreseeable future exercise any influence upon the life of the nation.'

A cold bath invigorates a man if, and only if, he has sufficient vitality to set up a violent reaction, and I should not have begun with this chilly douche from the *Rowntree Report* if I were not convinced that our spiritual vitality is strong enough for us to be able to react to its challenge.

This depressing judgment is, of course, true from the point of view of the writers of the *Report*. It is the natural inference to draw from a consideration of the trends of religious life which have obtained during the last half-century, provided that we take no account of God. It is possible to criticize the *Report* in detail: York and High Wycombe, the towns investigated, may not be typical; and all such surveys are liable to be partially invalidated by errors in sampling. But the general picture is only too true; it tallies with the conclusions of *Puzzled People*, the report on a metropolitan area published by Mass Observation in 1947, and the Archbishop of York agrees that it is substantially reliable.

If we believe in God, we shall reject this conclusion. If we do not believe in God, we must wind up the Church, liberate the clergy to do some useful work, and pension off those who are too old, realizing for this purpose the property held by the Church Commissioners. If we do not wind up the Church, we can justify ourselves only on the ground that we are prepared to attempt great things for God because we expect great things from God. But if we believe in the ultimate victory of God and of His plan for the world through Jesus Christ and His Church, we must not make the mistake of identifying God's ultimate aim with our own proximate aim. It does not follow that, because God is God, England will remain a Christian country. A-Lo-Pen established the Church in China at about the same time that St. Augustine of Canterbury came to England. Yet within a few centuries the Christian Church had ceased to exist in China. About half a millennium later the Christian Church was re-established in the Far East. I am not prepared to say that Christianity will survive under the present *régime* in China, although my personal opinion is that it will, but I am convinced that if it should fail again, as it did before, it will once again be renewed. We cannot presume

to say that the Church of England will survive in her present form or in any other form, but we can trust God that, if we fail, the task which has been too great for us will be entrusted to others, it may be to missionaries from the Church of West Africa in the twenty-second century A.D., and that finally God's purpose will not fail. It is because we believe in the final victory of God that we can face the evidence for our own partial and temporary failure.

What are the reasons for this decline? We must not pass over such permanent factors as human sin, blindness, laziness and stupidity; they are always with us. But these conditions applied fifty years ago just as they do to-day. We must also examine the difficulties which are greater now than they were fifty years ago if we are to account for the fact that the influence of the Church is weaker, the incidence of divorce more frequent, and juvenile delinquency more rampant, than when Edward VII sat on the throne of England.

We must not spend too much time upon such factors as inflation, which has diminished the purchasing power of the revenues of the Church, or upon the shock and disintegration caused by the sequence war — unemployment — war — economic debility which we ourselves have witnessed, although their cumulative effect is considerable. The real causes lie deeper.

Prior to 1914 a countryman lived and worked in a village which he seldom left and which was dominated architecturally, and to some extent socially, by the Parish Church. To-day the dwellers in most single localities work in many different localities. In a typical Berkshire village some are employed on the local farms, others at the Morris Works in Cowley, and yet others at the Harwell Station for Atomic Research. The women who are earning their living do so not in local 'service' but as typists or shop assistants in Oxford or in Abingdon or as bus conductresses all over the county. The unity of place has broken and with it the unity of life. The children are educated at the village school only until the magic age of 11 plus. After that they cast off the village as something connected with childhood and depart to a school where Religious Knowledge may be taught, and often is taught competently and with conviction, but where no clergyman has the right of entry. Is it strange that the Church is regarded as one of those childish things which must be put away?

In the nineteenth century almost the only literature known to the man at the plough or to the woman in the kitchen was the Bible. Those who could not or did not read it for themselves could hear it read aloud in church. Admittedly, the Bible includes much picture language, which is not scientific, but it does present

us with a view of the world which is unified, complete and above all comprehensible. The view that God made the world in six days, parable though it be, did satisfy an earlier generation and gave a definite answer to the question, 'Why are we here?' The cosmologies of Hoyle and of Milne are just not comprehensible to the majority of men and give no answer at all to the repetition worker who asks, 'Why are we here?' Is it surprising that his tacit assumption, if it were to be formulated in words, is that condemned in the *Book of Wisdom*:

> Because by mere chance were we born,
> And hereafter we shall be as though we had never been:
> Because the breath in our nostrils is smoke,
> And while our heart beateth reason is a spark,
> Which being extinguished, the body shall be turned into ashes,
> And the spirit shall be dispersed as thin air. . . .

It would be tedious to extend the list of changes which have occurred in the last century; all can be summed up into one phrase: we are living in a new world. I have in this paper attempted so far to make the following points:

(1) The influence of the Church has declined in the last half-century.

(2) This is due in part to permanent factors which in the language of traditional theology are designated by the term 'Original Sin.'

(3) The differential factors, those which distinguish our own times from those of our grandfathers, may be summed up in the phrase, 'We are living in a new world.'

The objection to this third point is obvious: it will be said that changes have occurred before. But I maintain that the present changes surpass all that went before in three respects: extent, depth and degree.

First in extent: they are not limited to a few nations or to a single culture group, but extend over the whole world.

Second in depth: the contemporary revolution in thought, culture and manner of life is not confined to an educated elite, but affects the entire population of the Western world and is spreading with great rapidity among the proletariat of the Eastern and of the equatorial countries.

Third in degree: the changes which have occurred in the last fifty years have exceeded in degree any that mankind experienced since the dawn of civilization.

These three points must be reviewed in greater detail.

(1) The world-wide extent of the changes can be illustrated from an experience recounted to me by the Rev. Dr. A. K. Cragg, who now holds the chair of Arabic and Islamics at Hartford Theological Seminary, Connecticut. When in the Middle East he met an Arab who was operating a most complicated piece of machinery for some purpose connected with oil. Dr. Cragg asked him what his occupation had been before he worked for the Oil Company. It transpired that he had been a shepherd, carrying on a manner of life which had not changed in its essentials since long before the time of Abraham. In a matter of months he had leapt over nearly four millenia. Is it surprising that when the Archbishop of York met the Rector of the Moslem University of El Ahrzar in Cairo the Rector told him that there had been 'a striking decline in the number of regular worshippers in the Mosques'? Further south, in the copper-belt, in the groundnuts area and in Johannesburg, the old pattern of culture has been broken up by the influence of technology, and with it the stabilizing power of all religions, Christian, Moslem and Pagan alike. In the East, India now ranks as the fifth or sixth industrial nation in the world, and the people of China, constituting nearly one-quarter of the human race, are in the throes of a revolution unique in their history.

(2) The 'depth' of the revolution can be gauged from a comparison with the eighteenth century when Voltaire declared, 'They are bringing the Sacraments to a dying God,' and thought that the Christian age was over. Yet most of the inhabitants of Great Britain did not so much as know that Voltaire existed. Many of them knew that John Wesley existed, and all of them knew their local incumbents, many of whom resembled Parson Adams and faithfully fulfilled their duty in an age when such work was not easy. Now, on the other hand, when most of us know how to read, but few of us know what to read, the disintegrating effects of the 'acids of modernity' are apparent not only in cultured circles but among all classes of the population alike. In the thirteenth century the intelligentsia, that is, the better informed clergy, were just as gravely alarmed as we are at the threat from the East, and probably with better reason. But the Franklins and the villeins in the country and the journeymen in the towns had hardly heard of the Mongols and were not disturbed as we are to-day by the threat of Russia and the not-so-cold war in Korea.

(3) In degree. A few years ago the late editor of the *Countryman* described the survival in Leicestershire of practices which he rightly described as neolithic. Ever since man took to agriculture, ceasing to be a mere food gatherer and becoming a food

producer, there has never been so profound a revolution as that which is now in process. But the development of agricultural civilization was gradual and sporadic; it never spread, for example, to the Aborigines of Australia. In comparison, the development of mechanical civilization has been like a flash of lightning coming forth from the West and seen even to the East.

When we ponder upon these very familiar facts we can hardly quarrel with the assumption that we are living in a new world. We shall not, therefore, underestimate the strength of the Goliath who has come against us, nor shall we be surprised at our own comparative ineffectiveness. I would personally not say that we are living in a world which has ceased to be Christian or that the Church has failed. It would be preferable to say that the Church has fulfilled her task, with some degree of success, in the world which is passing away, and is faced with the task of evangelizing a new world.

At this point the relevance of Toynbee's *Study of History* becomes obvious. Toynbee points out that Christianity alone among the world religions survived the death of the culture in which it was born, when it responded to the challenge presented by the disintegration of the Roman Empire. Toynbee's biological analogy, his comparison between civilizations and living organisms which react to the challenge of a change in their environment, is of limited value. But it will suffice to make clear the task of adaptation which lies before us. I would not claim that we can prove the existence of God from Toynbee's *Study of History*, nor would I attempt to argue that because the Church survived the death of the culture in which it was born, therefore there is a God and the Church is His instrument. But, if we start from belief in God, we can see the working of His hand in the fact that when Rome died the Church lived on; and whenever we see the hand of God working in the affairs of men our belief in Him is confirmed.

Toynbee's work is illuminated by Professor Latourette. He reminds us that the Church expanded in the first five centuries. This was followed by a decline associated with the fall of Rome, the rise of Islam and the incursions of the north-men. From the tenth century onwards there was an advance in which the Church surpassed her previous peak. In this revival a great part was played by the Cluniac and similar movements, and in our own country by St. Dunstan. The Church grew among the inhabitants of Scandinavia, Central Europe and Russia, and the Crescent was almost eliminated from Western Europe. After the thirteenth century, in spite of the renewal which came through St. Francis and St. Dominic, there was a further decline. But in the sixteenth

century the new lands were evangelized by St. Francis Xavier and by his co-religionists, who made America in some sense a Christian continent. A lull in the eighteenth century was succeeded by the great age of Christian expansion. From 1815 to 1914 the Christian religion, associated with what was then the dominant world culture, established itself in every corner of the globe. Since 1914 it has met with heavy weather due to the growth of Communism and of Nationalism and to the refusal of the equatorial proletariat to rest content with a low standard of life. It is against this background that we must view our own local ministry, a background of world history seen in the light of God's purpose for the human race.

We come back to 'the congregations committed to our charge.' We have in each parish a small nucleus of the faithful led by a diminishing number of clergy. We have a wider circle of 'fringers' who have some knowledge of Christ and who still respond to the preaching of the Gospel or at least recognize its challenge, even though they fail to face it. We have the still wider circle of those who do not recognize a challenge and who do not look to the Churches for a solution of the personal, basically religious problems which they have to face. We remember the words of Studdert Kennedy:

> 'When Jesus came to Birmingham
> They simply passed Him by.'

What are we to do about it? By 'we' I mean the innermost circle of the clergy. We cannot evade our responsibilities by saying 'leave it to the laity.' The laity are fine tinder but it is through the clergy that they must be set ablaze. The Rev. R. H. W. Falconer, in his booklet *Success and Failure of a Radio Mission*, makes it clear that the vision displayed by the laity was far inferior to that of the clergy. It will not do to give the laity their head: we must give them a lead! But we cannot organize 'an ourpouring of the Holy Spirit.' We must content ourselves with preparing the conditions under which the Holy Spirit can work.

In the first place we must continue the ordinary faithful performance of pastoral duties aimed at the edification, in the good sense, of the nucleus. It is now almost universally agreed that the evangelizing unit is not the individual but the group. In the Scottish Radio Mission mentioned above success was generally achieved in those parishes where the minister was supported by an active lay nucleus. If we have a good nucleus, we have the first essential for effective evangelization. We are ministering to an unconscious need, the need for God. Men do not realize that they need God, but they are aware of their need for personal

significance. It is an exaggeration to speak of the present day 'de-personalized mass-society,' but the exaggeration is not very great. A church community where life is personal in a small society can both attract and hold. It is therefore important to maintain parochial organizations, not directly as bait, but as a means of making the fellowship in worship full and real. The theoretical advantages of the parish Eucharist and breakfast are obvious; it would be interesting to know how this new method has worked out in practice.

Secondly, we must evangelize those who have still some contact with the church, and we can do this by adaptation of the conventional technique. On this point I should like to commend Canon Bryan Green's book, *The Practice of Evangelism*, with which I am largely in agreement. I would suggest that groups of clergy, working perhaps on a deanery basis, should meet not merely to discuss this book but to discuss it as a basis for action. Not everything that Canon Green suggests can be carried out in every parish. But if we ask ourselves at every point 'Would this work in my parish?' and go on to ask 'If this would not, what would?' we shall be well on the way to discovering something which is at least worthy trying. It is not, of course, possible to make a hard and fast distinction between (1) the inner circle, (2) those who can be reached by conventional methods, and (3) those whose whole outlook is so different that an entirely new approach must be employed.

In this third task the Church has two valuable handmaids in the B.B.C. and the schools. The Religious Broadcasting Department is doing its work well, though with full awareness of the possibility of and need for improvement, but its work is only ancillary; its task is to spread ground bait. If you want to catch fish you cannot rely upon ground bait alone : somewhere there must be a worm on a hook. The work of the B.B.C. and much of the work in the schools is good of its kind, but largely fails to achieve its purpose because the parishes are not able to follow it up.

In addition to the well-tried conventional methods we need new methods. It is not possible for the Church in its official capacity to raise up prophets, but it is the duty of the Church to recognize and to use them when they are raised up by God. It was God and not the Pope who raised up St. Francis. But it was the privilege of the Pope to recognize the value of the Franciscan movement and to integrate it into the framework of the Church.

In our own day there are many movements in which unconventional methods are employed. I do not believe that any one of them can yet be said to have found the answer : we are not yet in

a position to acclaim a new St. Francis or the John Wesley of the twentieth century. But it is through movements of the kind which I am about to enumerate that the answer will be found. It is our duty to encourage them all : ' In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand, for thou knowest not which shalt prosper, whether this or that, or whether they shall both alike be good.'

Perhaps the best known is the Jocist movement, which has done valuable work in Belgium. In North-east Paris there are priest workmen; this movement has not yet led to any widespread revival, but such experiments are worth making, not instead of, but in addition to the normal work of the Church. In Marseilles there are small cells of lay Christians, working among the dockers, who have achieved some success. Father Algy Roberts informs me that there are also nuns who establish contact by going to dances ! In Scotland there are at least two significant movements. The Iona Community led by George Macleod has not yet bridged the gulf which separates the Church from the slum dweller, but it has thrown a rope across, and the same applies to Canon Ted Wickham's work in the diocese of Sheffield. In the western isles of Scotland there has recently been a straightforward, old-fashioned revival of the evangelical type. The leading influence is that of the Rev. Duncan Campbell. He might not have succeeded in an area which was not dominated by the Scottish Free Church. Here in Bristol the Rev. Mervyn Stockwood has won fame and filled his church by his incursions into the field of politics. It should be noted that his political activities are dominated by pastoral concern for his parishioners. None of these movements can claim to be the answer, but all are examples of a new and unconventional approach. I suggest that such ventures are highly desirable as an addition to the conventional technique.

I would not suggest that any individual incumbent should copy any of the new methods which I mentioned, but I would plead that each one of us should help and pray for all these ventures. It is true that there is bound to be stress between those who are pursuing the ordinary methods and those who are attempting something new, for example, between factory chaplains and parish clergy. But in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries relations between the friars and the secular clergy were not always easy. Where there is life there is frequently strife.

For purposes of discussion I would offer this summary.

(1) The impact of the Church on the nation has declined in the last fifty years.

(2) This is due not only to permanent factors but to the extent and to the rapidity of the changes which justify us in saying that we are living in a new world.

(3) In order to evangelize this new world we must continue in a modified form the ordinary work of the Church, public worship, pastoral visiting and parish missions, with the kind of adaptations of which Canon Bryan Green's book supplies examples.

(4) At the same time we must give reasonable freedom of action to those who feel called by God to strike out on new lines. There have been several such attempts and there will probably be many more. It may well be the case that one or more of these will do for us in the twentieth century what St. Francis did for the thirteenth century and John Wesley for the eighteenth.

What part can the Modern Churchmen's Union play in the evangelization of this new world? In many respects we can do the same work as other people. The Church is faced with new problems, and divisions of opinions about them do not follow the old lines of cleavage. One of our own members, Frank Moyle of Coventry, will serve as an excellent example of a member of our Union who is employing new techniques and who may be compared in this respect with Canon Wickham or with the Rev. Mervyn Stockwood. But we have a specific rôle. The Church must not be tempted to tamper with truth in order to win adherents. At the same time the challenge of the Christian truth must be made effective; and for this reason the Eternal Truth must be presented in contemporary language and thought forms. We as modern churchmen have a special call to bear witness to these two truths and also, I believe, to the need for reunion without, of course, giving the impression that we have any monopoly in this respect.

Finally, may I express the hope that in the ensuing discussion we shall not merely talk and then go back to our several pastoral charges and do nothing. The object of a session like this is that many of us who are present should go back to our regular work and do it more effectively as a result of having attended the 35th Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen.

THE CHRISTIAN VOCABULARY: THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

By Howard E. Root, Senior Demy of Magdalen College, Oxford

OUR sub-title, 'The Problem of Communication,' suggests that we are bothered, anxious, dissatisfied. What is the source of our dissatisfactions? Empty pews in near-empty churches? The oppressive suspicion that Christian civilization is about to go under? The discrepancies, in our Christian world, between Christian profession and Christian behaviour? The seeming ineptitude of the Church to influence or understand huge sections of our populations? The disappearance of 'Christian values' as universally accepted norms in our society, even in the Church? Some of these are conditions which we can observe for ourselves, but most of them are more like inferences which we draw from less troublesome things. Some may be valid and others not. It would save needless anxiety if we could always begin by confining our worry to the things we can observe. But unfortunately the professionals who devote their working energy to worrying about these things sometimes contribute to the confusion and treat them as all the same. 'Christian civilisation' looks like the same kind of label as 'The Parish of St. John's,' and we forget that they are as unlike as any two labels could be. Worse still, we are often told that all these things, of all types, are symptoms of some other underlying, all-pervading *malaise* which has now been accurately and finally diagnosed by Sociologist X or Politician Y or Theologian Z. It is worse still because the form of the argument leads us to believe that this special 'diagnosis' is on the same footing with, say, a straightforward medical diagnosis. And this in turn can conceal from us the great gulf between the two. Our cultural diagnosticians are playing another game according to other sets of rules. They seldom tell us much about their rules, preferring no doubt to make them up as they go along. But, whatever they are, they are not the rules of the physician or physiologist or even psychologist. And if the diagnostician happens to be a Christian, the matter becomes more, not less, complicated.

We are all familiar enough with some of the entries in this catalogue of diagnoses, sometimes formulated by Christians, more often by non-Christians. At times we may pause and say to ourselves, 'Now this chap really has something. If only everybody would vote Conservative or practise Yoga ten minutes a day or support co-operatives or practise birth-control or give more to charity or stop smoking or write to the Prime Minister or refuse to buy

Russian lobster or come to our church every Sunday.' We do sometimes say these things or make mental notes of this kind, but seldom do we let them agitate us for long.

If these are too trivial, we can find others which are very complicated indeed. So complicated that a response of 'Now if everyone would only do . . .' is hardly appropriate. The interesting thing is that most of us, Christian and non-Christian, usually look for answers which do call for this response. And only in a condition of extreme sobriety will we admit that the *if* clause can never be fulfilled. Perhaps, to be really satisfied, we want to find an *if* clause which need not be fulfilled: a paradoxical wish, but our assumptions and thinking on these matters are infested with unproductive paradoxes. With greater originality, we might forget general diagnoses of sick civilizations and confine ourselves to specific problems, without worrying whether they be 'symptoms' or just difficult problems.

The subject of this paper is stated in a way which may lead some to expect a discussion on the lines of 'Now if all Christians everywhere were only more careful about the terms they use . . .' But this is not quite what we shall be up to. Unobtrusively, it may be, the very concepts of 'communication' and of a 'Christian vocabulary' conceal a multitude of half-thought or ill-thought ideas. Our purpose will be to look more closely at the statement of the subject, contending that we know far less about these things than our easy use of the word suggests.

In the first place, what about this notion of communication? Conventionally, three elements are distinguished in those situations of which we say that communication has taken or is taking place: 'Some utterances (*a*) are produced by a speaker, (*b*) induce effects in an interpreter, (*c*) are related to a certain subject matter (which may, but in general will not, include either the speaker or interpreter') (Max Black). It will be useful to keep the distinctions in mind, even though we shall make no use of them as such. For this is not a discussion of what communication is supposed to be. Another useful thing to remember is that the word itself, as Mr. Eliot wrote in another connection, may beg the most important question. However, within the context of discussion by Christians of 'Christianity To-day: Challenge and Opportunity,' the use of the word *communication* seems to hint at something rather special. What is our concern about? Are we claiming that there is some sort of communication peculiar to Christianity or some means of communication peculiar to Christians? Are we anxious about how to transmit religious or theological or 'Christian' knowledge? Do we think we are being misunderstood, that there is

some defect in our instruments, our language, or our own ability? Do we sometimes suspect that our words are just words, that we do not really know what 'subject matter' they refer to? And, when thinking and talking about these problems, are we referring to a mixed bag of difficulties, some of which we have ourselves experienced and some which we only infer to be there for, perhaps, a great variety of reasons? If there is or could be such a thing as a 'problem of communication' then we shall have to isolate it. For as they stand the words could point to a number of problems, or rather, to a series of dissatisfactions.

Generally in schools, sometimes on lecture platforms, and sometimes even in drawing-rooms we make things known or communicate facts, opinions, interpretations, preferences, anxieties, wishes, etc. 'The name of Martin Luther is of prime importance in the history of the Reformation in Germany,' or 'The speculations of Pythagoras preceded and perhaps in some respects influenced those of Plato,' or 'My dear, what a tiresome man he is.' or 'China tea is very nice, isn't it?' etc. And, though more rarely, we sometimes make things of a similar sort known without saying a word: by a nod, a gesture, a raised eyebrow. There is no need here to sort out the distinctions between all these. We do in fact succeed in communicating, in making facts and feelings known. In each instance we succeed because we know what we are doing, know what it is to give a date in history or to characterize a person. Our success is directly proportionate to how well we know how to do it and to the amount of common ground (in education, opinions, preferences, etc.) we share with those who are there to hear or see. I can say that Smith is a tiresome man. If you know Smith, and if we roughly share a common notion of what it is to be tiresome, then my communication will have got through. You may, immediately or upon later reflection, disagree. But this is neither here nor there as far as the success of the communication is concerned. After all, I didn't set out to prove that Smith was tiresome in the first place. I just said it, and you knew what I meant. There are occasions, of course, when we say of someone else: 'Jones' behaviour at Smith's party certainly gave him away, didn't it?' or 'Why, Jones didn't even bother to speak to Smith at the reception yesterday,' And by so saying we claim that Jones in fact 'communicated' things to us without realizing it. Perhaps there is something curious about using the word 'communicate' here at all. We might be happier with 'unwittingly revealed,' or something like that. In these cases the question of success is inapplicable. One can neither succeed nor fail at something one has not set out to do. Or, at least, it would sound very odd to say that Jones

'succeeded' in communicating an opinion of Smith when what lay behind our statement was only our own inference of an opinion from certain things Jones had or had not done.

Communication of one general type aims at being informative. Given adequate circumstances, there is nothing particularly difficult about it. We impart information to others, about things or happenings or ourselves or whatever you like. We succeed if our hearers understand the words we use or can rightly interpret our gestures. We fail if they cannot understand or interpret for any of an infinite variety of reasons. Much more should be said about this, but we must leave communication of this more prosaic sort and go on to another sort. Just one common feature ought to be mentioned. When and if we are asked *what* someone communicated to us, we can generally frame an answer in a simple form: 'He said that' so-and-so or such-and-such. The information which is the substance of the communication is durable stuff and pretty well fits into this kind of mould. It can be relayed by a whole string of people without the aid of strenuous interpretative effort at any stage.

On the other hand, we speak sometimes of people communicating feelings or attitudes or emotions in rather different ways. The very fact that we use the verb 'communicate' to cover these cases as well is interesting. A verb like *express* is probably more general, but few would deny, *e.g.* that communication takes place in the arts. It does make sense to say that the Andante of one of the Beethoven Op. 59 Quartets expresses anguish, or that there is a quality of inscrutability about Leonardo's 'Mona Lisa,' that it expresses this quality. Yet these statements can scarcely be conformed to the mould which served for our conventionally informative communications. We cannot say, 'In this Quartet Beethoven communicates or expresses or says *that* such-and-such.' The words fail to fit. Anguish may well be a quality of the effect which the music has upon us, or it may even have been an anguished state of mind which led Beethoven to compose it. Or his intention may conceivably have been to evoke a sense of anguish in his audience. But we do not normally speak of the Quartet as a 'success' because we can find a word to sum up our reactions to it, or because we can find a memorandum in Beethoven's hand which declares an intention to give a musical translation of some noun or adjective. And yet, as we sit in the concert hall or near our gramophones, or stand in a picture gallery, we are in a communication-situation of some kind. We do not feel disposed to deny that *something* is communicated to us or that we are 'in communication' with something.

Similarly, the poet is said to communicate his attitudes, interpretations and feelings. Indirectly perhaps, metaphorically and through imagery, but none the less to communicate. And in ordinary conversation, and often quite silently, so do we. But unlike the instances where we are directly and avowedly (in principle) bent upon imparting information, whether information *that* or information *about*, the criteria for success are illusive. The success of a poem cannot be measured in terms of the (often unknown) intentions of its author. The success of my gesture of friendliness or disdain cannot be measured by simple reference to whether or not you recognized it or understood it to be such a gesture, or a gesture of such intention. In fact, when we talk of 'success' here we do not seem to have got hold of the right term. Who would be so intrepid as to try to assess conclusively the success of a Mozart Symphony, or of a personal expression of sympathy? We do assess and, in some sense, measure; but success is not the word with which we tie these things up. The conclusion may be that, in using the words communicate and communication for these cases we extend them too far. But this would be a strange thing to say about perfectly ordinary usage, and it is cases like these which may tell us something about our peculiar preoccupations with 'Christian Communication.'

Before going any further something should be said which applies to all the communication-situations we have looked at so far. In each instance, before any kind of communication can be said to take place, a number of prior conditions have to be fulfilled. We presuppose a common language, and, to some extent, a common background of experience, interest, and even belief. This is obvious, but nevertheless interesting. By saying 'Isn't he a tiresome person' we would impart no information to anyone who had not been brought up to understand some rather sophisticated notions current in our social circles. Nor would much be conveyed to a savage by comments on the chronology of Greek philosophers. Nor would Beethoven's Quartets mean much to ears wholly unattuned to traditional musical form as we understand it. Translations from German to French or French to English can be, in these days of UNO discussions, almost simultaneous. But education and experience still take longer. And as for the common beliefs, who is to say what processes would be involved before the communication of many opinions could be readily achieved? Theological discourse is probably the example *par excellence* of communication severely constricted by the narrow limits of shared beliefs. It is possible to *understand* without holding in common. We may grasp the fact that our neighbour

is prejudiced against cats without sharing the prejudice. We may understand that the idea of 'saving face' has special significance for the Japanese without ourselves sharing it. But, as they say, something is lost in the translation. More so, perhaps, in the case of our second group of examples, but possibly with information too. It is difficult to draw rigid lines; these things shade off into one another. Anyhow, we are not trying to formulate a general theory of communication. The point of all the examples adduced and the broad distinction claimed has been to make more manifest the tangle of problems which lie quite near the surface. Any talk about Christian communication is bound to encounter them at some stage, and partially exposing them at the outset may help to prevent us from falling into a number of traps.

One thing should by now be quite clear. As Christians, or in their capacity as Christians, people do indulge in all these forms of communication. By the phrase 'as Christians' is meant that the substance of or motive for some communication would not be the same were they not Christians. Biblical and Patristic scholars, Christians, impart a great deal of information about the subjects which absorb their professional interests. And in so far as we understand and accept their methods of enquiry, their communicating is successful. There is nothing controversial here; their communication succeeds for reasons which have little or nothing to do with whether their audiences are predominantly atheist, Christian or Hindu. If Professor Rowley takes us successively through the steps which lead him to place the Exodus at a certain date, we cannot say that he has failed to communicate even if we dissent from his conclusions. The steps are retraced in public. We may engage him in argument, and may conceivably win him to our point of view, persuade him to change his opinion in the light of an alternative weighing of the evidence. But should this happen, we do not say that his initial communication failed. It was successful, though successful, if you like, in conveying error. We understood what he said quite clearly. Similarly, the theologian's enunciation of doctrinal norms and his exposition of the tenets of Christian belief are, in principle, no different from the Palestinian archaeologist's pronouncements about the ruins of Jericho. They are, truly enough, invariably interpretations, selective in nature, and our arguments with him may not follow the same form as ones with Professor Rowley. Not that anything less is at stake, but something different undoubtedly. It is sometimes claimed, of course, that all theological disputes can be resolved into disputes of scholarship. But such a claim, however interesting, does not materially affect the question of communica-

ion. Whether we reject, accept, or consider them meaningless, he communication of theological ideas is a fairly straightforward usiness.

Less straightforward is the communication of what are called eligious feelings or emotions. Poets and hymnists express their eelings about (or of) Christian things. Painters steeped in Biblical nd traditional lore are said to convey distinctively religious attiudes and feelings. There is neither more nor less difficulty about hese than there was about ordinary expressions of feeling. That s probably one reason why theses on 'The religion of Mr. A as xpressed in his art' are so tantalizingly attractive to try and yet o hard to bring off. In an effort to talk, say, about the religious eelings of Bach as exposed in the B minor Mass we are obliged o fill in so many blanks, to 'interpret' so thoroughly that we can asily be accused of no more than attributing our own reactions o the composer. Still, the B minor Mass, the Madonna and Child, he hymn, the poem all do communicate. And they do so just ecause they mediate or are expressions. The only claim made ere is that Christians do, strictly for reasons rising from their eligious inclinations, communicate in all the senses illustrated efore. And there does not seem to be any problem involved. hey do and will succeed or fail in making information, opinions, nterpretations and feelings known for precisely the same reasons hat people (including themselves) succeed or fail in communiating other sorts of information, opinions, interpretations and eelings.

At this point no doubt someone will want to ask: where exactly as all this taken us? It rather looks as though the very idea of hristian communication is dissolving, or as least as though we ave failed to locate it. When we tabulate some of the varieties of ommunication common in everyday use, and then deny any disinction between these and those we often accept as Christian xamples, what are we up to? The fact seems to be that when we ook closely at all these cases (which in a broader sense are all ypical of only one sort of communication) we cannot find the thing hich is troubling us and makes us uneasy about our situation. he list, as so far presented, simply omits the type of communicaion which gives us our problem. What we must do is to extend ur list.

Perhaps by starting, so to speak, at the other end, we can see he problem more clearly. Many Christians, and not only those ho call themselves evangelical, feel that just being a Christian arries with it the possession of some sort of special message: not ust information and not just diffused feelings. And this message,

it is often thought, is not really made known unless it convinces, changes the perspectives and even behaviour of those who 'hear' it. As people in possession of (or possessed by) an 'evangel,' many Christians are not satisfied that they have got their point of view across unless they make Christians where there were none before. Notice how naturally the expression 'point of view' comes to mind here. There is some difficulty in calling a point of view either a type of information or an expression of feeling. It looks to be rather more complicated. But there is something more interesting to be noticed; when we have come this far, someone will interject, 'Ah, yes, what you mean is that we must not only communicate a message but also show that it is true.' Plainly we have found that the standards for success and failure which applied before will not do. Communication could be successful in the ordinary sense without any truth-demonstrating. Subsequent argument and disagreement spelt a form of success, not of failure. Nothing hinged upon whether we were communicating fact or nonsense. And therefore some will conclude that now, in the Christian case, we must prove as well as make known. One theory which supports this kind of conclusion is familiar. To make known the *truth* of a principle, say a moral one, is in itself to ensure that it will be adopted and followed. Truth, it is said, is coercive. Therefore we begin by showing the truth of Christianity and automatically, if we are speaking the truth, we convince and our audiences are transformed. Perhaps this is too bald a summary. It sounds too much like the rationalism of a Godwin. But something resembling this is at the bottom of the objection. There is no point in arguing it as it stands. Scarcely anyone would choose to defend it in this form. Its importance lies in the way it clarifies the position we are moving toward. The point we would make to the contrary is that persuasive communication, the kind which compels specific reactions of attitude and action, is not dependent for its success upon any sort of proof, validation or verification. To ask how we may improve Christian communication is not to ask how we may validate Christianity or Christian belief. And anyway there is something terribly curious about asking how we are to validate Christianity. What specifically is being asked? Put it the other way around. What kind of sense does this dialogue make?

Believer: So now, I have told you what it means to be Christian. I have gone through all the Christian claims, making them clear: and I have shown what happens to people's lives when they become Christians.

Unbeliever: Yes, very interesting. But so far as I can see all you have done is to make a series of assertions. You have claimed enormous significance for a few historical events and, so far as I can tell, you haven't produced any compelling reasons for me to accept these claims of significance, or, for that matter, any of your claims. I see what you mean all right, but I'm just not convinced. How do I know it's true?

Believer: Well then, let's begin again. This time I will prove each thing I say is true as I go along . . . (and a 'demonstration' follows).

Unbeliever: Aha! Yes, now you have done what I wanted you to do. You have proved all these claims and things. Now I really know that Christianity is true. Now I suppose that makes me a Christian, too.

No, this will not do. But why not? In ordinary situations when we are asked to demonstrate the truth of our assertions about something or other this, roughly, is what we are being asked to do. And, in the most general sense possible, some kind of 'validation' question is probably always lurking behind the non-Christian's inability to 'understand.' We cannot by-pass it altogether. But our purpose here is not to do that. What we meant to show by the dialogue is simply that it is ludicrous to think of *convincing* in this way. Does anyone know of any living cases where Christian communication achieved success with this method? Is it even conceivable that there should be such a case? And even if so, could it possibly be 'proved' in this way? We must beware of becoming so mesmerised by conventional forms for demonstration that we suppose all things communicable to be amenable to them. Without following this lead any further we must simply stress the distinction begun before: successful communication, in the sense in which Christians intend it, is neither identical with nor absolutely bound to a truth-demonstration in any of the forms which we have looked at. That, at least, is not the crux of our problem.

Thus far, mostly problems; some that should bother us and some that we can afford to ignore for the time being. What we have tried to show is that the notion of communication is far from simple, that the word in Christian usage carries with it rather special qualifications, and that we cannot afford to be detained by talk about truth (in general). From this stage onward we could do either or both of two things. We shall in fact do only one; but a word about the other first.

If one can take it for granted that there are essentially two elements in Christian communication, the 'message' itself and the peculiar dynamism which makes it felt as contagious, then it is obvious that we must be pretty clear ourselves as to what constitutes element one; *i.e.* what the message is. There are speakers who can hold audiences spellbound and yet say nothing. But even the crudest advice of a rhetorician is not to be despised: there must be some content, and one is in a better position to make it convincing if he knows precisely what that content is. Therefore, confronted by Christians who are worried about the matter, we can legitimately pose several difficult questions. First, we have all encountered convinced Christians, sometimes in our churches and sometimes distributing tracts on street corners, who are quite clear as to what they wish to make known. We can, perhaps, temporarily confuse them with subtle theologizing. But in most cases their conviction is firm and lasting. Have we (and this is the most far-reaching question one could ask) any such clarity or firmness? If not, have we a substitute which serves equally well? Secondly, a question following out the first. We must, I suppose, be constantly assuming that to be a Christian 'makes a difference' in some way or other. If there were no means for coming to a conclusion as to whether A is or is not a Christian, then surely there would be little point in discussing it at all. And yet, to what extent are we clear as to what this 'difference' is? Many answers have been provided. Sometimes the answers are formulated in terms of a simple assent to certain propositions and at other times in strictly behavioural terms. But the tradition of liberal Protestantism, more noticeable in its American than in its British versions, has been concerned with translation. This is by no means the only, or even the most significant, tradition of liberal Protestantism, but no one could fail to notice how largely the resultant translations do in effect banish rather than clarify all distinctions. At times the difference (if so it may be called in this dress) is purely ethical, aesthetic or, these days, existentialist. The only reason this tendency is worth special notice is that, once accomplished, its instigators cannot be surprised to find themselves left on an extremely shaky limb. For if distinctions are banished, if being a Christian means something which can easily be translated into terms which omit the word Christian, then no reflective non-Christian can be expected to regard the word Christian with much seriousness. The translation may be found quite acceptable in itself. (Is this all that we want?) It may even inspire noble and illuminated behaviour. But, none the less, the distinction between Christian and non-Christian is abolished, and

f we indulge in this sort of thing we must expect the natural consequences. Furthermore, the translations do away with the problem of Christian communication. We can drop the notion altogether and begin to study 'comparative rhetoric' or some such subject.

There is an irony in such efforts of translation. The goals are so often confused. It is sometimes hard to get at what the translators want, what job they expect their translations to do. Do we want larger congregations in our churches, a more equable social order, a more tolerant political atmosphere? Whichever goal our translators choose to sponsor, they must somehow be prepared to show that 'the difference' involved in being a Christian will inevitably entail the sort of behaviour which will bring about their desired end. This could never be an easy task. But if we begin by banishing the word Christian, it becomes not only difficult but impossible. This is not to suggest, of course, that any one or any combination of these goals is what the Christian goal *ought* to be. But most translation talk is so couched as to imply that these are the things that, respectively, count most with the Christians who recommend 'Christianity in translation.' Put so baldly, perhaps none of us will be willing to accept them. But it is worth calculating what our translations sound like to ears untrained in the original language. Whatever stand we choose to take on the essential content of the Christian message, we certainly should know why we are taking it, and we must look far enough forward to see what kinds of behaviour and attitude amongst new Christians we expect to follow upon their conversion. This surely is one area where a real difference might naturally manifest itself. And if we cannot see the sense of these questions, we must give up trying to make any sense of a problem of communication.

So much for the line which we cannot follow any further. We must now explore more fully the tangle of questions which still obscures the idea of Christian communication. In one way such an exploration may help us see our way more clearly when it comes to taking a stand on the content of Christianity. When we start to think seriously about what it is we wish to communicate, we can scarcely ignore the complexity of the question itself. A crucial matter is involved. In beginning to draw up a list of things which constitute Christianity, or 'being a Christian,' or 'being Christian' (and observe how different these three headings sound) we are almost bound to end with a series of items of different (logical) types. And they cannot with any ease be adapted to a simple notion of communication. What should be noticed is that we tend to hop about from 'things' to 'qualities' without clearly

foreseeing the divergent questions they lead to, how widely varied their handling ought to be. For example, it is quite feasible to devise a vocabulary, virtually self-contained, which will give some sense to the classical doctrines, Incarnation, Atonement, etc. That is, we can show what sense has been made of them, how they grew up, the purposes they were aimed to serve. But even though such a vocabulary might furnish the material for an *Instruction in the Faith*, it will not communicate in the rather special Christian sense. The point is that no detailed explication of terms will ever be more than an explication of terms. An explanation will explain only an explanation. Those who bother to listen must already be 'in communication' however (by theological standards) imperfectly.

Similarly we might ask what course would be the best to follow if we wished to convince a hardened traditionalist in music that the works of a modern composer like Hindemith are extremely worth-while pieces of music? We should not, presumably, begin by giving our traditionalist a copy of Hindemith's systematic treatise on Harmony. It might be much more useful to contrive an occasion for getting him to listen to one of Hindemith's earlier, and possibly more traditional works, one, say, where his descendancy from the line of Brahms was clearest. This might arouse curiosity, and the next move would be ours. In other words, we begin as much as possible from where our man's tastes and inclinations lie. Patently, he may refuse to move beyond this first initiation. But then again, he may not. In any event we count on the fact that a process of learning is involved, maybe a very long one. If our tactics fail, we do not discard our method. In some cases it has succeeded. The interesting thing about this example is that we have moved away from the explication of terms (the systematic account of the formal structure of Hindemith's later work) to the simple pointing at qualities and resemblances (with what our man already likes). And the consistency and systematic coherence of explication are not the things which characterize the method. We behave differently depending upon what features we choose to 'communicate.' For the moment we shall reserve further comment upon how far we may, with hope of success, try to push our man from one step to the next, as well as upon how many steps there are in the process. At present we wish only to maintain (to put it into the jargon) that there are various logics of communication, and that 'qualities' in this sense cannot be treated like terms or things.

At the back of our minds there still lurks the old worry about the Christian vocabulary. Based, no doubt, on the examples used

in any school text in rhetoric, the belief persists that if only our Christian terminology were more efficient, more related to other sorts of vocabulary, the task of communication would be eased, if not superseded. It is almost as though we felt the barrier between Christian and non-Christian were merely verbal, in the sense, that is, that could we only achieve greater verbal efficiency we should have no difficulty in the job of persuasion. Now it is obvious that Christian vocabularies (and the plural is used with determination) must always be subject to revision. Christians have been reading, hearing, and saying that since the second century A.D. But when we are paying such lavish devotion to a principle which is so obvious we ought at the same time to beware of falling prey to an equally obvious fallacy. If our action follows a pattern like the following, then we have tripped ourselves up: 'Since Christian words like Sin, Grace, Salvation, Sacrament, etc., mean nothing to non-Christians (begging the question, incidentally, of what they "mean" to Christians), then let them be unceremoniously dropped. And let us, in their place, use words borrowed from the current coinage.' What the substitutions would finally amount to is usually left in the air, but we are free to guess that they will be something very much like the kind of translations mentioned before. 'By Original Sin all we mean is the residual animality of *homo sapiens*.' 'By Salvation all we mean is riddance of anxiety, neuroses, etc.' 'By Conversion all we mean is beginning to live in accordance with the Golden Rule,' etc., *ad. inf.*

There is no need to say again what was said before about these translations. Our question should be: Once effected, will we or will anyone else be satisfied with a strictly behavioural account of what it is to embrace Christianity? If we could wholeheartedly grant that such substitutions truly represent the old terms and leave nothing out, the other problem would remain. It is one thing to make the body of Christian terms intelligible in new translations, but this is less than what we wanted from communication. The fact, of course, is that we shall never get any better translations if we persist in treating our questions of 'what is it to be Christian?', etc., as though they were exactly like other questions of the same grammatical form: what is it to be unselfish, jealous, schizophrenic, temperate, cowardly, etc.? Here we have adjectives which, however loosely, represent various dispositions or classes of dispositions and which for all general purposes can be elucidated or translated in pretty strictly behavioural terms. It must straightway be admitted that much of our descriptive talk will be bound to forms like these. The problem is as to whether we can legitimately hope to treat all our Christian terms this way.

And not only this, but it appears that some of the most interesting exceptions will be those qualities which cannot be treated like terms at all.

For example, most discussions about Christianity begin to flounder when they get around to the Saints. Christians will say with great conviction: 'Mr. A is a perfect example of what it is to be a real Christian. There's just something about him which makes you know that he lives constantly in the presence of God.' There is no use pretending that we do not talk this way. We may always be a bit uneasy about our words, but we cannot seem to push beyond them. Nor are we usually anxious to translate this something-or-other about Mr. A into a complex of dispositions which resolves itself into the things which Mr. A does. Succumbing to a temptation to find a way round the difficulty, we say that the quality which is communicated to us may be partially, but cannot be exhaustively, covered by any list of behaviouristics. And if we are more bold, we may even leap to the answer that the uncovered part is covered neatly by a reference to an inferred relationship between Mr. A and God. But to try to escape by these routes is not only to misconstrue the function of behavioural terms, it is also to relegate God to the task of filling up the dark corners in our descriptions. If there is a way out it lies in refusing to be led astray in the first place by the sort of descriptions which focus our attention wrongly. It may be, for example, that in such cases we are talking about something that has happened to us, not something which should be classed as a character-trait of Mr. A. In which case they call for a very different analysis.

Whatever line we take here (and the decision is a complicated one which demands full discussion in its own right) we shall find ourselves compelled to use a language of imagery and metaphor and in part to encroach upon the territory of poetry. But to admit this is no more to say that our language is about nothing than it is to say that 'The Tempest' or 'Samson Agonistes' or the Odes of Keats are about nothing. Some people are too fond of paradoxes. It might be sententiously proclaimed that a great novel, which is supremely communicative, evocative, illuminating, is really about nothing, no one, no place, no time. But to see a profound paradox here is only myopia. We are wilfully refusing to examine our language. The justification of poetry, if there be a call for such justification, will have to be in terms of the purposes it fulfills. And when we talk about something which has happened to us, the justification of our talk is not a demonstration that our language corresponds with something or other. Rather, that it has the power to make known, to transmit accurately (and perhaps

evocatively as well) our particular feelings, reactions, attitudes. And the more particular they are, the greater our need for poetic language. To assert meaning for our language does not entail establishing its valid 'connection' with 'transcendent fact' of some sort. It does entail showing that it has power to portray and evoke. Finding out whether it has meaning, in other words, is an empirical and not a metaphysical enterprise. This, on some reckoning, makes it a less interesting question than it has usually appeared; but, even at the risk of dullness, there is no good reason why Christians should make their task more difficult than it already is.

The really interesting question, perhaps, is whether the connections and disconnections (as Professor Wisdom is so fond of calling them) which underlie the Christian explanation of attitudes and feelings by relating them to God are ill or well made. Most of us would agree that it is a naïve conception of providence which supports a conviction that it was God's blessing which enabled Johnny's St. Christopher's medal to stop the bullet. We would call it a disconnection, too. But how are any connections, even nicely sophisticated ones, to be established? Not, we take it, in the way that the laboratory researcher establishes a connection between influenza and a particular virus. But this kind of question is not to be confused with the problem of communication as understood here. And to discuss all that is involved would require countless examples and illustrations. One thing, however, is obvious. In using and criticizing metaphor we do not call it 'bad' (or a failure) unless it fails to arouse an appropriate reaction. We do talk about 'misplaced' metaphors (and it may be that religious language is full of howlers), but the question of connection and disconnection does not arise. To say of Shakespeare's simile,

> Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
> So do our minutes hasten to their end . . .

that it shows disconnections because it confuses the relation of the moon to the tides with a strange notion of time, would be a mark of illiteracy rather than analytic acumen.

None the less, we cannot brush aside all the complications in too cavalier a fashion. For, as before, it will be objected that we are begging the whole question of the 'truth' of Christianity. A great deal should be asked about this. What sort of a 'truth' is it that we mean? Is it like the truth we 'discover' in working out a problem in geometry? Or is it like the truth that there are thirty days in September, or like the truth that there are exactly n number of people in this room, or that my wife's eyes are blue?

Or are we perhaps given to using the word truth in special ways in Christian contexts? Certainly sentences like 'I am the way, the truth, and the life' do not seem to have come from the everyday moulds. It might be contended that the whole conception of 'truth' in Christianity has often been radically misconceived in traditional philosophical theology. Orthodoxy has always kept one eye open to this possible curiosity by insisting that when we push our language too far it comes apart in our hands. Orthodoxy, until relatively recently, was seldom happy for long with any metaphysical system. Of this we should make the most. But this idea is never carried very far because it seems to lead to such wild and unmanageable paradoxes. Meanwhile, many go on gaily and even casually trying to do the impossible. And it may be good that the practice is so incorrigible. For in the great systems which finally get so tangled up in themselves, we do find suggestions, insights into the workings of Christian believing. There is, says Professor Wisdom, a preposterous proof for a preposterous theorem which is worth investigating, and in the Systems it is well worth following out and reflecting upon. There is, for example (though we are not applying the adjective 'preposterous'), an important job which the classical proofs of the existence of God can do. But if we conceive them as of similar character to 'proofs' of ordinary kinds, we are, in our way, making the same blunder which we laid at the door of our objector to Shakespeare's simile. No doubt philosophical theology has lots of things to do. But one thing which it can constructively do is to explore as thoroughly as possible the way in which Christians have spoken and do speak about what, in Tillich's expression, is of 'ultimate concern' to them. A good many disconnections there may be, but some surprisingly good connections there are too. And if this job be called a mere dilettante 'criticism of rhetoric' (though who would dare, after St. Augustine, to call it 'mere'?) then we shall have to see what can be done with the label. We may in defence ask for a justification of the more conventional approaches in terms of their actual results to date. What are we to make of their power to unravel the problem of communication?

But to return to the projected translations. Put crudely, the problem is to find out what sort of translations really do *translate*, what sort are permissible because they do not sacrifice any of the content in striving to be generally comprehensible. Once again, the predicament is not unlike one we sometimes find in poetry. It is a universally approved maxim, these days, that any poem worth the name can never be paraphrased without the loss of what makes it poetry. This analogy bears pondering, but even it can be mis-

leading. For one can at least in principle enumerate the factors 'over and above' the paraphrase which make the poem: the language, rhythm, imagery, etc. And this is precisely what we seem unable to do, for example, with the qualities of our Christian saint. How would we set about to enumerate the 'things' which are 'over and above' a list of his character traits? Even so, Christians (and probably non-Christians) will not be satisfied that the paraphrase tells the whole story. Some might choose to devise a formula, rather like Q.E.D., which should conclude every exercise in theology, roughly meaning 'Beyond this we can say no more.' And is this only another way of saying that the question 'What is this lyric about? is an improper question?

We must look to see how far we have come. We started with admonitions about the reductionist fallacy, and we went on to examine the complex problems which arise when we try to discuss the 'quality' of being Christian. Four points could be singled out:

(1) If the expression 'Christian communication' is meaningful, then there must be something distinctively Christian in that which we 'make known,' that which we would attempt to make 'persuasive.'

(2) Translations which result from a banishing of distinctions leave us suspended on a rapidly rotting limb.

(3) In looking to the illustration of the saint, whose quality of life, we say, in itself communicates something to us which we in turn would like to communicate to others without ourselves being saints, we find the reductions unsatisfactory and yet face the dilemma of what more there is to be said. Perhaps, except from the saints themselves, there is nothing more to be said.

(4) The analogy drawn from poetry is helpful exactly where it is most misleading: or, if you prefer, *vice versa*.

Perhaps we have, in devoting so much attention to the saint, taken on too much. What might be called 'Christian phenomena' (without pausing to note the odd things about this expression) are probably more puzzling than Christian terms pure and simple. Although, and this is of chief interest, our normal expectation would be that the 'Christian phenomena,' or people and events called Christian, brought the Christian vocabulary into being. Languages and terminologies do not, in the ordinary way, generate themselves. So that to pretend that we can sort out the Christian vocabulary by restricting ourselves to an examination of that vocabulary alone is a vain pretension. In principle it might be claimed that Christian terms like Redemption and Repentance have been kept alive, if at all, by a continuous stream of 'Christian experience'; but to say this is to raise again the question of con-

nections and disconnections in an acute form. The systems, in an effort to tidy up and render terminologically consistent and to harmonize, inevitably distort. To some extent, it is the very untidy particularity of key words like those in the New Testament which makes them so baffling, so hard to handle, and of such supreme interest and importance.

In short, any Christian vocabulary will drift more and more into meaninglessness the further it drifts away from the particularity of 'Christian phenomena.' Once the tendency to drift is as marked as it is to-day, there seem to be two things which we might do. First, we could go in for 'historical explanation,' taking our audience through the business step by step. It is not easy at best, and such a rehearsal could never be coercive. We will, probably, be making 'connections' which our audience will be loth to follow. In a sense, they will understand only if they already are tempted to make the same connections for themselves. How otherwise could one hope to move from the narrative of Pentecost in *Acts* to an elucidation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? Naturally this kind of (informative) discourse is useful; but it is not our sort of communication. Second, we could make as much as possible out of all the things we like to think of as examples of Christian phenomena. And the words accompanying the pointing will then read: 'By the Pauline idea of "walking by faith" what is meant is the quality of life which informs Mr. X in his actions a, b, and c in situations D, E, and F.' Such 'definitions' are inevitably fallible, and in process of pointing out and referring we shall be guilty of many disconnections. But if we say, 'By this I mean A, standing over there,' then so much at least will be clear. Communication begins to look like a very indirect thing. If a visiting Chinese, before we begin our Sunday dinner, asks me what it feels like to eat Yorkshire pudding, perhaps the best thing I can do is to point to that always rather different and unlike-last-week's piece of Yorkshire pudding on his plate.

No doubt we passed too quickly the most difficult patches. But then, this was meant to be an exploratory exercise, scarcely informative, and certainly not coercive. There is a passage in the Gospel which must be relevant somehow:

> 'And the disciples of John told him of all these things. And John, calling unto him two of his disciples, sent them to the Lord, saying, Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another? And when the men were come unto him, they said, John the Baptist hath sent us unto thee, saying, Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another? . . . And he answered and said unto them, Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and heard; the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, the poor have good tidings preached to them.'

The verses call for reflection. There is a certain *naiveté* in the question of the disciples of John, as though the acceptance or rejection of a title, a formula, was the key to their problem. And the reply suitably directs their attention away from the explosive terms of the situation as it was, whether it be spoken of or not. It was left to them to make or fail to make the connection. And whether they made it or not the situation was the same.

NOTE

Not until this paper was completed did I see an essay by O. K. Bouwsma, 'The Expression Theory of Art' (in *Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press). He makes several points which had not occurred to me, and all that is said above about 'expression' in art could be much improved in the light of his conclusions. While in some ways the implications of Bouwsma's essay make the analogy with art more illusive, they point clearly to the problems which will arise in any talk about the 'expression' of religious feelings and attitudes.

SIGNS OF REVIVAL*

By the REV. H. H. WALSH, M.A., B.D., S.T.M., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Church History, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

THE theme of my sermon is the part which Christianity and the Church could and should play in society — what the objectives before us ought to be in the light of past history and experience. I am going, at the outset, to place before you a pattern of history relative to religious revival; and then endeavour to support this preliminary outline by brief references to the spiritually bleak periods in history, where it seems to me our pattern inevitably emerges in time to restore humanity on 'the road to spiritual recovery.'

In preparation for this Conference I read *English Life and Leisure* by Rowntree and Lavers. It is said that when Pushkin had finished reading *Dead Souls* he exclaimed, 'O Lord, how wretched our Russia is.' *English Life and Leisure* calls forth a similar sigh: the case histories therein are those of dead souls. I think it was a happy coincidence that at about the same time I read *English Life and Leisure* I also read *Waiting on God* by Simone Weil. This latter book reassured me that there are souls

* Sermon preached on September 8, 1952, before the Bristol Conference of Modern Churchmen.

still very much alive in our decadent age and also provided me with a text for my sermon. It is *Genesis* vi, 5-9; the translation is Simone Weil's:

> 'God seeing that the misdeeds of man were multiplied on earth, and that the thoughts of his heart were continually bent upon evil . . . was grieved inwardly with sorrow, but there was Noah. "Noah was a just man, and perfect in his generation, and he walked with God."'

One of the great consolations of history is the sudden and surprising appearance in bleak ages like our own of Noahs. The pattern of history that I now submit for your consideration is built around Noahs, obscure men and women, who are friends of God in a far more intimate sense than is the case with most of us, and who are charged with an authentic message to their age. One of the characteristics of a bleak age is the disappearance of all objective standards and values; so these friends of God seek for truth in the inmost part of man; they are what we would to-day call Existentialists, who push down deep into themselves, but they ultimately rise above the rational soul to an object that transcends all mutability. In order to find solitude for such an inner examination they often flee the world for the cloister, but at the same time never lose contact with visible things. They are always concerned about God's little ones and are anxious to share their new found truth with all those who seek for guidance in a chaotic world. Usually, there is a time-lag before the renewed vision of God achieves its full effect upon social life, and during this period there spring up 'societies of the concerned,' who by following an ascetic way of life create 'centres of disinterested opinion' to which the mass of men turn for objective standards of value, free from the taint of vested-interest. Finally, there emerges a great religious revival or an age of faith, and society becomes strong and vigorous once more.

There is another very important aspect intrinsic to our pattern that we must not overlook. A decadent age is invariably subject to irrational outbursts of violence and witch-hunting, and so it is part of the function of the pioneers of a religious revival to make a frontal attack upon the demonic element in human nature. Such an attack puts them at cross purposes with the established order of things and particularly with the Church, from which the demons of self-interest and blind reaction are never far distant.

As an illustration of this pattern one turns first to the fifth century of the Christian era, which was about as bleak as any in human history. During this century there lived two men who had more influence in Christian thought than any other two since New

Testament times — St. Augustine of Hippo, and Dionysius the Areopagite. The latter certainly fulfills the element of surprise and obscurity in our pattern. His exact date is still a matter of debate and we only know him under a pseudonym. Nevertheless, we are indebted to him for the fact that the mighty stream of truth that had emerged from Greece for over eight hundred years did not come to an end with the closing of the doors of the Athenian Academy. His *Celestial Ladder* for over fifteen hundred years has helped many a pilgrim on the way up to the Eternal.

Dionysius' contribution to the resuscitation of Europe after the prostration of Greco-Roman culture is only excelled by St. Augustine's. No one has ever been more sensitively aware of the demon in man's soul, nor has anyone ever pleaded more eloquently the need of predestinating grace, if mankind is to be saved from cosmic folly, than the Bishop of Hippo. There would seem to be little doubt that his stern attack on the classical error, man's self-sufficiency, saved Europe for many centuries from the suicidal tendencies that are so starkly evident to-day.

As we must expect, there was a considerable time-lag before the new Europe began to take definite form. Dionysius' writings were completely neglected for a long time, though there is a casual reference to them by Gregory the Great; and it is possible that they may have played some minor part in the Benedictine revival which began to lay the foundations of Western civilization. However, the Carolingian Empire, which emerged from this revival, seems to have been the fulfilment of Augustine's dream rather than the Areopagite's.

This short-lived Carolingian venture into an age of faith was followed by an era almost as bleak as that which followed upon the collapse of the antique empire. So once again there appears a Noah in the most unexpected quarter, namely, John the Scot from Ireland. Not the least of his contributions to the spiritual welfare of Europe was his translation into Latin, just in the nick of time, of the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite; but he also made a considerable benefaction of his own drawn from the depths of his inner consciousness.

The speculations of John the Scot, unfortunately, had little effect upon the materialistic religion of his time; like his master Dionysius, he was suspected of heresy and so remained under a cloud for a while. However, in the twelfth century his influence is clearly evident in the great Cistercian revival in which St. Bernard of Clairvaux is the dominant figure. Also, behind this twelfth-century flowering, which really gave the Age of Faith its distinctive colouring, was a wave of asceticism that had been set

in motion by Peter Damian and his flagellating hermits. Though the extremes of asceticism indulged in by these hermits are almost beyond belief, yet it may well be that such self-expiatory exercises alone made it possible for Hildebrand and his Cluniacs to lay the basis of a Christian Republic. Be that as it may, the hopes and dreams of Dionysius, St. Augustine and John the Scot ultimately received their highest expression in the life of St. Francis Assisi and the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas. Making full allowance for all the monstrous crimes and the petty wars of the Age of Faith, it is generally conceded that it was one of the truly creative eras of human history.

It came to an end, however, even while Dante was expressing its transcendent ideal in the most sublime poetry of all time; and it was followed by a bleak period with numerous parallels to our own age. The failure of the Crusades, the Babylonian Captivity and the recurrent scourges of the Black Death created a state of mind which is no longer strange to the twentieth century. Also, like our own age, the two centuries preceding the Reformation were bold and liberal in philosophy, religion and politics. The great Conciliar efforts for the restoration of the social and religious life of Europe were just as intelligently planned as our own ecumenical gatherings, but they resulted in the same dreary deterioration.

Viewing it from our own perspective we can see, despite the best endeavours of Church and State, that the real creative efforts for revival were taking form in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries among outlawed Christian groups. The most effective of these were the Friends of God, who claimed a Dominican monk, Eckhart, as their master. According to a Papal Bull of 1329, Meister Eckhart was guilty of propagating seventeen heretical propositions; nevertheless, he is now regarded as one of the great watershed men of history who thought many of the new thoughts that brought about not only the Reformation but the Counter-Reformation as well. In the words of Rufus Jones,

> 'No mystic has ever dropped his plummet deeper into the mysteries of the Godhead, nor has there ever been a bolder interpreter of those mysteries in the language of the common people.'

Unfortunately, this common parentage did not prevent the two wings of the sixteenth-century revival from engaging in a disastrous civil war, which created the religious apathy of the eighteenth century.

I have only time to pause very briefly on the spiritual deadness and the shocking immoralities of the Age of Reason; and will

limit myself to the Anglo-Saxon world. Nor is it necessary to say anything about England before and after Wesley. Bready has done that. But it is perhaps well to remind ourselves that England before Wesley is even more depressing reading than *English Life and Leisure*. The sports of the eighteenth century as described in Bready's book make modern greyhound racing appear as a highly cultured form of entertainment. But not all the credit for the great change that came over the Anglo-Saxon world as a result of the evangelical revival can go to Wesley.

Behind Wesley was William Law, who, though confessedly an orthodox Anglican, was in more fundamental opposition to the Church of England than the founder of Methodism. As J. B. Green has said, Law felt that

> 'there were breaches and intrusions in the basic harmony of the universe which required deeper explanations than Anglican theology was prepared to give.'

That Law's influence had penetrated to remote corners of the world previous to the Wesleyan revival can be illustrated from my own native land. In the Maritime Provinces there was a 'Great Awakening' in the eighteenth century under the leadership of a farm boy, Henry Alline, who had avidly read the works of William Law. He it was who prepared the ground for the later Wesleyan revival under the guidance of William Black. Nor should we overlook the fact that Jonathan Edwards in New England was asserting the inwardness and spirituality of true religion before Whitefield appeared upon the scene. In other words, a 'Great Awakening' both in New England and in the Maritime Provinces preceded the 'Great Revival' that later swept across the continent of America. Recalling these earlier 'awakenings' does not depreciate the work of John Wesley. In the final analysis it was his remarkable organizing ability that brought about, as Latourette has emphasized, 'the most extensive geographical spread of Christianity' in its history. At the same time it is to be regretted that this eighteenth-century revival was greater in expanse than in depth. It was an integral part of the Romantic Movement, which has raised more doubts than it has dispelled.

I have now reached the place where we pass from history to prophecy; and historians are fearful of prophecy. One thing, however, seems abundantly clear from our survey: *signs of revival must be sought outside conventional church channels.* Also, we must remain very wary of officially planned recalls to religion. These of late years have been an embarrassment. The tough mind of Hensley Henson early perceived their weaknesses. While the

'National Mission' of the first world war was under way he wryly remarked in his *Journal*:

> 'If religious revival is to take place in our time, I suspect it will come from outside the Church, not from inside. This much trumpeted "National Mission" appears to be become more utterly conventional every day.'

It is is because of their less conventional approach to the problem of our time that I am inclined to look rather closely at the existentialists. I am aware that they have been denounced by Noberto Bobbio as the philosophers of decadentism, which he defines as 'an irrevocable withdrawal of man into himself.' But withdrawal has always been the herald of a new vision of the Transcendent. And we must question whether the withdrawal is irrevocable. Bobbio's denunciation includes Kirkegaard, and Kirkegaard's saga is so much like that of the great watershed men of the past that Bobbio's denunciation seems to complete the pattern. Kirkegaard's long neglect for almost a hundred years, his feud with the officials of his Church, his appeal away from the illusion of things to the reality that belongs to God alone, make him one with Dionysius, Augustine and Eckhart. His praise of solitude and his fear of mass society has the ring of the cloister, and his rejection of marriage shows his sympathy with asceticism. Though he was suspicious of mystics, yet he is not far removed from them when he declares 'that what Christ communicates to man is the incommunicability of God.' Above all, in the middle of the self-assured nineteenth century, he perceived the deadly demon lurking in modern culture and made the 'heroic choice of Christianity as against modern culture.'

Existentialism, at the moment, may not look like a very hopeful way back to God. Some of Kirkegaard's descendants seem to have abandoned all objective standards and values, which is what Professor Joad calls 'dropping the object' — another definition of decadentism. One can heartily agree with Professor Joad that

> 'it is not in self-absorption but in self-forgetfulness that the key to zestful living and fruitful reproducing is to be found.'

Yet it is sometimes necessary for a mentally sick person to go through a long period of self-analysis before he can again gain contact with the external world and enjoy zestful living; so it is perhaps necessary for a mentally sick society to go through an existentialist stage before it can again gain contact with the Eternal and enjoy zestful living. For this reason I think we must remain alert and sympathetic while our existentialist friends explore their inner existence.

Some of them, like Heidigger and Sartre, seem to have come o empty-handed. But there are signs that as they penetrate more eeply they will find something more fruitful than phenomenology. he conversional tendency of Sartre has theistic implications. is most important service so far, as Philip Mairet suggests, is in aising precisely the questions which so many in this age are ixious, in the name of dogmatic scientism, to suppress.'

However, there are more hopeful portents for the future of e religious spirit among the less secular existentialists. The eology of Barth and Brunner could hardly have been written ithout the pioneer work of Kirkegaard. When Rheinold Niebuhr rites a book entitled *The Irony of American History*, one recalls at *The Concept of Irony* was the title of Kirkegaard's thesis for master's degree, which may be the clue to Niebuhr's penetrating tack upon the 'demonic element in American idealism.' Also ere is Berdyaev, who immersed himself more deeply than all e others

> 'in the depth of human existence, and there he came face to face with the ineffable mystery of the world and of all that is, and was made poignantly and burningly aware that the world cannot be self-sufficient, that there is hidden in some still greater depth a mysterious transcendent meaning.'

A common characteristic of all existentialists, which adds lustre their cause, is their concern for the autonomy of the individual. imone Weil, because of this concern, reluctantly remained out- de the Church.

> 'Undoubtedly,' she writes, 'there is a real intoxication in being a member of the Mystical Body of Christ. But to-day a great many other mystical bodies, which have not Christ for their head, produce an intoxication in their members which to my way of thinking is of the same order.'

Such fear on the part of a very saintly character, that she ight lose her vision of God through involvement in the Church, ght not to surprise members of the Modern Churchmen's Union. ean Inge, long ago, warned us that 'a rebirth of religion would e independent of the churches and not too kindly regarded by the clesiastics.'

If Simone Weil and those like her represent a genuine rebirth religion, then we must expect this tension with the Church. evertheless, it would seem to me that it is the special vocation of is Union to be ready to give attentive hearing when the wind ows in unusual quarters. For it has long been one of your aims, s expressed by Dean Matthews at a former conference,

> 'to be ready to welcome any new truth which comes to light, believing that the truth shall make us free, and that those who are "of the truth"

will be willing to listen to the revelation which comes to our generation, as well as that which has come to generations that are past.'

As your topic indicates, you are here in a mood of response to the challenge of contemporary society. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the magnitude of the challenge. 'In all history now known,' says Simone Weil, 'there has never been a period in which souls have been in such peril as they are to-day in every part of the globe. She also observes that 'a new kind of saintliness is demanded by the present moment itself without precedent.' One must admit the difficulty for those whose deepest inclination is a rationally ordered Universe to comprehend the intuitive speech of the existentialists. But again Dean Inge seems to have prepared the members of this Conference for such comprehension, since from the turn of the century he has been urging the mystical way to reality, and both mysticism and existentialism are intuitive. By listening carefully and patiently to these new teachers we may receive that overwhelming assurance of a transcendent reality which is the most necessary preliminary to a religious revival. Listening, however, is not enough. There must be communication and fellowship with all those who are concerned for a frontal attack upon the demonic element in modern society; and there must be suffering, since no true witness has ever been made without suffering. Nor need all this dismay us.

On the contrary, there should be a spirit of exhilaration that we have been called upon to witness in an age of cosmic upheavals. Let our response be in the accents of eternal hope as expressed by Hildegarde when things were going very badly in twelfth-century Germany:

'Divine justice shall have its hour. . . . The judgments of God are about to be accomplished; the Empire and the Papacy, sunk in impiety, shall crumble away together . . . but upon their ruins shall appear a new nation . . . the heathen, the Jews, the worldly and the unbelieving, shall be converted together; springtime and peace shall reign over a regenerated world, and the angels will return with confidence to dwell among men.'